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Semantic Scholar18. ACM-EC 2017: Cambridge, MA, USA
Constantinos Daskalakis, Moshe Babaioff, Hervé Moulin:
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC '17, Cambridge, MA, USA, June 26-30, 2017. ACM 2017, ISBN 978-1-4503-4527-9
Plenary session
1a: Static Revenue Maximization 1
- Andrew Chi-Chih Yao:
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions: Maximum Revenue Determination and Comparison. 3-20 - Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden:
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service. 21-38 - Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case. 39-40 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Nima Haghpanah, Christos-Alexandros Psomas:
Optimal Multi-Unit Mechanisms with Private Demands. 41-42
1b: Peer Predictions
- Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
The Double Clinching Auction for Wagering. 43-60 - Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah:
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. 81-98
2a: Matching 1
- Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li:
The Stochastic Matching Problem: Beating Half with a Non-Adaptive Algorithm. 99-116 - Yash Kanoria, Daniela Sabán:
Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms: Restricting Agent Actions. 117 - Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer:
Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match. 121-122
2b: Predictions and Queries
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Annie Liang, Sendhil Mullainathan:
The Theory is Predictive, but is it Complete?: An Application to Human Perception of Randomness. 125-126
3a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 1
- Dirk Bergemann, Francisco Castro, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex Post Participation Constraints. 163-164 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme:
Dynamic Mechanisms with Martingale Utilities. 165 - Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart:
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers. 167-168 - José R. Correa, Patricio Foncea, Ruben Hoeksma, Tim Oosterwijk, Tjark Vredeveld:
Posted Price Mechanisms for a Random Stream of Customers. 169-186
3b: Economic Equilibrium
- Frank Cheng, Michael P. Wellman:
Accounting for Strategic Response in an Agent-Based Model of Financial Regulation. 187-203 - Erik Brinkman, Michael P. Wellman:
Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets. 205-221 - Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer:
Potential Function Minimizers of Combinatorial Congestion Games: Efficiency and Computation. 223-240
4a: Matching 2
- Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. 243-244 - Saeed Alaei, Pooya Jalaly Khalilabadi, Éva Tardos:
Computing Equilibrium in Matching Markets. 245-261 - Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi:
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets. 263 - Ravi Jagadeesan:
Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks. 265
4b: Voting
- Gerdus Benade, Anson Kahng, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Making Right Decisions Based on Wrong Opinions. 267-284 - Ashish Goel, Anilesh Kollagunta Krishnaswamy, Kamesh Munagala:
Metric Distortion of Social Choice Rules: Lower Bounds and Fairness Properties. 287-304 - Yu Cheng, Shaddin Dughmi, David Kempe:
Of the People: Voting Is More Effective with Representative Candidates. 305-322
5a: Static Revenue Maximization 2
- Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. 323 - Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar:
Price Doubling and Item Halving: Robust Revenue Guarantees for Item Pricing. 325-342 - Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. 343 - Gerardo Berbeglia, Gwenaël Joret:
Assortment Optimisation under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments. 345-346
5b: Information Games
- David Lingenbrink, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers. 347 - Sampath Kannan, Michael J. Kearns, Jamie Morgenstern, Mallesh M. Pai, Aaron Roth, Rakesh V. Vohra, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Fairness Incentives for Myopic Agents. 369-386
Best Paper and Best Dissertation presentations
6a: Scheduling
- Shuchi Chawla, Nikhil R. Devanur, Janardhan Kulkarni, Rad Niazadeh:
Truth and Regret in Online Scheduling. 423-440 - Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty. 441-458
6b: Fair Division 1
- Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. 459-460
7a: Dynamic Revenue Maximization 2
- Sébastien Bubeck, Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Rad Niazadeh:
Online Auctions and Multi-scale Online Learning. 497-514 - Siddhartha Banerjee, Daniel Freund, Thodoris Lykouris:
Pricing and Optimization in Shared Vehicle Systems: An Approximation Framework. 517 - Aaron Roth, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Jonathan Ullman, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Multidimensional Dynamic Pricing for Welfare Maximization. 519-536
7b: Experiments
- Apostolos Filippas, John Joseph Horton:
The Tragedy of your Upstairs Neighbors: Is the Negative Externality of Airbnb Internalized? 537-538 - Shrabastee Banerjee, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Georgios Zervas:
Interacting User Generated Content Technologies: How Q&As Affect Ratings & Reviews. 539 - Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri, James R. Wright:
Learning in the Repeated Secretary Problem. 541 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Matthew O. Jackson:
Diffusion in Networks and the Unexpected Virtue of Burstiness. 543
8a: Mechanism Design -- General
- Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, George Christodoulou, Evangelos Markakis:
Truthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness. 545-562 - Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies. 563-564 - Sophie Bade, Yannai A. Gonczarowski:
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness. 565
8b: Decision Making and Learning
- Ilan Lobel, Renato Paes Leme, Adrian Vladu:
Multidimensional Binary Search for Contextual Decision-Making. 585 - Ger Yang, Georgios Piliouras, David Basanta:
Bifurcation Mechanism Design - from Optimal Flat Taxes to Improved Cancer Treatments. 587
9a: Auctions -- Equilibrium
- Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu, Mingfei Zhao:
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms. 589-590 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Stefano Turchetta:
Approximately Efficient Two-Sided Combinatorial Auctions. 591-608 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Yonatan Gur:
Learning in Repeated Auctions with Budgets: Regret Minimization and Equilibrium. 609
9b: Fair Division 2
- Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta:
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. 611-628 - Siddharth Barman, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy:
Approximation Algorithms for Maximin Fair Division. 647-664
Plenary session
- Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes:
Graphons: A Nonparametric Method to Model, Estimate, and Design Algorithms for Massive Networks. 665-672
10a: Matching 3
- John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Westkamp:
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms. 673-674 - Benjamin N. Roth, Ran I. Shorrer:
Making it Safe to Use Centralized Markets: Epsilon - Dominant Individual Rationality and Applications to Market Design. 677
10b: Strategic Games
- Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games. 693 - Soheil Behnezhad, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
A Polynomial Time Algorithm for Spatio-Temporal Security Games. 697-714
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last updated on 2018-04-25 19:18 CEST by the dblp team