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ORCID12th WINE 2016: Montreal, Canada
- Yang Cai
, Adrian Vetta:
Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December 11-14, 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10123, Springer 2016, ISBN 978-3-662-54109-8 - Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Equilibria with Partial Commitment. 1-14 - Artur Czumaj, Argyrios Deligkas, Michail Fasoulakis, John Fearnley, Marcin Jurdzinski, Rahul Savani:
Distributed Methods for Computing Approximate Equilibria. 15-28 - Argyrios Deligkas, John Fearnley, Rahul Savani:
Inapproximability Results for Approximate Nash Equilibria. 29-43 - Hau Chan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Ruta Mehta:
Multilinear Games. 44-58 - Xiaotie Deng, Zhe Feng, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Power-Law Distributions in a Two-Sided Market and Net Neutrality. 59-72 - Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers. 73-86 - Weina Wang, Lei Ying, Junshan Zhang:
Buying Data from Privacy-Aware Individuals: The Effect of Negative Payments. 87-101 - Aris Anagnostopoulos, Ruggiero Cavallo, Stefano Leonardi, Maxim Sviridenko:
Bidding Strategies for Fantasy-Sports Auctions. 102-115 - Rad Niazadeh, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Competitive Equilibria for Non-quasilinear Bidders in Combinatorial Auctions. 116-130 - Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions. 131-144 - Elliot Anshelevich, Koushik Kar, Shreyas Sekar:
Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets. 145-159 - Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
A Prior-Independent Revenue-Maximizing Auction for Multiple Additive Bidders. 160-173 - D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. 174-187 - Christos Tzamos, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue. 188-206 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Qiang Zhang:
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Pricing in Matching Markets with Budgets. 207-220 - Dimitris Fotakis, Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot:
Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences. 221-235 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Zihan Tan:
Truthful Facility Assignment with Resource Augmentation: An Exact Analysis of Serial Dictatorship. 236-250 - Yuqing Kong, Katrina Ligett, Grant Schoenebeck:
Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling Focal. 251-264 - Elliot Anshelevich, Shreyas Sekar:
Truthful Mechanisms for Matching and Clustering in an Ordinal World. 265-278 - Gilles Barthe, Marco Gaboardi, Emilio Jesús Gallego Arias, Justin Hsu, Aaron Roth, Pierre-Yves Strub:
Computer-Aided Verification for Mechanism Design. 279-293 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Bojana Kodric:
Smoothness for Simultaneous Composition of Mechanisms with Admission. 294-308 - Susanne Albers, Dennis Kraft:
Motivating Time-Inconsistent Agents: A Computational Approach. 309-323 - Piotr Skowron:
FPT Approximation Schemes for Maximizing Submodular Functions. 324-338 - Tobias Brunsch, Michael Etscheid, Heiko Röglin:
Bounds for the Convergence Time of Local Search in Scheduling Problems. 339-353 - Rupert Freeman, Samuel Haney, Debmalya Panigrahi:
On the Price of Stability of Undirected Multicast Games. 354-368 - Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficiency and Budget Balance. 369-383 - Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala:
The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem. 384-399 - Liad Blumrosen, Yehonatan Mizrahi:
Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading. 400-413 - Georgios Amanatidis, Georgios Birmpas, Evangelos Markakis:
Coverage, Matching, and Beyond: New Results on Budgeted Mechanism Design. 414-428 - Sanjeev Goyal, Shahin Jabbari, Michael J. Kearns, Sanjeev Khanna, Jamie Morgenstern:
Strategic Network Formation with Attack and Immunization. 429-443 - Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Luca Moscardelli:
Opinion Formation Games with Dynamic Social Influences. 444-458 - Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu:
Complex Contagions on Configuration Model Graphs with a Power-Law Degree Distribution. 459-472
Abstracts
- Itai Feigenbaum, Yash Kanoria, Irene Lo, Jay Sethuraman:
The Magician's Shuffle: Reusing Lottery Numbers for School Seat Redistribution. 475 - Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings. 476-477 - Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Multi-unit Facility Location Games. 478-479
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