Stop the war!Остановите войну!
for scientists:
default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 43
Volume 43, Number 1, February 2014
- André Casajus:
Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value. 1-11 - Yakov Babichenko:
How long to Pareto efficiency? 13-24 - Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler
, Burkhard C. Schipper:
When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? 25-36 - Jean Derks, Hans Peters, Peter Sudhölter:
On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games. 37-63 - Maria Vittoria Levati, Matthias Uhl, Ro'i Zultan:
Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox". 65-88 - Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi:
Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games. 89-135 - Daniel Monte:
Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory. 137-143 - Jason Teutsch:
A savings paradox for integer-valued gambling strategies. 145-151 - Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga, Shigehiro Serizawa:
A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model. 153-168 - Tadeusz Radzik:
Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games. 169-192 - Ziv Hellman:
Countable spaces and common priors. 193-213 - Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar Wolfstetter:
Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire. 215-244
Volume 43, Number 2, May 2014
- Kfir Eliaz, Roberto Serrano:
Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners' dilemma. 245-267 - Alex Fink, Aviezri S. Fraenkel, Carlos Pereira dos Santos:
LIM is not slim. 269-281 - Igal Milchtaich:
Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games. 283-350 - René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan, Valeri A. Vasil'ev:
Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players. 351-368 - Arieh Gavious, Yizhaq Minchuk:
Ranking asymmetric auctions. 369-393 - Carlos Pimienta, Jianfei Shen:
On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria. 395-402 - José Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto:
Monotonic models and cycles. 403-413 - Will Johnson:
The combinatorial game theory of well-tempered scoring games. 415-438 - Eun Jeong Heo:
The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain. 439-454 - Antonio Jiménez-Martínez:
Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games. 455-485
Volume 43, Number 3, August 2014
- Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders. 487-514 - Ron Siegel:
Contests with productive effort. 515-523 - Ronald Stauber:
A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs. 525-550 - Daniel Carvalho, Luís Santos-Pinto:
A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game. 551-577 - Vikram Manjunath:
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped. 579-597 - Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives. 599-618 - Anirban Kar, Arunava Sen:
The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare. 619-627 - Rabah Amir, Giuseppe de Feo:
Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly. 629-658 - Josep Freixas, Sascha Kurz:
On \({\alpha }\) -roughly weighted games. 659-692 - Naoki Kojima:
Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach. 693-719
Volume 43, Number 4, November 2014
- Abhimanyu Khan:
Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation. 721-745 - Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman:
Voting power and proportional representation of voters. 747-766 - Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states. 767-789 - Ron Lavi, Ella Segev:
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals. 791-819 - Julio González-Díaz, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez:
Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games. 821-843 - Christian Trudeau:
Linking the Kar and folk solutions through a problem separation property. 845-870 - Jesús Getán, Jesús Montes, Carles Rafels:
A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes. 871-879 - Christian W. Bach, Andrés Perea:
Utility proportional beliefs. 881-902 - Abhimanyu Khan, Ronald J. A. P. Peeters:
Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play. 903-924 - Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent Vannetelbosch, Wouter Vergote:
Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems. 925-943 - János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan, Koos Vrieze:
Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \) -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon. 945-951 - Akira Okada:
The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification. 953-973 - Jiuqiang Liu, Xiaodong Liu:
Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies. 975-990 - Zacharias Maniadis:
Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium. 991-1008
a service of 
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-04-22 20:02 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
