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ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 46
Volume 46, Number 1, March 2017
- Gilad Bavly:
Uncertainty in the traveler's dilemma. 1-12 - Zhe Yang:
Essential stability of \(\alpha \) -core. 13-28 - Emiliya Lazarova, Dinko Dimitrov:
Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty. 29-49 - Thomas Gall
:
Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities. 51-78 - Ezra Einy, Mridu Prabal Goswami, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela:
Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information. 79-102 - Ayse Canan Yazici:
Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems. 103-124 - Zhiwei Cui, Yan-An Hwang:
House exchange and residential segregation in networks. 125-147 - Toshiyuki Hirai:
The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency. 149-166 - M. Ali Khan, Yongchao Zhang:
Existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bayesian games: a sharpened necessity result. 167-183 - Chih Chang, Cheng-Cheng Hu:
A non-cooperative interpretation of the kernel. 185-204 - Joss Sánchez-Pérez:
A decomposition for the space of games with externalities. 205-233 - Ching-Jen Sun:
Dynamic price dispersion in Bertrand-Edgeworth competition. 235-261 - Endre Boros, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino:
A nested family of \(\varvec{k}\) -total effective rewards for positional games. 263-293
Volume 46, Number 2, May 2017
- André Casajus, Harald Wiese:
Scarcity, competition, and value. 295-310 - Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Klaus Ritzberger:
Characterizations of perfect recall. 311-326 - Karl Jandoc, Ruben Juarez:
Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation. 327-355 - Dimitrios Xefteris, Didier Laussel, Michel Le Breton:
Simple centrifugal incentives in spatial competition. 357-381 - Jian Yang:
A link between sequential semi-anonymous nonatomic games and their large finite counterparts. 383-433 - Mehmet Karakaya, Bettina Klaus:
Hedonic coalition formation games with variable populations: core characterizations and (im)possibilities. 435-455 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses:
Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality. 457-473 - Michal Król:
On the equivalence of quantity competition and supply function competition with sunk costs. 475-486 - Jaeok Park:
Competitive equilibrium and singleton cores in generalized matching problems. 487-509 - Pablo Brañas-Garza, Debrah Meloso, Luis Miller:
Strategic risk and response time across games. 511-523 - Hans Peters, José Manuel Zarzuelo:
An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index. 525-545 - Tanya Khovanova, Karan Sarkar:
P-positions in modular extensions to Nim. 547-561 - Volker Hahn:
On the drawbacks of large committees. 563-582 - Jonathan Newton:
The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity. 583-589 - Joseph Y. Halpern:
Erratum to: A nonstandard characterization of sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium. 591-594
Volume 46, Number 3, August 2017
- Fabrizio Germano, Peio Zuazo-Garin:
Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria. 595-629 - Koji Yokote:
Weighted values and the core in NTU games. 631-654 - Ilan Kremer, Zvi Wiener, Eyal Winter:
Flow auctions. 655-665 - Sergiu Ungureanu:
Dynamic contracting under permanent and transitory private information. 667-692 - Elisabeth Schulte, Mike Felgenhauer:
Preselection and expert advice. 693-714 - Takaaki Abe, Yukihiko Funaki:
The non-emptiness of the core of a partition function form game. 715-736 - Ottorino Chillemi, Benedetto Gui, Lorenzo Rocco:
Community repeated interaction and strategic delegation. 737-760 - Sujatha Babu, Nagarajan Krishnamurthy, T. Parthasarathy:
Stationary, completely mixed and symmetric optimal and equilibrium strategies in stochastic games. 761-782 - Soumendu Sarkar:
Mechanism design for land acquisition. 783-812 - Vladimir A. Karamychev, Bauke Visser:
Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning. 813-850 - Krzysztof R. Apt, Bart de Keijzer, Mona Rahn, Guido Schäfer, Sunil Simon:
Coordination games on graphs. 851-877 - Azar Abizada:
Paths to stability for college admissions with budget constraints. 879-890
Volume 46, Number 4, November 2017
- Lukás Adam, Tomás Kroupa:
The intermediate set and limiting superdifferential for coalitional games: between the core and the Weber set. 891-918 - Giulia Cesari, Roberto Lucchetti, Stefano Moretti:
Generalized additive games. 919-939 - Jiuqiang Liu:
Existence of competitive equilibrium in coalition production economies with a continuum of agents. 941-955 - Pingzhong Tang, Hanrui Zhang:
Unit-sphere games. 957-974 - Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal:
Asymptotic equivalence between Cournot-Nash and Walras equilibria in exchange economies with atoms and an atomless part. 975-990 - Wonki Jo Cho, Battal Dogan:
Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak. 991-1014 - Michele Lombardi, Naoki Yoshihara:
Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies. 1015-1036 - Heng Liu:
Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. 1037-1069 - Takashi Shimizu:
Cheap talk with an exit option: a model of exit and voice. 1071-1088 - Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, René van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan, Oriol Tejada:
From hierarchies to levels: new solutions for games with hierarchical structure. 1089-1113 - Bram Driesen, Peter Eccles, Nora Wegner:
A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution. 1115-1135 - David Pérez-Castrillo, Marilda Sotomayor:
On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets. 1137-1161 - Edward J. Cartwright, Anna Stepanova:
Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game. 1163-1191
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