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ORCID22nd ACM-EC 2021: Virtual Event, Hungary
- Péter Biró, Shuchi Chawla, Federico Echenique:
EC '21: The 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Budapest, Hungary, July 18-23, 2021. ACM 2021, ISBN 978-1-4503-8554-1
Keynote Talk
- Leeat Yariv:
Disentangling Exploration from Exploitation. 1
Technical Program Presentation
- Shipra Agrawal, Steven Yin, Assaf Zeevi:
Dynamic Pricing and Learning under the Bass Model. 2-3 - Shipra Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Robust Repeated First Price Auctions. 4 - Narges Ahani, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexander Teytelboym, Andrew C. Trapp:
Dynamic Placement in Refugee Resettlement. 5 - Saba Ahmadi, Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Avrim Blum, Keziah Naggita:
The Strategic Perceptron. 6-25 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Scott Duke Kominers, Shengwu Li, Paul R. Milgrom:
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms. 26 - Saeed Alaei
, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection. 27-28 - Michele Albach, James R. Wright:
The Role of Accuracy in Algorithmic Process Fairness Across Multiple Domains. 29-49 - Amine Allouah, Achraf Bahamou, Omar Besbes:
Optimal Pricing with a Single Point. 50 - Amine Allouah, Achraf Bahamou, Omar Besbes:
Revenue Maximization from Finite Samples. 51 - Tal Alon, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effort. 52-69 - Tal Alon, Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Incomplete Information VCG Contracts for Common Agency. 70 - Gabriel P. Andrade, Rafael M. Frongillo, Sharadha Srinivasan, Elliot Gorokhovsky:
Graphical Economies with Resale. 71-90 - Ali Aouad, Daniela Sabán:
Online Assortment Optimization for Two-sided Matching Platforms. 91-92 - Guy Aridor, Yeon-Koo Che, Tobias Salz:
The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR. 93-94 - Itai Arieli, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Rann Smorodinsky:
On Social Networks that Support Learning. 95-96 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Sequential Naive Learning. 97 - Luis Armona, Greg Lewis, Georgios Zervas:
Learning Product Characteristics and Consumer Preferences from Search Data. 98-99 - Nick Arnosti, Tim Randolph:
Parallel Lotteries: Insights from Alaskan Hunting Permit Allocation. 100 - Itai Ashlagi, Faidra Georgia Monachou, Afshin Nikzad:
Optimal Dynamic Allocation: Simplicity through Information Design. 101-102 - Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl:
Efficient, Fair, and Incentive-Compatible Healthcare Rationing. 103-104 - Haris Aziz, Zhaohong Sun:
Multi-Rank Smart Reserves. 105-124 - Abdellah Aznag, Vineet Goyal, Noémie Périvier:
MNL-Bandit with Knapsacks. 125-126 - Moshe Babaioff, Tomer Ezra, Uriel Feige:
Fair-Share Allocations for Agents with Arbitrary Entitlements. 127 - Yakov Babichenko, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Haifeng Xu, Konstantin Zabarnyi:
Regret-Minimizing Bayesian Persuasion. 128 - Matthew Backus, Thomas Blake, Jett Pettus, Steven Tadelis:
Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis. 129 - Jackie Baek, Vivek F. Farias, Andreea Georgescu, Retsef Levi, Tianyi Peng, Deeksha Sinha, Joshua Wilde, Andrew Zheng:
The Limits to Learning a Diffusion Model. 130-131 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
The Landscape of Auto-bidding Auctions: Value versus Utility Maximization. 132-133 - Amir Ban, Avi Cohen, Shahar Dobzinski, Itai Ashlagi:
Simple Economies are Almost Optimal. 134-135 - Manuel Beyeler, Gianluca Brero, Benjamin Lubin, Sven Seuken:
iMLCA: Machine Learning-powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Interval Bidding. 136 - Kostas Bimpikis, Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Sabán:
Data Tracking under Competition. 137 - Avrim Blum, Paul Gölz:
Incentive-Compatible Kidney Exchange in a Slightly Semi-Random Model. 138-156 - Vitor Bosshard, Sven Seuken:
The Cost of Simple Bidding in Combinatorial Auctions. 157 - Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker:
Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain't Bad. 158-179 - Simina Brânzei, Nikhil R. Devanur, Yuval Rabani:
Proportional Dynamics in Exchange Economies. 180-201 - Alexander Braun, Thomas Kesselheim:
Truthful Mechanisms for Two-Sided Markets via Prophet Inequalities. 202-203 - Mark Braverman, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Prior-free Dynamic Mechanism Design With Limited Liability. 204-223 - Linda Cai, Raghuvansh R. Saxena:
99% Revenue with Constant Enhanced Competition. 224-241 - Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou:
On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items. 242-262 - Ozan Candogan, Philipp Strack:
Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver. 263 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
On Interim Envy-Free Allocation Lotteries. 264-284 - Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti:
Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contracts. 285-286 - Javier Cembrano, José Correa, Victor Verdugo:
Multidimensional Apportionment through Discrepancy Theory. 287-288 - Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Renato Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi:
A Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade. 289-309 - Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Kurt Mehlhorn, Ruta Mehta, Pranabendu Misra:
Improving EFX Guarantees through Rainbow Cycle Number. 310-311 - Yeon-Koo Che, Olivier Tercieux:
Optimal Queue Design. 312-313 - Yeon-Koo Che, Weijie Zhong:
Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods. 314-315 - Ningyuan Chen, Anran Li, Shuoguang Yang:
Revenue Maximization and Learning in Products Ranking. 316-317 - Xi Chen, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar:
The Complexity of Pacing for Second-Price Auctions. 318 - Christine T. Cheng, Will Rosenbaum:
Stable Matchings with Restricted Preferences: Structure and Complexity. 319-339 - Krishna Dasaratha, Kevin He:
Aggregative Efficiency of Bayesian Learning in Networks. 340 - Henrique De Oliveira, Yuhta Ishii, Xiao Lin:
Robust Merging of Information. 341-342 - Rahul Deb, Anne-Katrin Roesler:
Multi-Dimensional Screening: Buyer-Optimal Learning and Informational Robustness. 343-344 - David Delacrétaz:
Processing Reserves Simultaneously. 345-346 - Argyrios Deligkas, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Alexandros Hollender:
Two's Company, Three's a Crowd: Consensus-Halving for a Constant Number of Agents. 347-368 - Yuan Deng, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond. 369 - Yuan Deng, Jason D. Hartline, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms. 370 - Emily Diana, Travis Dick, Hadi Elzayn, Michael Kearns, Aaron Roth, Zachary Schutzman, Saeed Sharifi-Malvajerdi, Juba Ziani:
Algorithms and Learning for Fair Portfolio Design. 371-389 - Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? 390-408 - Paul Dütting, Silvio Lattanzi, Renato Paes Leme, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Secretaries with Advice. 409-429 - Jeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Sina Moghadas Khorasani, Luis Rayo:
Optimal Feedback in Contests. 430-431 - Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria. 432 - Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Proof-of-Stake Mining Games with Perfect Randomness. 433-453 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Philip Lazos, Diogo Poças:
On the Complexity of Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions. 454-476 - Daniel Freund, Jiayu (Kamessi) Zhao:
Overbooking with Bounded Loss. 477-478 - Rafael M. Frongillo, Robert Gomez, Anish Thilagar, Bo Waggoner:
Efficient Competitions and Online Learning with Strategic Forecasters. 479-496 - Drew Fudenberg, Wayne Gao, Annie Liang:
How Flexible is that Functional Form?: Measuring the Restrictiveness of Theories. 497-498 - Jason Gaitonde, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
Polarization in Geometric Opinion Dynamics. 499-519 - Jason Gaitonde, Éva Tardos:
Virtues of Patience in Strategic Queuing Systems. 520-540 - Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors. 541-559 - Negin Golrezaei, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Jon Schneider, Shreyas Sekar:
Learning Product Rankings Robust to Fake Users. 560-561 - Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Krishnamurthy Iyer:
The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market. 562 - Guru Guruganesh, Jon Schneider, Joshua R. Wang:
Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. 563-582 - Nima Haghpanah, Aditya Kuvalekar, Elliot Lipnowski:
Selling to a Group. 583-584 - Xiang Han, Onur Kesten, M. Utku Ünver:
Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences. 585-586 - Kevin He, Jonathan Libgober:
Evolutionarily Stable (Mis)specifications: Theory and Applications. 587 - Sherry He, Brett Hollenbeck, Davide Proserpio:
The Market for Fake Reviews. 588 - Hoda Heidari, Solon Barocas, Jon M. Kleinberg, Karen Levy:
On Modeling Human Perceptions of Allocation Policies with Uncertain Outcomes. 589-609 - Yihang Hu, Zhiyi Huang, Yiheng Shen, Xiangning Wang:
Targeting Makes Sample Efficiency in Auction Design. 610-629 - Xin Huang, Pinyan Lu:
An Algorithmic Framework for Approximating Maximin Share Allocation of Chores. 630-631 - Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Alexander Wei:
Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms. 632-633 - Ravi Jagadeesan, Alexander Teytelboym:
Matching and Money. 634 - Mobin Y. Jeloudar, Irene Lo, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi:
Decentralized Matching in a Probabilistic Environment. 635-653 - Yaonan Jin, Shunhua Jiang, Pinyan Lu, Hengjie Zhang:
Tight Revenue Gaps among Multi-Unit Mechanisms. 654-673 - Ashwin Kambhampati:
Robust Performance Evaluation. 674 - Zi Yang Kang:
Optimal Public Provision of Private Goods. 675 - Jong Gwang Kim:
Equilibrium Computation of Generalized Nash Games: A New Lagrangian-Based Approach. 676 - Margarita Kirneva, Matías Núñez:
Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes. 677-678 - Pieter Kleer:
Sampling from the Gibbs Distribution in Congestion Games. 679-680 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
Optimal Stopping with Behaviorally Biased Agents: The Role of Loss Aversion and Changing Reference Points. 681-682 - Rucha Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Setareh Taki:
Indivisible Mixed Manna: On the Computability of MMS+PO Allocations. 683-684 - Jiangtao Li, Piotr Dworczak:
Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated? 685-686 - Annie Liang, Xiaosheng Mu, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Dynamically Aggregating Diverse Information. 687-688 - Guocheng Liao, Yu Su, Juba Ziani, Adam Wierman, Jianwei Huang:
The Privacy Paradox and Optimal Bias-Variance Trade-offs in Data Acquisition. 689 - Young-San Lin, Hai Nguyen, Thành Nguyen, Kemal Altinkemer:
Allocation with Weak Priorities and General Constraints. 690-691 - Allen Liu, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pál, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Variable Decomposition for Prophet Inequalities and Optimal Ordering. 692 - Shuze Liu, Weiran Shen, Haifeng Xu:
Optimal Pricing of Information. 693 - Vahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Scott Rodilitz:
Fair Dynamic Rationing. 694-695 - Antonio Miralles, Marek Pycia:
Foundations of Pseudomarkets: Walrasian Equilibria for Discrete Resources. 696 - Kamesh Munagala, Zeyu Shen, Kangning Wang:
Optimal Algorithms for Multiwinner Elections and the Chamberlin-Courant Rule. 697-717 - Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. 718-733 - Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden:
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation. 734 - Thành Nguyen, Rakesh Vohra:
Δ-Substitute Preferences and Equilibria with Indivisibilities. 735-736 - Rad Niazadeh, Negin Golrezaei, Joshua R. Wang, Fransisca Susan, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru:
Online Learning via Offline Greedy Algorithms: Applications in Market Design and Optimization. 737-738 - Franz Ostrizek, Denis Shishkin:
Screening with Frames. 739-740 - Michael Ostrovsky:
Choice Screen Auctions. 741-742 - Dario Paccagnan, Martin Gairing:
In Congestion Games, Taxes Achieve Optimal Approximation. 743-744 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, Binghui Peng:
Public Goods Games in Directed Networks. 745-762 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, Tristan Pollner, Amin Saberi, David Wajc:
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Bipartite Matching: Beyond Prophet Inequalities. 763-764 - Pál András Papp, Roger Wattenhofer:
Debt Swapping for Risk Mitigation in Financial Networks. 765-784 - Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ünver, M. Bumin Yenmez:
Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing. 785-786 - Marek Pycia, Kyle Woodward:
Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid. 787 - Ignacio Rios, Daniela Sabán, Fanyin Zheng:
Improving Match Rates in Dating Markets through Assortment Optimization. 788-789 - Michelangelo Rossi:
Quality Disclosures and Disappointment: Evidence from the Academy Awards. 790-791 - Tim Roughgarden:
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design. 792 - Danny Segev, Sahil Singla:
Efficient Approximation Schemes for Stochastic Probing and Prophet Problems. 793-794 - Mark Sellke, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexity. 795-796 - Leon Sering, Laura Vargas Koch, Theresa Ziemke:
Convergence of a Packet Routing Model to Flows Over Time. 797-816 - Denis Shishkin:
Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure. 817-818 - Amandeep Singh, Jiding Zhang, Senthil K. Veeraraghavan:
Fulfillment by Platform: Antitrust and Upstream Market Power. 819 - Piotr Skowron:
Proportionality Degree of Multiwinner Rules. 820-840 - Krzysztof Sornat, Virginia Vassilevska Williams, Yinzhan Xu:
Fine-Grained Complexity and Algorithms for the Schulze Voting Method. 841-859 - Clayton Thomas:
Classification of Priorities Such That Deferred Acceptance is OSP Implementable. 860 - Can Urgun, Leeat Yariv:
Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain. 861 - Dong Quan Vu, Patrick Loiseau:
Colonel Blotto Games with Favoritism: Competitions with Pre-allocations and Asymmetric Effectiveness. 862-863 - Xintong Wang, David M. Pennock, Nikhil R. Devanur, David M. Rothschild, Biaoshuai Tao, Michael P. Wellman:
Designing a Combinatorial Financial Options Market. 864-883 - Lirong Xia:
How Likely Are Large Elections Tied? 884-885 - Mu Zhang:
A Theory of Choice Bracketing under Risk. 886-887 - Shuran Zheng, Yiling Chen:
Optimal Advertising for Information Products. 888-906 - Shuran Zheng, Fang-Yi Yu, Yiling Chen:
The Limits of Multi-task Peer Prediction. 907-926 - You Zu, Krishnamurthy Iyer, Haifeng Xu:
Learning to Persuade on the Fly: Robustness Against Ignorance. 927-928
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