default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 104
Volume 104, July 2017
- Gary Charness, Chetan Dave:
Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs. 1-23 - Anat Bracha, Lise Vesterlund:
Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income. 24-42 - Bettina Klaus
:
Consistency and its converse for roommate markets. 43-58 - Mihai Manea:
Bargaining in dynamic markets. 59-77 - Jingfeng Lu, Sérgio O. Parreiras:
Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux. 78-91 - Abraham Neyman:
Continuous-time stochastic games. 92-130 - Daniel Martin:
Strategic pricing with rational inattention to quality. 131-145 - Adam Bjorndahl, Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass:
Reasoning about rationality. 146-164 - Trine Tornøe Platz, Lars Peter Østerdal:
The curse of the first-in-first-out queue discipline. 165-176 - Artyom Jelnov, Yair Tauman, Richard Zeckhauser:
Attacking the unknown weapons of a potential bomb builder: The impact of intelligence on the strategic interaction. 177-189 - Friederike Mengel, Javier Rivas:
Common value elections with private information and informative priors: Theory and experiments. 190-221
- Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn:
Non-revelation mechanisms for many-to-many matching: Equilibria versus stability. 222-229
- Taro Kumano:
Nash implementation of constrained efficient stable matchings under weak priorities. 230-240 - Jean-François Laslier, Matías Núñez, Carlos Pimienta:
Reaching consensus through approval bargaining. 241-251 - Toomas Hinnosaar:
Calendar mechanisms. 252-270 - Christian Kellner, Mark Thordal-Le Quement:
Modes of ambiguous communication. 271-292 - Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Perception games and privacy. 293-308 - Andrés Perea, Souvik Roy:
A new epistemic characterization of ε-proper rationalizability. 309-328 - Jérôme Renault, Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille:
Optimal dynamic information provision. 329-349 - Semin Kim:
Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: A mechanism design approach. 350-371 - Samuel Häfner:
A tug-of-war team contest. 372-391 - Itai Arieli:
Payoff externalities and social learning. 392-410 - Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica:
Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces. 411-429 - Rune Midjord, Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer, Justin Valasek:
Voting in large committees with disesteem payoffs: A 'state of the art' model. 430-443 - Alan Gelder, Dan Kovenock:
Dynamic behavior and player types in majoritarian multi-battle contests. 444-455 - Oren Ben-Zwi:
Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction. 456-467 - Maksymilian Kwiek:
Efficient voting with penalties. 468-485
- Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Sang-Hyun Kim:
"Small, yet Beautiful": Reconsidering the optimal design of multi-winner contests. 486-493 - Peter Buisseret:
Electoral competition with entry under non-majoritarian run-off rules. 494-506
- Subir Bose, Arup Daripa:
Shills and snipes. 507-516 - Jonathan Newton:
Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration. 517-534 - Adam Sanjurjo:
Search with multiple attributes: Theory and empirics. 535-562
- Jiangtao Li, Rui Tang:
Every random choice rule is backwards-induction rationalizable. 563-567
- Matt V. Leduc, Matthew O. Jackson, Ramesh Johari:
Pricing and referrals in diffusion on networks. 568-594 - Daniel F. Garrett:
Dynamic mechanism design: Dynamic arrivals and changing values. 595-612 - Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto, Eve Ramaekers:
Implementation in undominated strategies with partially honest agents. 613-631 - Frank Rosar:
Test design under voluntary participation. 632-655 - Mustafa Oguz Afacan:
Some further properties of the cumulative offer process. 656-665
- Christoph Kuzmics:
Abraham Wald's complete class theorem and Knightian uncertainty. 666-673 - Florian Brandl:
The distribution of optimal strategies in symmetric zero-sum games. 674-680
- Simon Dato, Andreas Grunewald, Daniel Müller, Philipp Strack:
Expectation-based loss aversion and strategic interaction. 681-705 - David J. Kusterer, Patrick W. Schmitz:
The management of innovation: Experimental evidence. 706-725 - Antonio A. Arechar, Anna Dreber, Drew Fudenberg, David G. Rand:
"I'm just a soul whose intentions are good": The role of communication in noisy repeated games. 726-743 - Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris:
Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness. 744-759 - Alexander Maas, Christopher Goemans, Dale Manning, Stephan Kroll, Thomas Brown:
Dilemmas, coordination and defection: How uncertain tipping points induce common pool resource destruction. 760-774
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-10-31 20:04 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
