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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 48
Volume 48, Number 1, July 2004
- David Cantala:

Restabilizing matching markets at senior level. 1-17 - Effrosyni Diamantoudi, Eiichi Miyagawa, Licun Xue:

Random paths to stability in the roommate problem. 18-28 - Ángel Hernando-Veciana

:
Successful uninformed bidding. 29-53 - Oliver Kirchkamp, Benny Moldovanu:

An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations. 54-85 - László Á. Kóczy

, Luc Lauwers
:
The coalition structure core is accessible. 86-93 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin

:
Best response dynamics in finite games with additive aggregation. 94-110 - Suresh Mutuswami, David Pérez-Castrillo

, David Wettstein
:
Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments. 111-123 - David P. Myatt

, Chris C. Wallace:
Adaptive play by idiosyncratic agents. 124-138 - Barry O'Neill, Dov Samet, Zvi Wiener

, Eyal Winter
:
Bargaining with an agenda. 139-153 - James Schummer

:
Almost-dominant strategy implementation: exchange economies. 154-170 - Marco Slikker, Henk Norde:

Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games. 171-200 - Rabah Amir, Robert J. Aumann, James Peck, Myrna Holtz Wooders:

Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik. 201-202
Volume 48, Number 2, August 2004
- Murali Agastya

:
Stochastic stability in a double auction. 203-222 - Bhaskar Dutta, Anirban Kar:

Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games. 223-248 - Lars Ehlers:

In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm. 249-270 - Roland Hain, Manipushpak Mitra

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Simple sequencing problems with interdependent costs. 271-291 - Frédéric Koessler:

Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games. 292-320 - Christoph Kuzmics

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Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information. 321-336 - Szilvia Pápai:

Unique stability in simple coalition formation games. 337-354 - Philip J. Reny, Arthur J. Robson:

Reinterpreting mixed strategy equilibria: a unification of the classical and Bayesian views. 355-384 - Makoto Shimoji:

On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response. 385-402 - Mark Voorneveld

:
Preparation. 403-414

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