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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 74
Volume 74, Number 1, January 2012
- Luciano Andreozzi:
Property rights and investments: An evolutionary approach. 1-11 - Jenna Bednar
, Yan Chen, Tracy Xiao Liu, Scott Page:
Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study. 12-31 - Clive Bell, Hans Gersbach, Maik T. Schneider:
Raising juveniles. 32-51 - Olivier Bochet, Sidartha Gordon:
Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities. 52-67 - Guillaume Cheikbossian:
The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game. 68-82 - Amil Dasgupta, Jakub Steiner, Colin Stewart:
Dynamic coordination with individual learning. 83-101 - Michalis Drouvelis, Wieland Müller, Alex Possajennikov:
Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection. 102-119 - Bhaskar Dutta, Debasis Mishra:
Minimum cost arborescences. 120-143 - Rohan Dutta:
Bargaining with revoking costs. 144-153 - Bhaskar Dutta, Arunava Sen:
Nash implementation with partially honest individuals. 154-169 - Marco Faravelli, Luca Stanca:
When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests. 170-183 - Joseph Y. Halpern, Rafael Pass:
Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept. 184-207 - Ernan Haruvy, Dale O. Stahl:
Between-game rule learning in dissimilar symmetric normal-form games. 208-221 - Yuval Heller, Eilon Solan, Tristan Tomala:
Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information. 222-234 - Ángel Hernando-Veciana:
Comment on: "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences". 235-239 - Christoph Kuzmics, Brian Rogers:
A comment on "Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games" by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32(2000) 247-262]. 240-242 - Yehuda Levy:
Stochastic games with information lag. 243-256 - Michael Mandler:
The fragility of information aggregation in large elections. 257-268 - Toshimasa Maruta, Akira Okada:
Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisonerʼs dilemma. 269-284 - Bill McEvily, Joseph R. Radzevick, Roberto A. Weber:
Whom do you distrust and how much does it cost? An experiment on the measurement of trust. 285-298 - Antonio Nicolò, Carmelo Rodríguez-Álvarez:
Transplant quality and patients' preferences in paired kidney exchange. 299-310 - Thomas W. L. Norman:
Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences. 311-320 - Daisuke Oyama, Olivier Tercieux:
On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors. 321-331 - Ron Peretz:
The strategic value of recall. 332-351 - Randy Silvers:
The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case. 352-365 - Matthew Van Essen, Natalia Lazzati, Mark Walker:
Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: Experimental evidence. 366-381 - Matthijs van Veelen:
Robustness against indirect invasions. 382-393
- Mustafa Oguz Afacan:
Group robust stability in matching markets. 394-398 - Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. de Vries:
The Herodotus paradox. 399-406 - Irem Bozbay, Franz Dietrich, Hans Peters:
Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: The extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. 407-417 - Guilherme Carmona, Konrad Podczeck:
Ex-post stability of Bayes-Nash equilibria of large games. 418-430 - C. Chameni Nembua:
Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation. 431-433 - Cars H. Hommes, Marius I. Ochea:
Multiple equilibria and limit cycles in evolutionary games with Logit Dynamics. 434-441 - Siyang Xiong:
Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures. 442-446
Volume 74, Number 2, March 2012
- Sandro Brusco, Marcin Dziubinski, Jaideep Roy:
The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting. 447-469 - James D. Dana Jr.:
Buyer groups as strategic commitments. 470-485 - Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. 486-503 - Takako Fujiwara-Greve, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, Nobue Suzuki:
Voluntarily separable repeated Prisonerʼs Dilemma with reference letters. 504-516 - Ziv Hellman, Dov Samet:
How common are common priors? 517-525 - Roland Hodler, Hadi Yektas:
All-pay war. 526-540 - Ernest K. Lai, Wooyoung Lim:
Authority and communication in the laboratory. 541-560 - Jingfeng Lu:
Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities. 561-575 - Vikram Manjunath:
When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds. 576-587 - Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo:
On the invariance of the set of Core matchings with respect to preference profiles. 588-600 - Friederike Mengel:
Learning across games. 601-619 - Thomas H. Noe, Michael Rebello, Jun Wang:
Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation. 620-636 - Ryuji Sano:
Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction. 637-650 - Patrick W. Schmitz, Thomas Tröger:
The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule. 651-665 - Xianwen Shi:
Optimal auctions with information acquisition. 666-686 - Yi-You Yang:
On the accessibility of core-extensions. 687-698
- Isa Emin Hafalir, R. Ravi, Amin Sayedi:
A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints. 699-708 - Philipp C. Wichardt:
Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties. 709-713
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