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International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 30
Volume 30, Number 1, September 2001
- Robert Samuel Simon:
The generation of formulas held in common knowledge. 1-18 - Taiji Furusawa, Quan Wen:
Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations. 19-39 - Olivier Gossner, Nicolas Vieille:
Repeated communication through the mechanism and. 41-60 - Emilio Calvo, Juan Carlos Santos:
A value for mixed action-set games. 61-78 - Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Jeroen Kuipers:
On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game. 79-98 - Francis C. Chu, Joseph Y. Halpern:
On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs. 99-106 - William H. Sandholm:
Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium. 107-116 - Peter Sudhölter, Jos A. M. Potters:
The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game. 117-139 - Carsten Helm:
On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities. 141-146
Volume 30, Number 2, December 2001
- Jens Leth Hougaard, Bezalel Peleg, Lars Thorlund-Petersen:
On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game. 147-165 - M. Josune Albizuri:
An axiomatization of the modified Banzhaf Coleman index. 167-176 - Tamás Solymosi, T. E. S. Raghavan:
Assignment games with stable core. 177-185 - Javier Arin, Elena Inarra:
Egalitarian solutions in the core. 187-193 - Koji Takamiya:
The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the α-core. 195-207 - Stefan Napel, Mika Widgrén:
Inferior players in simple games. 209-220 - Jérôme Renault:
3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side. 221-245 - Chih Chang, Yan-An Hwang:
Some results related to the Harsanyi-Shapley solution. 247-258 - Eilon Solan:
Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games. 259-277 - Gérard Hamiache:
Associated consistency and Shapley value. 279-289 - Noritsugu Nakanishi:
On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma. 291-307
Volume 30, Number 3, March 2002
- René van den Brink:
An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property. 309-319 - James L. Smith, Dan Levin:
Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation. 321-350 - Chih Chang, Yan-An Hwang:
Closedness under Hart-Mas Colell reduction. 351-357 - Rida Laraki:
The splitting game and applications. 359-376 - David Housman:
Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games. 377-404 - Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Ram Orzach, Aner Sela:
Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions. 405-419 - Bettina Klaus, Eiichi Miyagawa:
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems. 421-435 - Siegfried K. Berninghaus, Werner Güth, R. Lechler, H.-J. Ramser:
Decentralized versus collective bargaining - An experimental study. 437-448 - Julien Geitner:
Note Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case. 449-452
Volume 30, Number 4, May 2002
- Geir B. Asheim:
Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs. 453-478 - Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth:
Stay-in-a-set games. 479-490 - Piercesare Secchi, William D. Sudderth:
N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs. 491-502 - Antoni Calvó-Armengol:
On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted. 503-515 - Hong Hu, Harborne W. Stuart Jr.:
An epistemic analysis of the Harsanyi transformation. 517-525 - Ulrich Berger:
Best response dynamics for role games. 527-538 - Dean T. Allemang:
Generalized genus sequences for misère octal games. 539-556 - Srihari Govindan, Robert B. Wilson:
Maximal stable sets of two-player games. 557-566 - Maurice Koster, Elisenda Molina, Yves Sprumont, S. H. Tijs:
Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations. 567-599 - Elena Yanovskaya, Theo S. H. Driessen:
Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games. 601-609
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