


default search action
Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 63
Volume 63, Number 1, January 2012
- Theresa C. Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach:

Preferences for harmony and minority voting. 1-13 - Gerald Pech

:
Intra-party decision making, party formation, and moderation in multiparty systems. 14-22 - Junnosuke Shino, Ryo Kawasaki

:
Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games. 23-30 - Toshimasa Maruta, Akira Okada

:
Stochastically stable equilibria in n-person binary coordination games. 31-42 - Ryo Nagata:

Organizational dynamics with symmetric responses of members. 43-49 - Alfred Greiner:

Transition dynamics in an AK growth model under wage rigidity. 50-56 - Luc Doyen

, Jean-Christophe Péreau
:
Sustainable coalitions in the commons. 57-64
Volume 63, Number 2, March 2012
- Jean-François Laslier

:
Introduction to the Special Issue 'Around the Cambridge Compromise: Apportionment in theory and practice'. 65-67 - Geoffrey R. Grimmett:

European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise. 68-73 - Andrew Duff:

Finding the balance of power in a post-national democracy. 74-77 - Axel Moberg:

EP seats: The politics behind the math. 78-84 - Richard Rose

, Patrick Bernhagen
, Gabriela Borz
:
Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats. 85-89 - Jean-François Laslier

:
Why not proportional? 90-93 - Wojciech Slomczynski, Karol Zyczkowski

:
Mathematical aspects of degressive proportionality. 94-101 - Thomas Kellermann:

The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament. 102-106 - Paolo Serafini:

Allocation of the EU Parliament seats via integer linear programming and revised quotas. 107-113 - Victoriano Ramírez-González, José Martínez-Aroza

, A. Márquez García:
Spline methods for degressive proportionality in the composition of the European Parliament. 114-120 - Jan Florek:

A numerical method to determine a degressive proportional distribution of seats in the European Parliament. 121-129 - Victoriano Ramírez-González:

Seat distribution in the European Parliament according to the Treaty of Lisbon. 130-135 - Geoffrey R. Grimmett, Kai-Friederike Oelbermann

, Friedrich Pukelsheim:
A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise. 136-140 - Antonin Macé

, Rafael Treibich
:
Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment. 141-151 - László Á. Kóczy

:
Beyond Lisbon: Demographic trends and voting power in the European Union Council of Ministers. 152-158 - Michel Le Breton, Maria Montero

, Vera Zaporozhets:
Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics. 159-173 - Nicola Maaser

, Stefan Napel:
A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting. 174-180 - Gabrielle Demange:

On party-proportional representation under district distortions. 181-191
Volume 63, Number 3, May 2012
- Wulf Gaertner, Yongsheng Xu

:
A general scoring rule. 193-196 - Bertrand Crettez

, Lisa Morhaim:
Existence of competitive equilibrium in a non-optimal one-sector economy without conditions on the distorted marginal product of capital. 197-206 - Xing Gao, Weijun Zhong, Shue Mei:

On local stability of Cournot models with simultaneous and sequential decisions. 207-212 - Christophe Courbage

, Béatrice Rey:
Optimal prevention and other risks in a two-period model. 213-217 - Michael R. Caputo, Amnon Levy:

A theory of mood-influenced consumption and investment in health. 218-227 - Itai Ashlagi, Emin Karagözoglu

, Bettina Klaus
:
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems. 228-233 - Kaname Miyagishima:

Ranking linear budget sets with different available goods: A note. 234-238 - Vikram Manjunath:

Group strategy-proofness and voting between two alternatives. 239-242 - Junichiro Wada:

A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm-Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy. 243-247 - Ming-Hung Weng

:
Demand structure and the incentive to innovate. 248-251 - André Lapied, Pascal Toquebeuf:

Dynamically consistent CEU preferences on f-convex events. 252-256

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.


Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID














