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ORCIDSocial Choice and Welfare, Volume 20
Volume 20, Number 1, January 2003
- Shasikanta Nandeibam
:
Distribution of coalitional power in randomized multi-valued social choice. 3-25 - Mark Fey:
A note on the Condorcet Jury Theorem with supermajority voting rules. 27-32 - Sang-Chul Suh:
Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria. 33-39 - John Bone:
Simple Arrow-type propositions in the Edgeworth domain. 41-48 - John P. Conley, Stefani Cheri Smith:
Finite decentralization in a Tiebout economy with crowding types. 49-75 - Koji Takamiya:
On strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores: A converse result. 77-83 - Norman Schofield:
Power, prosperity and social choice: A review. 85-118 - Arieh Gavious, Shlomo Mizrahi:
A signaling model of peaceful political change. 119-136 - Mauricio Soares Bugarin:
Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: Towards a unified model. 137-154 - Flavio M. Menezes:
An auction theoretical approach to fiscal wars. 155-166 - Toyotaka Sakai:
An axiomatic approach to intergenerational equity. 167-176
Volume 20, Number 2, March 2003
- Zvi Safra, Einat Weissengrin:
Harsanyi's impartial observer theorem with a restricted domain. 177-187 - S. David Promislow, Virginia R. Young:
Decomposition properties of dual choice functionals. 189-201 - Jean-Paul Chavas, Jay Coggins:
On fairness and welfare analysis under uncertainty. 203-228 - Jean-François Laslier:
Analysing a preference and approval profile. 229-242 - John Broome:
Representing an ordering when the population varies. 243-246 - Stephen J. Willson:
Money-egalitarian-equivalent and gain-maximin allocations of indivisible items with monetary compensation. 247-259 - Deanna B. Haunsperger:
Aggregated statistical rankings are arbitrary. 261-272 - Donald E. Campbell, Jerry S. Kelly:
On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems. 273-281 - Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter:
On the probabilities of correct or incorrect majority preference relations. 283-306 - Yew-Kwang Ng:
From preference to happiness: Towards a more complete welfare economics. 307-350
Volume 20, Number 3, June 2003
- Özgür Kibris:
Constrained allocation problems with single-peaked preferences: An axiomatic analysis. 353-362 - Antonio Quesada:
Positional independence in preference aggregation. 363-370 - Szilvia Pápai:
Groves sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects with fair prices. 371-385 - Vincent C. H. Chua, H. C. Huang:
The Shapley-Shubik index, the donation paradox and ternary games. 387-403 - Gaël Giraud, Céline Rochon:
Generic efficiency and collusion-proofness in exchange economies. 405-428 - Drora Karotkin, Jacob Paroush:
Optimum committee size: Quality-versus-quantity dilemma. 429-441 - Yew-Kwang Ng, Guang-Zhen Sun:
Exclusion of self evaluations in peer ratings: An impossibility and some proposals. 443-456 - Fabio Maccheroni, Massimo Marinacci:
How to cut a pizza fairly: Fair division with decreasing marginal evaluations. 457-465 - Matthias Hild, Richard Jeffrey, Mathias Risse:
Flipping and ex post aggregation. 467-475 - Baris Kaymak, M. Remzi Sanver:
Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners. 477-494 - Semih Koray, Bulent Unel:
Characterization of self-selective social choice functions on the tops-only domain. 495-507 - Marco A. Haan, Peter Kooreman:
How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox. 509-522 - Gerhard J. Woeginger:
Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize. 523-528
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