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Synthese, Volume 162
Volume 162, Number 1, May 2008
- Jessica Carter:

Categories for the working mathematician: making the impossible possible. 1-13 - Amir Eshan Karbasizadeh:

Revising the concept of lawhood: special sciences and natural kinds. 15-30 - Juan Comesaña:

Could there be exactly two things? 31-35 - Chris John Daly:

The methodology of genuine modal realism. 37-52 - Eugen Fischer

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Wittgenstein's 'Non-Cognitivism' - Explained and Vindicated. 53-84 - Jack Ritchie

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Structural realism and Davidson. 85-100 - Benjamin Schnieder

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On what we can ensure. 101-115 - Jonathan Tallant

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What is it to "B" a relation? 117-132 - Linton Wang:

Epistemic comparative conditionals. 133-156
Volume 162, Number 2, May 2008
- Peter Mark Ainsworth

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Cosmic inflation and the past hypothesis. 157-165 - Anthony Brueckner:

Reply to Coffman on closure and skepticism. 167-171 - E. J. Coffman:

Warrant without truth? 173-194 - Olivier Darrigol:

The modular structure of physical theories. 195-223 - Mirja Helena Hartimo:

From geometry to phenomenology. 225-233 - Mark Schlatter, Ken Aizawa

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Walter Pitts and "A Logical Calculus". 235-250 - Pierre Le Morvan:

Epistemic means and ends: a reply to Hofmann. 251-264 - Peter Baumann:

Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy's view. 265-273 - Fred D'Agostino:

Naturalizing the essential tension. 275-308
Volume 162, Number 3, June 2008
- Troy Catterson:

Introduction. 309-311 - Sydney Shoemaker:

Persons, animals, and identity. 313-324 - Raymond Martin:

What really matters. 325-340 - Daniel Kolak

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Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity. 341-372 - Garrett Thomson:

Counting subjects. 373-384 - Troy Catterson:

Changing the subject: on the subject of subjectivity. 385-404 - Marya Schechtman:

Diversity in unity: practical unity and personal boundaries. 405-423 - Jure Zovko:

Metaphysics as interpretation of conscious life: some remarks on D. Henrich's and D. Kolak's thinking. 425-438 - Jay Lombard:

Synchrnoic consciousness from a neurological point of view: the philosophical foundations for neuroethics. 439-450

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