


default search action
Synthese, Volume 176
Volume 176, Number 1, September 2010
- Paul Weirich

:
Introduction. 1-3 - Adam Morton

:
Human bounds: rationality for our species. 5-21 - José Luis Bermúdez:

Pitfalls for realistic decision theory: an illustration from sequential choice. 23-40 - Mark Kaplan:

In defense of modest probabilism. 41-55 - John L. Pollock:

A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem. 57-82 - Paul Weirich

:
Utility and framing. 83-103 - Lisa J. Carlson, Raymond Dacey:

Social norms and the traditional deterrence game. 105-123 - Cristina Bicchieri

, Azi Lev-On
, Alex Chavez:
The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games. 125-147 - Paul Weirich

:
The contributors. 149-150
Volume 176, Number 2, September 2010
- Marc A. Moffett:

Introduction: Proceedings of the 36th annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy - Syntax and the Void! 151-152 - Charles Chihara:

New directions for nominalist philosophers of mathematics. 153-175 - Walter Dean, Hidenori Kurokawa:

From the Knowability Paradox to the existence of proofs. 177-225 - Graeme Forbes:

Intensional verbs in event semantics. 227-242 - Frederick Maier, Donald Nute:

Well-founded semantics for defeasible logic. 243-274 - Michael W. Pelczar:

Presentism, eternalism, and phenomenal change. 275-290 - Malte Willer:

New surprises for the Ramsey Test. 291-309
Volume 176, Number 3, October 2010
- Holger Andreas:

New account of empirical claims in structuralism. 311-332 - Jake Chandler

:
The transmission of support: a Bayesian re-analysis. 333-343 - Andrea Sauchelli

:
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge. 345-359 - Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen:

Luck as an epistemic notion. 361-377 - Alexander Rueger, Patrick McGivern

:
Hierarchies and levels of reality. 379-397 - Kourken Michaelian

:
In defence of gullibility: the epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection. 399-427 - Jonathan Y. Tsou

:
Putnam's account of apriority and scientific change: its historical and contemporary interest. 429-445 - Hamid Vahid:

Rationalizing beliefs: evidential vs. pragmatic reasons. 447-462

manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.


Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID














