Synthese, Volume 190

Volume 190, Number 1, January 2013

The Formal Epistemology Project

• 
  Igor Douven:
  The Formal Epistemology Project. 1-2
• 
  Helen De Cruz, Johan De Smedt:
  Mathematical symbols as epistemic actions. 3-19
• 
  Karolina Krzyzanowska:
  Belief ascription and the Ramsey test. 21-36
• 
  Sylvia Wenmackers, Leon Horsten:
  Fair infinite lotteries. 37-61
• 
  Martin Fischer:
  Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle. 63-88
• 
  Jan Heylen:
  Modal-Epistemic Arithmetic and the problem of quantifying in. 89-111
• 
  Sebastian Sequoiah-Grayson:
  Epistemic closure and commutative, nonassociative residuated structures. 113-128
• 
  Jake Chandler:
  Contrastive confirmation: some competing accounts. 129-138
• 
  Richard Dietz:
  Comparative concepts. 139-170
• 
  Igor Douven, Christoph Kelp:
  Proper bootstrapping. 171-185

Volume 190, Number 2, January 2013

Models and Simulations 4

• 
  Marion Vorms, Christopher Pincock:
  Preface. 187-188
• 
  Paul Teller:
  The concept of measurement-precision. 189-202
• 
  Brian Epstein, Patrick Forber:
  The perils of tweaking: how to use macrodata to set parameters in complex simulation models. 203-218
• 
  Agnes Bolinska:
  Epistemic representation, informativeness and the aim of faithful representation. 219-234
• 
  Gordon Michael Purves:
  Finding truth in fictions: identifying non-fictions in imaginary cracks. 235-251
• 
  Axel Gelfert:
  Strategies of model-building in condensed matter physics: trade-offs as a demarcation criterion between physics and biology? 253-272
• 
  Peter Gildenhuys:
  Classical population genetics and the semantic approach to scientific theories. 273-291
• 
  Marion Vorms:
  Models of data and theoretical hypotheses: a case-study in classical genetics. 293-319
• 
  Ekaterina Svetlova:
  De-idealization by commentary: the case of financial valuation models. 321-337

Volume 190, Number 3, February 2013

• 
  Dennis Whitcomb:
  One wage of unknowability. 339-352
• 
  Jonas Clausen Mork:
  Uncertainty, credal sets and second order probability. 353-378
• 
  José Díez, Kareem Khalifa, Bert Leuridan:
  General theories of explanation: buyer beware. 379-396
• 
  Mark McEvoy:
  Experimental mathematics, computers and the a priori. 397-412
• 
  Frank A. Hindriks:
  The location problem in social ontology. 413-437
• 
  Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia:
  Zeno and flow of information. 439-447
• 
  D. Benjamin Barros:
  Negative causation in causal and mechanistic explanation. 449-469
• 
  Keizo Matsubara:
  Realism, underdetermination and string theory dualities. 471-489
• 
  James R. Shaw:
  De se belief and rational choice. 491-508
• 
  Miguel Hoeltje, Benjamin Schnieder, Alex Steinberg:
  Explanation by induction? 509-524
• 
  Boris Culina:
  Logic of paradoxes in classical set theories. 525-547
• 
  Chunghyoung Lee:
  The staccato roller coaster: a simple physical model of the staccato run. 549-562
• 
  Andrew Rotondo:
  Undermining, circularity, and disagreement. 563-584

Volume 190, Number 4, March 2013

SYNTHESE Conference 2007 - Between Logic and Intuition: In Honor of David Lewis

• 
  Luca Tummolini, Giulia Andrighetto, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Rosaria Conte:
  A convention or (tacit) agreement betwixt us: on reliance and its normative consequences. 585-618
• 
  Tomasz Bigaj:
  How to evaluate counterfactuals in the quantum world. 619-637
• 
  Berit Brogaard, Joe Salerno:
  Remarks on counterpossibles. 639-660
• 
  John Cantwell:
  Conditionals in causal decision theory. 661-679
• 
  Vladan Djordjevic:
  Similarity and cotenability. 681-691
• 
  Ulrich Meyer:
  Modal property comprehension. 693-707
• 
  Neil Tennant:
  Parts, classes and Parts of Classes: an anti-realist reading of Lewisian mereology. 709-742
• 
  Alessandro Torza:
  How to Lewis a Kripke-Hintikka. 743-779

Volume 190, Number 5, March 2013

Synthese Conference on Epistemology and Economics

• 
  Jeffrey Helzner:
  Epistemology and economics. 781-786
• 
  Franz Dietrich, Christian List:
  Reasons for (prior) belief in Bayesian epistemology. 787-808
• 
  Lina Eriksson, Wlodek Rabinowicz:
  The interference problem for the betting interpretation of degrees of belief. 809-830
• 
  Horacio L. Arló-Costa, Arthur Paul Pedersen:
  Fast and frugal heuristics: rationality and the limits of naturalism. 831-850
• 
  Brian Hill:
  Awareness and equilibrium. 851-869
• 
  Giacomo Sillari:
  Rule-following as coordination: a game-theoretic approach. 871-890
• 
  Olivier Roy, Eric Pacuit:
  Substantive assumptions in interaction: a logical perspective. 891-908
• 
  Cristina Bicchieri, Hugo Mercier:
  Self-serving biases and public justifications in trust games. 909-922
• 
  Brian Skyrms:
  The core theory of subjunctive conditionals. 923-928

Volume 190, Number 6, April 2013

• 
  Jeffrey Helzner:
  Rationalizing two-tiered choice functions through conditional choice. 929-951
• 
  C. M. Asmus:
  Vagueness and revision sequences. 953-974
• 
  Adolfas Mackonis:
  Inference to the best explanation, coherence and other explanatory virtues. 975-995
• 
  Daniel A. Wilkenfeld:
  Understanding as representation manipulability. 997-1016
• 
  Luke Glynn:
  Causal foundationalism, physical causation, and difference-making. 1017-1037
• 
  Peter Gärdenfors, Frank Zenker:
  Theory change as dimensional change: conceptual spaces applied to the dynamics of empirical theories. 1039-1058
• 
  Benjamin McMyler:
  The epistemic significance of address. 1059-1078
• 
  Barry Lam:
  Calibrated probabilities and the epistemology of disagreement. 1079-1098
• 
  Joongol Kim:
  What are numbers? 1099-1112
• 
  Stephen Wright:
  Does Klein's infinitism offer a response to Agrippa's trilemma? 1113-1130
• 
  Pieter E. Vermaas, Massimiliano Carrara, Stefano Borgo, Pawel Garbacz:
  The design stance and its artefacts. 1131-1152
• 
  Kareem Khalifa:
  Is understanding explanatory or objectual? 1153-1171
• 
  Steve Petersen:
  Utilitarian epistemology. 1173-1184

Volume 190, Number 7, May 2013

The Epistemology of Inclusiveness

• 
  Kristoffer Ahlström-Vij, Klemens Kappel, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
  The epistemology of inclusiveness. 1185-1188
• 
  Sanford C. Goldberg:
  Inclusiveness in the face of anticipated disagreement. 1189-1207
• 
  Hélène Landemore:
  Deliberation, cognitive diversity, and democratic inclusiveness: an epistemic argument for the random selection of representatives. 1209-1231
• 
  Christopher Thompson:
  A general model of a group search procedure, applied to epistemic democracy. 1233-1252
• 
  Fabienne Peter:
  The procedural epistemic value of deliberation. 1253-1266
• 
  J. D. Trout:
  Democracy and scientific expertise: illusions of political and epistemic inclusion. 1267-1291
• 
  Boaz Miller:
  When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement. 1293-1316
• 
  Miranda Fricker:
  Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom? 1317-1332

Volume 190, Number 8, May 2013

Formal Epistemology Meets Experimental Philosophy

• 
  Stephan Hartmann, Chiara Lisciandra, Edouard Machery:
  Editorial: Formal epistemology meets experimental philosophy. 1333-1335
• 
  Mark Colyvan:
  Idealisations in normative models. 1337-1350
• 
  Giovanna Devetag, Hykel Hosni, Giacomo Sillari:
  You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment. 1351-1381
• 
  James A. Overton:
  "Explain" in scientific discourse. 1383-1405
• 
  Matthias Unterhuber, Gerhard Schurz:
  The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science. 1407-1435
• 
  Aron Vallinder, Erik J. Olsson:
  Do computer simulations support the Argument from Disagreement? 1437-1454
• 
  Carl G. Wagner:
  The corroboration paradox. 1455-1469

Volume 190, Number 9, June 2013

• 
  Robert Northcott:
  Verisimilitude: a causal approach. 1471-1488
• 
  Joel Pust:
  Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan. 1489-1501
• 
  Michael Bertrand:
  Proper environment and the SEP account of biological function. 1503-1517
• 
  Geoff Pynn:
  The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure. 1519-1531
• 
  Jesús Zamora-Bonilla:
  Why are good theories good? reflections on epistemic values, confirmation, and formal epistemology. 1533-1553
• 
  Aris Spanos:
  A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference. 1555-1585
• 
  Joshua C. Thurow:
  The defeater version of Benacerraf's problem for a priori knowledge. 1587-1603
• 
  Xuefeng Wen, Shier Ju:
  Semantic games with chance moves revisited: from IF logic to partial logic. 1605-1620
• 
  Jonathan Bain:
  Category-theoretic structure and radical ontic structural realism. 1621-1635
• 
  David H. Wolpert, Gregory Benford:
  The lesson of Newcomb's paradox. 1637-1646
• 
  Graham Oddie:
  The content, consequence and likeness approaches to verisimilitude: compatibility, trivialization, and underdetermination. 1647-1687
• 
  Rohan French:
  Expressive power, mood, and actuality. 1689-1699
• 
  Matthew Lockard:
  Epistemic instrumentalism. 1701-1718
• 
  K. Brad Wray:
  Success and truth in the realism/anti-realism debate. 1719-1729

Volume 190, Number 10, July 2013

Philosophy of Language and Mind: Selected Papers from the First PLM Conference

• 
  Peter Pagin, Robert van Rooij, Jonas Åkerman:
  Philosophy of language and mind. 1731-1733
• 
  Craig French:
  Perceptual experience and seeing that $$p$$. 1735-1751
• 
  Peter Fritz:
  A logic for epistemic two-dimensional semantics. 1753-1770
• 
  Nat Hansen:
  A slugfest of intuitions: contextualism and experimental design. 1771-1792
• 
  Marie Guillot:
  The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts. 1793-1816
• 
  Elisabeth Pacherie:
  Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite. 1817-1839
• 
  François Récanati:
  Perceptual concepts: in defence of the indexical model. 1841-1855

Volume 190, Number 11, July 2013

Philosophy of and as Interdisciplinarity

• 
  Michael H. G. Hoffmann, Jan C. Schmidt, Nancy J. Nersessian:
  Philosophy of and as interdisciplinarity. 1857-1864
• 
  J. Britt Holbrook:
  What is interdisciplinary communication? Reflections on the very idea of disciplinary integration. 1865-1879
• 
  Hanne Andersen, Susann Wagenknecht:
  Epistemic dependence in interdisciplinary groups. 1881-1898
• 
  Steve Fuller:
  Deviant interdisciplinarity as philosophical practice: prolegomena to deep intellectual history. 1899-1916
• 
  Robert Frodeman:
  Philosophy dedisciplined. 1917-1936
• 
  Michael O'Rourke, Stephen J. Crowley:
  Philosophical intervention and cross-disciplinary science: the story of the Toolbox Project. 1937-1954
• 
  Nancy Tuana:
  Embedding philosophers in the practices of science: bringing humanities to the sciences. 1955-1973
• 
  Michael H. G. Hoffmann, Jan C. Schmidt, Nancy J. Nersessian:
  Erratum to: Philosophy of and as interdisciplinarity. 1975

Volume 190, Number 12, August 2013

• 
  Berislav Marusic:
  The Self-Knowledge Gambit. 1977-1999
• 
  Andreas M. Bartels:
  Why metrical properties are not powers. 2001-2013
• 
  Samuel Alexander:
  An axiomatic version of Fitch's paradox. 2015-2020
• 
  Jessica Brown:
  Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness. 2021-2046
• 
  Giuliano Torrengo:
  The grounding problem and presentist explanations. 2047-2063
• 
  Jonathan Tallant:
  Optimus prime: paraphrasing prime number talk. 2065-2083
• 
  Erich H. Rast:
  On contextual domain restriction in categorial grammar. 2085-2115
• 
  J. Brian Pitts:
  Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism. 2117-2139
• 
  Jean-Pierre Marquis:
  Mathematical forms and forms of mathematics: leaving the shores of extensional mathematics. 2141-2164
• 
  Massimo Warglien, Peter Gärdenfors:
  Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds. 2165-2193
• 
  Dunja Seselja, Christian Straßer:
  Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates. 2195-2217
• 
  Nikolaj Nottelmann:
  The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment. 2219-2241
• 
  Charlotte Werndl:
  On choosing between deterministic and indeterministic models: underdetermination and indirect evidence. 2243-2265
• 
  Michiru Nagatsu:
  The limits of unification for theory appraisal: a case of economics and psychology. 2267-2289
• 
  Nate Charlow:
  What we know and what to do. 2291-2323
• 
  Christos Douskos:
  The linguistic argument for intellectualism. 2325-2340
• 
  Martin Montminy:
  The role of context in contextualism. 2341-2366
• 
  Patrick Grim, Robert Rosenberger, Adam Rosenfeld, Brian Anderson, Robb E. Eason:
  How simulations fail. 2367-2390
• 
  Jacob Stegenga:
  An impossibility theorem for amalgamating evidence. 2391-2411
• 
  Sam Baron:
  A Truthmaker Indispensability Argument. 2413-2427
• 
  Kourken Michaelian:
  The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck. 2429-2456
• 
  John N. Williams:
  The completeness of the pragmatic solution to Moore's paradox in belief: a reply to Chan. 2457-2476

Volume 190, Number 13, September 2013

Epistemic Transmission and Interaction

• 
  Luca Moretti, Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen:
  Epistemic transmission and interaction. 2477-2479
• 
  Luca Moretti, Tommaso Piazza:
  When warrant transmits and when it doesn't: towards a general framework. 2481-2503
• 
  Jens Christian Bjerring:
  Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result. 2505-2524
• 
  Tomoji Shogenji:
  Coherence of the contents and the transmission of probabilistic support. 2525-2545
• 
  Rogier De Langhe:
  Peer disagreement under multiple epistemic systems. 2547-2556
• 
  Erik J. Olsson, Aron Vallinder:
  Norms of assertion and communication in social networks. 2557-2571
• 
  Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Jesper Kallestrup:
  The epistemology of absence-based inference. 2573-2593

Volume 190, Number 14, September 2013

• 
  Maria Aloni, Paul Égré, Tikitu de Jager:
  Knowing whether A or B. 2595-2621
• 
  Till Grüne-Yanoff:
  Preference change and conservatism: comparing the Bayesian and the AGM models of preference revision. 2623-2641
• 
  Ralph Wedgwood:
  Gandalf's solution to the Newcomb problem. 2643-2675
• 
  Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo, Sara Negri:
  The Church-Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory. 2677-2716
• 
  Andrew Moon:
  Remembering entails knowing. 2717-2729
• 
  Assaf Sharon, Levi Spectre:
  Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it? 2731-2748
• 
  Christopher Gregory Weaver:
  A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation. 2749-2772
• 
  Arthur Sullivan:
  Multiple propositions, contextual variability, and the semantics/pragmatics interface. 2773-2800
• 
  John M. Dukich:
  Two types of empirical adequacy: a partial structures approach. 2801-2820
• 
  Darrell P. Rowbottom:
  Empirical evidence claims are a priori. 2821-2834
• 
  Stephen Hetherington:
  Concessive knowledge-attributions: fallibilism and gradualism. 2835-2851
• 
  Claudio Mazzola:
  Correlations, deviations and expectations: the Extended Principle of the Common Cause. 2853-2866
• 
  Luigi Scorzato:
  On the role of simplicity in science. 2867-2895
• 
  Jaroslav Peregrin, Vladimír Svoboda:
  Criteria for logical formalization. 2897-2924
• 
  Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia:
  On Norton's dome. 2925-2941
• 
  Ian Evans:
  The problem of the basing relation. 2943-2957

Volume 190, Number 15, October 2013

• 
  Jonathan Tallant:
  Intuitions in physics. 2959-2980
• 
  Stephanie Beardman:
  A Non-factualist defense of the Reflection principle. 2981-2999
• 
  Adrian Brasoveanu:
  The grammar of quantification and the fine structure of interpretation contexts. 3001-3051
• 
  Magdalena Balcerak Jackson:
  Conceptual Analysis and Epistemic Progress. 3053-3074
• 
  Martin L. Jönsson, Elias Assarsson:
  Shogenji's measure of justification and the inverse conjunction fallacy. 3075-3085
• 
  Robert Northcott:
  Degree of explanation. 3087-3105
• 
  Francesco Guala:
  The normativity of Lewis Conventions. 3107-3122
• 
  Fabrizio Cariani:
  Aggregating with reason(s). 3123-3147
• 
  Carlo Martini:
  A puzzle about belief updating. 3149-3160
• 
  Adam Rieger:
  Conditionals are material: the positive arguments. 3161-3174
• 
  Jody Azzouni:
  Inconsistency in natural languages. 3175-3184
• 
  Katarzyna Budzynska:
  Circularity in ethotic structures. 3185-3207
• 
  Moti Mizrahi:
  The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far. 3209-3226
• 
  María Caamaño Alegre:
  Pragmatic norms in science: making them explicit. 3227-3246
• 
  David Spector:
  Margin for error semantics and signal perception. 3247-3263
• 
  Ronnie Hermens:
  Speakable in quantum mechanics. 3265-3286
• 
  Arvid Båve:
  Formulating deflationism. 3287-3305

Volume 190, Number 16, November 2013

• 
  Gustavo Cevolani, Roberto Festa, Theo A. F. Kuipers:
  Verisimilitude and belief change for nomic conjunctive theories. 3307-3324
• 
  Sven Ove Hansson:
  Maximal and perimaximal contraction. 3325-3348
• 
  Sergei N. Artëmov, Tudor Protopopescu:
  Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis. 3349-3376
• 
  Wolfgang Schwarz:
  Variations on a Montagovian theme. 3377-3395
• 
  Björn Kralemann, Claas Lattmann:
  Models as icons: modeling models in the semiotic framework of Peirce's theory of signs. 3397-3420
• 
  Min Chen, Luciano Floridi:
  An analysis of information visualisation. 3421-3438
• 
  John F. Halpin:
  Briggs on antirealist accounts of scientific law. 3439-3449
• 
  Rawad El Skaf, Cyrille Imbert:
  Unfolding in the empirical sciences: experiments, thought experiments and computer simulations. 3451-3474
• 
  Jonas R. Becker Arenhart:
  Wither away individuals. 3475-3494
• 
  Jane Suilin Lavelle, George S. Botterill, Suzanne Lock:
  Contrastive explanation and the many absences problem. 3495-3510
• 
  Ilho Park:
  Simultaneous belief updates via successive Jeffrey conditionalization. 3511-3533
• 
  Julia Staffel:
  Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief? 3535-3551
• 
  Gregor Betz:
  Justifying inference to the best explanation as a practical meta-syllogism on dialectical structures. 3553-3578
• 
  Adam Corner, Ulrike Hahn:
  Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others? 3579-3610
• 
  Alistair M. C. Isaac:
  Modeling without representation. 3611-3623
• 
  Scott Tanona:
  Decoherence and the Copenhagen cut. 3625-3649

Volume 190, Number 17, November 2013

• 
  Rik Peels:
  Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise? 3651-3669
• 
  Newton C. A. da Costa, Olimpia Lombardi, Mariano Lastiri:
  A modal ontology of properties for quantum mechanics. 3671-3693
• 
  Sharon Berry:
  Default reasonableness and the mathoids. 3695-3713
• 
  J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis, Katherine Rubin:
  Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability. 3715-3729
• 
  Dana Tulodziecki:
  Underdetermination, methodological practices, and realism. 3731-3750
• 
  Kelly Becker:
  Why reliabilism does not permit easy knowledge. 3751-3775
• 
  Charlie Pelling:
  Assertion and safety. 3777-3796
• 
  Adam J. Bowen:
  Dissolving an epistemological puzzle of time perception. 3797-3817
• 
  Marco Giovanelli:
  Talking at cross-purposes: how Einstein and the logical empiricists never agreed on what they were disagreeing about. 3819-3863
• 
  Susanne Mantel:
  Acting for reasons, apt action, and knowledge. 3865-3888
• 
  Sam Cowling:
  Ideological parsimony. 3889-3908
• 
  Grant Ramsey:
  Driftability. 3909-3928
• 
  Anne Baril:
  Pragmatic encroachment in accounts of epistemic excellence. 3929-3952
• 
  Daniel M. Johnson:
  B-theory old and new: on ontological commitment. 3953-3970
• 
  Martin Roth:
  Folk psychology as science. 3971-3982
• 
  Jessica Carter:
  Handling mathematical objects: representations and context. 3983-3999

Volume 190, Number 18, December 2013

• 
  Ruurik Holm:
  Non-zero probabilities for universal generalizations. 4001-4007
• 
  Peter J. Lewis:
  The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument. 4009-4022
• 
  Can Baskent:
  Some topological properties of paraconsistent models. 4023-4040
• 
  Georg Brun, Hans Rott:
  Interpreting enthymematic arguments using belief revision. 4041-4063
• 
  Scott Stapleford:
  Imperfect epistemic duties and the justificational fecundity of evidence. 4065-4075
• 
  James R. Beebe:
  Weakness of will, reasonability, and compulsion. 4077-4093
• 
  Stefania Centrone:
  Notes on Mally's deontic logic and the collapse of $${\varvec{Seinsollen}}$$ and $${\varvec{Sein}}$$. 4095-4116
• 
  Janet Levin:
  Armchair methodology and epistemological naturalism. 4117-4136
• 
  Samuel Schindler:
  The Kuhnian mode of HPS. 4137-4154
• 
  Michal Arciszewski:
  Reducing the dauer larva: molecular models of biological phenomena in Caenorhabditis elegans research. 4155-4179
• 
  Manuel Pérez Otero:
  Purposes of reasoning and (a new vindication of) Moore's proof of an external world. 4181-4200
• 
  J. Adam Carter:
  Extended cognition and epistemic luck. 4201-4214
• 
  Fernando Tohmé, Ricardo Crespo:
  Abduction in economics: a conceptual framework and its model. 4215-4237
• 
  Peter W. Ross, Dale Turner:
  Existence problems in philosophy and science. 4239-4259
• 
  Philip Percival:
  Branching of possible worlds. 4261-4291
• 
  Michael Blome-Tillmann:
  Knowledge and implicatures. 4293-4319
• 
  K. Brad Wray:
  The pessimistic induction and the exponential growth of science reassessed. 4321-4330
• 
  David Deutsch:
  Constructor theory. 4331-4359
• 
  Jochen Briesen:
  Reliabilism, bootstrapping, and epistemic circularity. 4361-4372

Volume 190, Number Supplement-1, December 2013

Third International Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI-III) in Guangzhou

• 
  Hans van Ditmarsch, Jérôme Lang:
  Editorial introduction to the special issue LORI Guangzhou. 1-4
• 
  Davide Grossi:
  Abstract argument games via modal logic. 5-29
• 
  Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi, Thomas F. Icard III:
  Information dynamics and uniform substitution. 31-55
• 
  Pavel Naumov, Brittany Nicholls:
  On interchangeability of Nash equilibria in multi-player strategic games. 57-78
• 
  Floris Roelofsen:
  Algebraic foundations for the semantic treatment of inquisitive content. 79-102
• 
  Yanjing Wang, Qinxiang Cao:
  On axiomatizations of public announcement logic. 103-134
• 
  Yì N. Wáng, Thomas Ågotnes:
  Public announcement logic with distributed knowledge: expressivity, completeness and complexity. 135-162