Synthese, Volume 194

Volume 194, Number 1, January 2017

Special issue on Carnap on Logic

• 
  Georg Schiemer:
  Carnap on logic and rationality. 1-14
• 
  Iris Loeb:
  The role of universal language in the early work of Carnap and Tarski. 15-31
• 
  Georg Schiemer, Richard Zach, Erich H. Reck:
  Carnap's early metatheory: scope and limits. 33-65
• 
  Steve Awodey:
  Carnap and the invariance of logical truth. 67-78
• 
  Richard Creath:
  The logical and the analytic. 79-96
• 
  Pierre Wagner:
  Carnapian and Tarskian semantics. 97-119
• 
  Peter Olen:
  A forgotten strand of reception history: understanding pure semantics. 121-141
• 
  Florian Steinberger:
  Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic. 143-162
• 
  A. W. Carus:
  Carnapian rationality. 163-184
• 
  Rudolf Carnap:
  Value concepts (1958). 185-194
• 
  Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Erich H. Reck:
  Carnapian explication, formalisms as cognitive tools, and the paradox of adequate formalization. 195-215
• 
  Sebastian Lutz:
  Carnap on empirical significance. 217-252

Volume 194, Number 2, February 2017

Special Issue: A Philosophical Look at the Discovery of the Higgs Boson

• 
  Richard Dawid:
  A philosophical look at the discovery the Higgs boson. 253-257
• 
  Allan Franklin:
  The missing piece of the puzzle: the discovery of the Higgs boson. 259-274
• 
  Pierre-Hugues Beauchemin:
  Autopsy of measurements with the ATLAS detector at the LHC. 275-312
• 
  Slobodan Perovic:
  Experimenter's regress argument, empiricism, and the calibration of the large hadron collider. 313-332
• 
  Koray Karaca:
  A case study in experimental exploration: exploratory data selection at the Large Hadron Collider. 333-354
• 
  Kent W. Staley:
  Pragmatic warrant for frequentist statistical practice: the case of high energy physics. 355-376
• 
  Richard Dawid:
  Bayesian perspectives on the discovery of the Higgs particle. 377-394
• 
  Robert D. Cousins:
  The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox and discovery criteria in high energy physics. 395-432
• 
  Michael Stöltzner:
  The variety of explanations in the Higgs sector. 433-460
• 
  Adrian Wüthrich:
  The Higgs discovery as a diagnostic causal inference. 461-476
• 
  James D. Wells:
  Higgs naturalness and the scalar boson proliferation instability problem. 477-490
• 
  C. D. McCoy:
  Prediction in general relativity. 491-509
• 
  Neil Levy:
  Embodied savoir-faire: knowledge-how requires motor representations. 511-530
• 
  Jordan Dodd:
  Hope, knowledge, and blindspots. 531-543
• 
  Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia:
  A simple and interesting classical mechanical supertask. 545-570
• 
  Colin Hamlin:
  Towards a theory of universes: structure theory and the mathematical universe hypothesis. 571-591
• 
  Garry Young:
  Knowledge how, ability, and the type-token distinction. 593-607
• 
  Sam Baron:
  Feel the flow. 609-630
• 
  Dustin Locke:
  Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment. 631-654

Volume 194, Number 3, March 2017

Special Issue: The future of social cognition: paradigms, concepts and experiments

• 
  Nivedita Gangopadhyay:
  The future of social cognition: paradigms, concepts and experiments. 655-672
• 
  Peter Carruthers:
  Mindreading in adults: evaluating two-systems views. 673-688
• 
  Hannes Rakoczy:
  In defense of a developmental dogma: children acquire propositional attitude folk psychology around age 4. 689-707
• 
  Joel Smith:
  What is empathy for? 709-722
• 
  Quassim Cassam:
  What asymmetry? Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, and the inferentialist challenge. 723-741
• 
  Søren Overgaard:
  The unobservability thesis. 743-760
• 
  Albert Newen:
  Defending the liberal-content view of perceptual experience: direct social perception of emotions and person impressions. 761-785
• 
  Somogy Varga:
  The case for mind perception. 787-807
• 
  Shaun Nichols:
  The essence of mentalistic agents. 809-825
• 
  Daniel D. Hutto:
  Basic social cognition without mindreading: minding minds without attributing contents. 827-846

Regular Papers

• 
  Vassilios Karakostas, Elias Zafiris:
  Contextual semantics in quantum mechanics from a categorical point of view. 847-886
• 
  Martin Flament Fultot:
  Modulation: an alternative to instructions and forces. 887-916
• 
  Niels Skovgaard-Olsen:
  The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments. 917-939
• 
  Eli Pitcovski:
  Getting the big picture - A question on composition and photography. 941-962
• 
  Minyao Huang:
  A plea for radical contextualism. 963-988
• 
  Christopher Willard-Kyle:
  Do great minds really think alike? 989-1026

Volume 194, Number 4, April 2017

Special issue on Teleological organisation

• 
  Sune Holm, John Basl:
  Teleological organisation. 1027-1029
• 
  Jay Odenbaugh:
  Nothing in ethics makes sense except in the light of evolution? Natural goodness, normativity, and naturalism. 1031-1055
• 
  John Basl:
  A trilemma for teleological individualism. 1057-1074
• 
  Sune Holm:
  Teleology and biocentrism. 1075-1087
• 
  Matteo Mossio, Leonardo Bich:
  What makes biological organisation teleological? 1089-1114
• 
  Antoine C. Dussault, Frédéric Bouchard:
  A persistence enhancing propensity account of ecological function to explain ecosystem evolution. 1115-1145
• 
  Karen Neander:
  Functional analysis and the species design. 1147-1168
• 
  Brian Leahy, Maximilian Huber:
  Two arguments for the etiological theory over the modal theory of biological function. 1169-1187

Regular Papers

• 
  Zachary Horne, Jonathan Livengood:
  Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism. 1189-1218
• 
  Jordan Stein:
  Tharp's theorems of metaphysics and the notion of necessary truth. 1219-1231
• 
  Christoph Kelp:
  Lotteries and justification. 1233-1244
• 
  Frank Cabrera:
  Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership. 1245-1272
• 
  Daniel A. Wilkenfeld:
  MUDdy understanding. 1273-1293
• 
  Leah Henderson:
  The no miracles argument and the base rate fallacy. 1295-1302
• 
  Jakob Koscholke, Marc Jekel:
  Probabilistic coherence measures: a psychological study of coherence assessment. 1303-1322
• 
  Jonas Rafael Becker Arenhart:
  The received view on quantum non-individuality: formal and metaphysical analysis. 1323-1347
• 
  Lukas Skiba:
  Fictionalism and the incompleteness problem. 1349-1362
• 
  Jeremy Howick:
  The relativity of 'placebos': defending a modified version of Grünbaum's definition. 1363-1396
• 
  Thomas Raleigh:
  Against an inferentialist dogma. 1397-1421
• 
  Peter Olen:
  Erratum to: A forgotten strand of reception history: understanding pure semantics. 1423
• 
  Alexander C. Paseau:
  Erratum to: A measure of inferential-role preservation. 1425

Volume 194, Number 5, May 2017

Special Issues on Truth & Epistemic Norms

• 
  Julien Dutant, Davide Fassio, Anne Meylan:
  Introduction. 1427-1431
• 
  Erik J. Olsson:
  Engel vs. Rorty on truth. 1433-1450
• 
  Conor McHugh:
  Engel on doxastic correctness. 1451-1462
• 
  J. Adam Carter:
  Assertion, uniqueness and epistemic hypocrisy. 1463-1476
• 
  Duncan Pritchard:
  Engel on pragmatic encroachment and epistemic value. 1477-1486
• 
  Christoph Kelp, Mona Simion:
  Commodious knowledge. 1487-1502
• 
  Lehrer Keith:
  Common sense and skepticism: a lecture. 1503-1516
• 
  Paul Égré:
  Knowledge as de re true belief? 1517-1529
• 
  Jérôme Dokic:
  Knowledge, perception, and the art of camouflage. 1531-1539
• 
  Igor Douven:
  How to account for the oddness of missing-link conditionals. 1541-1554
• 
  Pascal Engel:
  Replies: on norms of belief and knowledge. 1555-1564

Regular Articles

• 
  Franz Huber:
  Why follow the royal rule? 1565-1590
• 
  Jay Newhard:
  Plain truth and the incoherence of alethic functionalism. 1591-1611
• 
  Jack M. C. Kwong:
  Is Open-Mindedness Conducive to Truth? 1613-1626
• 
  Travis Dumsday:
  MaxCon extended simples and the dispositionalist ontology of laws. 1627-1641
• 
  Jared Warren:
  Epistemology versus non-causal realism. 1643-1662
• 
  Diego E. Machuca:
  A neo-Pyrrhonian response to the disagreeing about disagreement argument. 1663-1680
• 
  Tobias Starzak:
  Interpretations without justification: a general argument against Morgan's Canon. 1681-1701
• 
  Tim Räz:
  The silent hexagon: explaining comb structures. 1703-1724
• 
  Pendaran Roberts:
  An ecumenical response to color contrast cases. 1725-1742
• 
  Wei Fang:
  Holistic modeling: an objection to Weisberg's weighted feature-matching account. 1743-1764
• 
  Dominic Alford-Duguid, Michael Arsenault:
  On the explanatory power of hallucination. 1765-1785
• 
  Cédric Paternotte, Milena Ivanova:
  Virtues and vices in scientific practice. 1787-1807
• 
  Robert E. Pezet:
  A foundation for presentism. 1809-1837

Volume 194, Number 6, June 2017

• 
  María Manzano, Enrique Alonso:
  A note on Visions of Henkin. 1839-1840
• 
  Lenny Clapp:
  On denying presuppositions. 1841-1900
• 
  Jie Gao:
  Rational action without knowledge (and vice versa). 1901-1917
• 
  Matthew William McKeon:
  Statements of inference and begging the question. 1919-1943
• 
  Christian Loew:
  Causation, physics, and fit. 1945-1965
• 
  Charles H. Pence:
  Is genetic drift a force? 1967-1988
• 
  Boris Hennig:
  The man without properties. 1989-2006
• 
  Markos Valaris:
  What reasoning might be. 2007-2024
• 
  Paul D. Thorn:
  On the preference for more specific reference classes. 2025-2051
• 
  Matthew Tugby:
  The problem of retention. 2053-2075
• 
  John D. Greenwood:
  Solitary social belief. 2077-2099
• 
  Benjamin Lennertz:
  Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences. 2101-2119
• 
  Yongfeng Yuan:
  Rational metabolic revision based on core beliefs. 2121-2146
• 
  Fernando Broncano-Berrocal:
  A robust enough virtue epistemology. 2147-2174
• 
  J. Adam Carter, Martin Peterson:
  The modal account of luck revisited. 2175-2184
• 
  Benjamin Rohrs:
  Supervaluational propositional content. 2185-2201
• 
  Luc Lauwers:
  Infinite lotteries, large and small sets. 2203-2209
• 
  Christopher Clarke:
  How to define levels of explanation and evaluate their indispensability. 2211-2231
• 
  Stefan Buijsman:
  Accessibility of reformulated mathematical content. 2233-2250

Volume 194, Number 7, July 2017

Special Issue on Causation and Structuralism

• 
  Andreas Hüttemann:
  Structuralism, causation and explanation. 2251-2253
• 
  Juha Saatsi:
  Structuralism with and without causation. 2255-2271
• 
  Anjan Chakravartty:
  Particles, causation, and the metaphysics of structure. 2273-2289
• 
  Alexander Reutlinger:
  Are causal facts really explanatorily emergent? Ladyman and Ross on higher-level causal facts and renormalization group explanation. 2291-2305
• 
  Mauro Dorato:
  Dynamical versus structural explanations in scientific revolutions. 2307-2327
• 
  Michael Esfeld:
  How to account for quantum non-locality: ontic structural realism and the primitive ontology of quantum physics. 2329-2344

Regular Articles

• 
  Kelly Trogdon:
  Revelation and physicalism. 2345-2366
• 
  Jeroen Smid:
  'Identity' as a mereological term. 2367-2385
• 
  David S. Oderberg:
  Finality revived: powers and intentionality. 2387-2425
• 
  Finnur Dellsén:
  Realism and the absence of rivals. 2427-2446
• 
  Mikkel Birkegaard Andersen, Thomas Bolander, Hans van Ditmarsch, Martin Holm Jensen:
  Bisimulation and expressivity for conditional belief, degrees of belief, and safe belief. 2447-2487
• 
  Xiaoxing Zhang:
  The paradox of the diffusiveness of power. 2489-2500
• 
  Ema Sullivan-Bissett:
  Malfunction defended. 2501-2522
• 
  Gennaro Chierchia:
  Clouds and blood. More on vagueness and the mass/count distinction. 2523-2538
• 
  Christopher J. Austin:
  Aristotelian essentialism: essence in the age of evolution. 2539-2556
• 
  Matteo Morganti, Tuomas E. Tahko:
  Moderately naturalistic metaphysics. 2557-2580
• 
  Milena Ivanova:
  Poincaré's aesthetics of science. 2581-2594
• 
  Zalán Gyenis, Gábor Hofer-Szabó, Miklós Rédei:
  Conditioning using conditional expectations: the Borel-Kolmogorov Paradox. 2595-2630
• 
  James Andow:
  Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive? 2631-2643
• 
  Giovanni Merlo:
  Multiple reference and vague objects. 2645-2666

Volume 194, Number 8, August 2017

Special Issue: Doxastic Agency and Epistemi Responsibility

• 
  Andrea Kruse, Heinrich Wansing:
  Introduction to the special issue "Doxastic Agency and Epistemic Responsibility". 2667-2671
• 
  Matthias Steup:
  Believing intentionally. 2673-2694
• 
  Hans Rott:
  Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief. 2695-2720
• 
  Nikolaj Nottelmann:
  Against a descriptive vindication of doxastic voluntarism. 2721-2744
• 
  Conor McHugh:
  Attitudinal control. 2745-2762
• 
  A. K. Flowerree:
  Agency of belief and intention. 2763-2784
• 
  Verena Wagner:
  On the analogy of free will and free belief. 2785-2810
• 
  Andrea Kruse:
  Why doxastic responsibility is not based on direct doxastic control. 2811-2842
• 
  Heinrich Wansing:
  Remarks on the logic of imagination. A step towards understanding doxastic control through imagination. 2843-2861
• 
  Sanford C. Goldberg:
  Should have known. 2863-2894
• 
  Rik Peels:
  Responsible belief and epistemic justification. 2895-2915

Regular Papers

• 
  Stephan Krämer:
  A hyperintensional criterion of irrelevance. 2917-2930
• 
  Jane McDonnell:
  Wigner's puzzle and the Pythagorean heuristic. 2931-2948
• 
  Ben Phillips:
  Inscrutability and visual objects. 2949-2971
• 
  Will Fleisher:
  Virtuous distinctions - New distinctions for reliabilism and responsibilism. 2973-3003
• 
  Cressida Gaukroger:
  Why broad content can't influence behaviour. 3005-3020
• 
  Philip Atkins:
  A Russellian account of suspended judgment. 3021-3046
• 
  Ken Warmbrod:
  Time, change and time without change. 3047-3067
• 
  Bryan C. Appley, Gregory Stoutenburg:
  Two new objections to explanationism. 3069-3084
• 
  Jordan Baker:
  Rejecting Pereboom's empirical objection to agent-causation. 3085-3100
• 
  Brian Kim, Anubav Vasudevan:
  How to expect a surprising exam. 3101-3133
• 
  Richard Heersmink:
  Distributed selves: personal identity and extended memory systems. 3135-3151
• 
  Michael Hughes:
  Epistemic inconsistency and categorical coherence: a study of probabilistic measures of coherence. 3153-3185

Volume 194, Number 9, September 2017

Special Issue on New Thinking about Scientific Realism

• 
  Stathis Psillos, Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem:
  Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism. 3187-3201
• 
  Timothy D. Lyons:
  Epistemic selectivity, historical threats, and the non-epistemic tenets of scientific realism. 3203-3219
• 
  Peter Vickers:
  Understanding the selective realist defence against the PMI. 3221-3232
• 
  Juha Saatsi:
  Replacing recipe realism. 3233-3244
• 
  Gauvain Leconte:
  Predictive success, partial truth and Duhemian realism. 3245-3265
• 
  Mario Alai:
  Resisting the historical objections to realism: Is Doppelt's a viable solution? 3267-3290
• 
  Ilkka Niiniluoto:
  Optimistic realism about scientific progress. 3291-3309
• 
  Steven French:
  (Structural) realism and its representational vehicles. 3311-3326
• 
  Curtis Forbes:
  A pragmatic, existentialist approach to the scientific realism debate. 3327-3346
• 
  David Spurrett:
  Physicalism as an empirical hypothesis. 3347-3360
• 
  Nora Berenstain:
  The applicability of mathematics to physical modality. 3361-3377
• 
  Anjan Chakravartty:
  Reflections on new thinking about scientific realism. 3379-3392

Regular Papers

• 
  Jean Baccelli:
  Do bets reveal beliefs? - A unified perspective on state-dependent utility issues. 3393-3419
• 
  Andrew Peet:
  Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation. 3421-3443
• 
  A. Philip Dawid:
  On individual risk. 3445-3474
• 
  Conrad Heilmann, Stefan Wintein:
  How to be fairer. 3475-3499
• 
  Erik Weber, Merel Lefevere:
  Unification, the answer to resemblance questions. 3501-3521
• 
  Kengo Miyazono:
  Does functionalism entail extended mind? 3523-3541
• 
  Anthony Vincent Fernandez:
  The subject matter of phenomenological research: existentials, modes, and prejudices. 3543-3562
• 
  Thomas William Barrett, Hans Halvorson:
  Quine's conjecture on many-sorted logic. 3563-3582
• 
  Dimitris Tsementzis:
  Univalent foundations as structuralist foundations. 3583-3617
• 
  Trip Glazer:
  Looking angry and sounding sad: The perceptual analysis of emotional expression. 3619-3643
• 
  Daniel C. Burnston:
  Cognitive penetration and the cognition-perception interface. 3645-3668
• 
  Jessie Munton:
  Frege, fiction and force. 3669-3692

Volume 194, Number 10, October 2017

Special Issue on Vagueness and Probability

• 
  Richard Dietz:
  Vagueness and probability: introduction. 3693-3698
• 
  Kit Fine:
  The possibility of vagueness. 3699-3725
• 
  Peter Pagin:
  Tolerance and higher-order vagueness. 3727-3760
• 
  Nicholas J. J. Smith:
  Undead argument: the truth-functionality objection to fuzzy theories of vagueness. 3761-3787
• 
  Rosanna Keefe:
  Degrees of belief, expected and actual. 3789-3800
• 
  Daniel Lassiter, Noah D. Goodman:
  Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation. 3801-3836
• 
  Paul Égré:
  Vague judgment: a probabilistic account. 3837-3865
• 
  Igor Douven:
  Verities, the sorites, and Theseus' ship. 3867-3878
• 
  Masaki Ichinose:
  Normativity, probability, and meta-vagueness. 3879-3900
• 
  Wlodek Rabinowicz:
  From values to probabilities. 3901-3929
• 
  Aidan Lyon:
  Vague Credence. 3931-3954
• 
  Eleonora Cresto:
  Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks. 3955-3977
• 
  Branden Fitelson, Alan Hájek:
  Declarations of independence. 3979-3995

Regular Papers

• 
  Martin Smith:
  Intuitionistc probability and the Bayesian objection to dogmatism. 3997-4009
• 
  José V. Hernández-Conde:
  A case against convexity in conceptual spaces. 4011-4037
• 
  Adrienne Prettyman:
  Perceptual content is indexed to attention. 4039-4054
• 
  Daniele Mundici:
  Coherence of de Finetti coherence. 4055-4063
• 
  Cameron Boult:
  Epistemic normativity and the justification-excuse distinction. 4065-4081
• 
  Francesco Martini:
  Hearsay viewed through the lens of trust, reputation and coherence. 4083-4099
• 
  Hugh Desmond:
  Symmetry breaking and the emergence of path-dependence. 4101-4131
• 
  Reuben Stern:
  Interventionist decision theory. 4133-4153
• 
  Jeremy Randel Koons:
  A Myth resurgent: classical foundationalism and the new Sellarsian critique. 4155-4169
• 
  Sam Cowling:
  Conceivability arguments for haecceitism. 4171-4190

Volume 194, Number 11, November 2017

Special Issue on Cognition

• 
  Cameron Buckner, Ellen Fridland:
  What is cognition? angsty monism, permissive pluralism(s), and the future of cognitive science. 4191-4195
• 
  William Ramsey:
  Must cognition be representational? 4197-4214
• 
  Mark Rowlands:
  Arguing about representation. 4215-4232
• 
  Colin Allen:
  On (not) defining cognition. 4233-4249
• 
  Albert Newen:
  What are cognitive processes? An example-based approach. 4251-4268
• 
  Ken Aizawa:
  Cognition and behavior. 4269-4288
• 
  Carrie Figdor:
  On the proper domain of psychological predicates. 4289-4310
• 
  Hajo Greif:
  What is the extension of the extended mind? 4311-4336
• 
  Ellen Fridland:
  Automatically minded. 4337-4363

Regular Papers

• 
  John Michael:
  Putting unicepts to work: a teleosemantic perspective on the infant mindreading puzzle. 4365-4388
• 
  John Pittard:
  Disagreement, reliability, and resilience. 4389-4409
• 
  Valtteri Lahtinen, Antti Stenvall:
  Towards a unified framework for decomposability of processes. 4411-4427
• 
  Anthony Sudbery:
  The logic of the future in quantum theory. 4429-4453
• 
  Rebekka Hufendiek:
  Affordances and the normativity of emotions. 4455-4476
• 
  Jan Willem Wieland:
  Responsibility for strategic ignorance. 4477-4497
• 
  Remco Heesen:
  Academic superstars: competent or lucky? 4499-4518
• 
  Samuli Pöyhönen:
  Value of cognitive diversity in science. 4519-4540
• 
  Eline Busck Gundersen:
  Lewis's revised conditional analysis revisited. 4541-4558
• 
  Evan Westra:
  Spontaneous mindreading: a problem for the two-systems account. 4559-4581
• 
  Daniel Immerman:
  Question closure to solve the surprise test. 4583-4596
• 
  Dylan Dodd:
  Belief and certainty. 4597-4621
• 
  Shieva Kleinschmidt:
  Refining Four-Dimensionalism. 4623-4640

Volume 194, Number 12, December 2017

Special Issue on Objectivity in Science

• 
  Matteo Colombo, Raoul Gervais, Jan Sprenger:
  Introduction: objectivity in science. 4641-4642
• 
  Max Bialek:
  Interest relativism in the best system analysis of laws. 4643-4655
• 
  Jaana Eigi:
  Different motivations, similar proposals: objectivity in scientific community and democratic science policy. 4657-4669
• 
  Inkeri Koskinen:
  Where is the epistemic community? On democratisation of science and social accounts of objectivity. 4671-4686
• 
  Martin Kusch:
  Epistemic relativism, scepticism, pluralism. 4687-4703
• 
  David Ludwig:
  The objectivity of local knowledge. Lessons from ethnobiology. 4705-4720
• 
  Femke L. Truijens:
  Do the numbers speak for themselves? A critical analysis of procedural objectivity in psychotherapeutic efficacy research. 4721-4740
• 
  Marcel Weber:
  How objective are biological functions? 4741-4755

Regular Articles

• 
  Tommaso Bertolotti, Lorenzo Magnani:
  Theoretical considerations on cognitive niche construction. 4757-4779
• 
  Jonathan Knowles:
  Global expressivism and the flight from metaphysics. 4781-4797
• 
  Ittay Nissan-Rozen:
  Newcomb meets Gettier. 4799-4814
• 
  Georgie Statham:
  The manipulation of chemical reactions: probing the limits of interventionism. 4815-4838
• 
  Arezoo Islami:
  A match not made in heaven: on the applicability of mathematics in physics. 4839-4861
• 
  David P. Ellerman:
  Quantum mechanics over sets: a pedagogical model with non-commutative finite probability theory as its quantum probability calculus. 4863-4896
• 
  Jonathan P. Drake:
  Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth. 4897-4912
• 
  Patrick Cronin:
  Regularity theories disconfirmed: a revamped argument and a wager. 4913-4933
• 
  Tyrus Fisher:
  Causal counterfactuals are not interventionist counterfactuals. 4935-4957
• 
  Benoit Gaultier:
  Skills, procedural knowledge, and knowledge-how. 4959-4981
• 
  Tyrus Fisher:
  Counterlegal dependence and causation's arrows: causal models for backtrackers and counterlegals. 4983-5003
• 
  Milos Kosterec:
  On the number of types. 5005-5021
• 
  Bruno Whittle:
  Self-referential propositions. 5023-5037
• 
  Ludwig Fahrbach:
  Scientific revolutions and the explosion of scientific evidence. 5039-5072
• 
  Jani Raerinne:
  Explanations of exceptions in biology: corrective asymmetry versus autonomy. 5073-5092
• 
  Jaemin Jung:
  Steadfastness, deference, and permissive rationality. 5093-5112