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2020 – today
- 2024
[c46]Kento Yoshida, Kei Kimura
, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Analyzing Incentives and Fairness in Ordered Weighted Average for Facility Location Games. ECAI 2024: 3380-3387- 2022
- [j3]Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Manipulation-resistant false-name-proof facility location mechanisms for complex graphs. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 36(1): 12 (2022) - [c45]Bo You, Ludwig Dierks, Taiki Todo, Minming Li, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategy-Proof House Allocation with Existing Tenants over Social Networks. AAMAS 2022: 1446-1454 - [c44]Sung-Ho Cho, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks. IJCAI 2022: 186-193 - [c43]Koji Osoegawa, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Wheel Graphs. PRIMA 2022: 139-155 - 2021
- [c42]Taiki Todo, Ryoji Wada, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo:
Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information. ADT 2021: 390-405 - [c41]Takehiro Kawasaki, Ryoji Wada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Mechanism Design for Housing Markets over Social Networks. AAMAS 2021: 692-700 - [c40]Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
New Algorithms for Japanese Residency Matching. IJCAI 2021: 412-418 - [c39]Zhaohong Sun, Taiki Todo, Toby Walsh:
Fair Pairwise Exchange among Groups. IJCAI 2021: 419-425 - 2020
- [c38]Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. AAAI 2020: 2062-2069 - [c37]Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Split Manipulations in Cost Sharing of Minimum Cost Spanning Tree. ECAI 2020: 219-226 - [c36]Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. ECAI 2020: 227-234 - [c35]Taiki Todo:
Mechanism Design with Uncertainty. IJCAI 2020: 5174-5177
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c34]Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Manipulations-resistant Facility Location Mechanisms for ZV-line Graphs. AAMAS 2019: 1452-1460 - [c33]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Competitive Auctions and Envy-Freeness for Group of Agents. COCOON 2019: 541-553 - [c32]Nodoka Okada, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
SAT-Based Automated Mechanism Design for False-Name-Proof Facility Location. PRIMA 2019: 321-337 - [i4]Seiji Takanashi, Takehiro Kawasaki, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Efficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network. CoRR abs/1904.12422 (2019) - [i3]Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures. CoRR abs/1907.08914 (2019) - [i2]Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanaël Barrot, Seiji Takanashi, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network. CoRR abs/1911.08809 (2019) - 2018
- [j2]Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategy-proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-nothing Utility. Fundam. Informaticae 158(1-3): 41-61 (2018) - [j1]Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange under Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 63: 515-555 (2018) - [c31]Chi Kit Ken Fong, Minming Li, Pinyan Lu, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Facility Location Games With Fractional Preferences. AAAI 2018: 1039-1046 - [c30]Yuho Wada, Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Facility Location with Variable and Dynamic Populations. AAMAS 2018: 336-344 - [c29]Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo:
Service Exchange Problem. IJCAI 2018: 354-360 - [i1]Ilan Nehama, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Manipulation-resistant facility location mechanisms for ZV-line graphs. CoRR abs/1804.03759 (2018) - 2017
- [c28]Tomohiro Ono, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Rename and False-Name Manipulations in Discrete Facility Location with Optional Preferences. PRIMA 2017: 163-179 - 2016
- [c27]Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proof Locations of Two Facilities: Economic and Algorithmic Approaches. AAAI 2016: 615-621 - [c26]Yuto Tominaga, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Manipulations in Two-Agent Sequential Allocation with Random Sequences. AAMAS 2016: 141-149 - [c25]Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets. PRIMA 2016: 181-196 - 2015
- [c24]Etsushi Fujita, Julien Lesca, Akihisa Sonoda, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
A Complexity Approach for Core-Selecting Exchange with Multiple Indivisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences. AAAI 2015: 907-913 - [c23]Mingyu Guo, Hong Shen, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Social Decision with Minimal Efficiency Loss: An Automated Mechanism Design Approach. AAMAS 2015: 347-355 - [c22]Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Fairness and False-Name Manipulations in Randomized Cake Cutting. AAMAS 2015: 909-917 - [c21]Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Hidenao Iwane, Hirokazu Anai, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo:
Parametric Mechanism Design via Quantifier Elimination. AAMAS 2015: 1885-1886 - [c20]Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Saya Onoue, Ken-ichi Matsumoto:
Characteristics of Sustainable OSS Projects: A Theoretical and Empirical Study. CHASE@ICSE 2015: 15-21 - [c19]Zhaohong Sun, Hideaki Hata, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Exchange of Indivisible Objects with Asymmetry. IJCAI 2015: 97-103 - [c18]Takamasa Ihara, Shunsuke Tsuruta, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategy-Proof Cake Cutting Mechanisms for All-or-Nothing Utility. PRIMA 2015: 118-133 - 2014
- [c17]Akihisa Sonoda, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Two Case Studies for Trading Multiple Indivisible Goods with Indifferences. AAAI 2014: 791-797 - [c16]Taiki Todo, Haixin Sun, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategyproof Exchange with Multiple Private Endowments. AAAI 2014: 805-811 - [c15]Shunsuke Tsuruta, Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yujiro Kawasaki, Mingyu Guo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Optimal false-name-proof single-item redistribution mechanisms. AAMAS 2014: 221-228 - [c14]Julien Lesca, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
Coexistence of utilitarian efficiency and false-name-proofness in social choice. AAMAS 2014: 1201-1208 - [c13]Dengji Zhao, Siqi Luo, Taiki Todo, Makoto Yokoo:
False-name-proof Combinatorial Auction Design via Single-minded Decomposition. ECAI 2014: 945-950 - [c12]Masaaki Oka, Taiki Todo, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo:
Predicting Own Action: Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Induced by Proper Scoring Rules. HCOMP 2014: 184-191 - 2013
- [c11]Taiki Todo, Vincent Conitzer:
False-name-proof matching. AAMAS 2013: 311-318 - [c10]Atsushi Iwasaki, Etsushi Fujita, Taiki Todo, Miao Yao, Makoto Yokoo:
VCG-equivalent in expectation mechanism: general framework for constructing iterative combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS 2013: 699-706 - 2012
- [c9]Taiki Todo, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
False-name-proofness in online mechanisms. AAMAS 2012: 753-762 - 2011
- [c8]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
False-name-proof mechanism design without money. AAMAS 2011: 651-658 - [c7]Taiki Todo, Runcong Li, Xuemei Hu, Takayuki Mouri, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Generalizing Envy-Freeness toward Group of Agents. IJCAI 2011: 386-392 - 2010
- [c6]Atsushi Iwasaki, Vincent Conitzer, Yoshifusa Omori, Yuko Sakurai, Taiki Todo, Mingyu Guo, Makoto Yokoo:
Worst-case efficiency ratio in false-name-proof combinatorial auction mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 633-640 - [c5]Taiki Todo:
Characterization of false-name-proof social choice mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 1675-1676 - [c4]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Characterization of Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions. IAT 2010: 383-390 - [c3]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
False-Name-Proofness in Facility Location Problem on the Real Line. WINE 2010: 559-562
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c2]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai:
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS (1) 2009: 265-272 - [c1]Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo:
Characterization of Strategy-Proof, Revenue Monotone Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms and Connection with False-Name-Proofness. WINE 2009: 561-568
Coauthor Index
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