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ORCIDY. Narahari
Yadati Narahari
Person information
- affiliation: Indian Institute of Science, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Bangalore, India
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Books and Theses
- 2009
[b1]Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, V. Hastagiri Prakash:
Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions. Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing, Springer 2009, ISBN 978-1-84800-937-0, pp. 1-274
Journal Articles
- 2022
- [j40]Divya Padmanabhan
, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Dominant strategy truthful, deterministic multi-armed bandit mechanisms with logarithmic regret for sponsored search auctions. Appl. Intell. 52(3): 3209-3226 (2022) - 2021
- [j39]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning multi-armed bandits. Artif. Intell. 296: 103485 (2021) - [j38]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 22: 174:1-174:31 (2021) - 2019
- [j37]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 85(1): 1-19 (2019) - [j36]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Parameterized dichotomy of choosing committees based on approval votes in the presence of outliers. Theor. Comput. Sci. 783: 53-70 (2019) - [j35]Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-Based Preference Aggregation. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 6(1): 46-59 (2019) - 2018
- [j34]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing. Artif. Intell. 254: 44-63 (2018) - [j33]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of manipulation with partial information in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 726: 78-99 (2018) - 2017
- [j32]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Multi-Label Classification from Multiple Noisy Sources Using Topic Models. Inf. 8(2): 52 (2017) - [j31]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal bribery in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 676: 15-32 (2017) - 2016
- [j30]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Kernelization complexity of possible winner and coalitional manipulation problems in voting. Theor. Comput. Sci. 616: 111-125 (2016) - [j29]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 3(4): 197-210 (2016) - 2013
- [j28]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Optimal multi-unit combinatorial auctions. Oper. Res. 13(1): 27-46 (2013) - [j27]Vikas K. Garg, Y. Narahari, M. Narasimha Murty:
Novel Biobjective Clustering (BiGC) Based on Cooperative Game Theory. IEEE Trans. Knowl. Data Eng. 25(5): 1070-1082 (2013) - 2012
- [j26]Chaitanya Nittala, Yadati Narahari:
Optimal equilibrium bidding strategies for budget constrained bidders in sponsored search auctions. Oper. Res. 12(3): 317-343 (2012) - [j25]Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham, S. V. Subrahmanya:
Carbon footprint optimization: game theoretic problems and solutions. SIGecom Exch. 11(1): 34-38 (2012) - 2011
- [j24]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 41: 131-154 (2011) - [j23]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Topologies of strategically formed social networks based on a generic value function - Allocation rule model. Soc. Networks 33(1): 56-69 (2011) - [j22]Ramasuri Narayanam, Yadati Narahari:
A Shapley Value-Based Approach to Discover Influential Nodes in Social Networks. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 8(1): 130-147 (2011) - 2009
- [j21]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
Nonconvex piecewise linear knapsack problems. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 192(1): 56-68 (2009) - [j20]G. V. R. Radhanikanth, Y. Narahari:
Reverse combinatorial auction-based protocols for resource selection in grids. Int. J. Grid Util. Comput. 1(2): 109-120 (2009) - [j19]Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari:
An Optimal Mechanism for Sponsored Search Auctions on the Web and Comparison With Other Mechanisms. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 6(4): 641-657 (2009) - 2008
- [j18]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks with Rational Nodes. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 26(7): 1138-1148 (2008) - [j17]Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari:
Mechanism Design for Single Leader Stackelberg Problems and Application to Procurement Auction Design. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 5(3): 377-393 (2008) - 2007
- [j16]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari, Charles H. Rosa, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew:
Multiattribute electronic procurement using goal programming. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 179(2): 518-536 (2007) - [j15]Pankaj Dayama, Yadati Narahari:
Design of Multiunit Electronic Exchanges Through Decomposition. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 4(1): 67-74 (2007) - [j14]Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Y. Narahari, Charles H. Rosa, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew, Pankaj Dayama:
Auction-Based Mechanisms for Electronic Procurement. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 4(3): 297-321 (2007) - 2006
- [j13]C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, K. Ravikumar:
Learning dynamic prices in electronic retail markets with customer segmentation. Ann. Oper. Res. 143(1): 59-75 (2006) - [j12]Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
Achieving sharp deliveries in supply chains through variance pool allocation. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 171(1): 227-254 (2006) - 2005
- [j11]Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari:
Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 44(3): 185-205 (2005) - 2004
- [j10]Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari:
Object oriented modeling and decision support for supply chains. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 153(3): 704-726 (2004) - [j9]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
Design of six sigma supply chains. IEEE Trans Autom. Sci. Eng. 1(1): 38-57 (2004) - 2000
- [j8]N. Hemachandra, Y. Narahari:
A Mathematical Programming Approach to Optimal Markovian Switching of Poisson Arrival Streams to Queueing Systems. Queueing Syst. Theory Appl. 36(4): 443-461 (2000) - 1999
- [j7]Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, V. Kiran Kumar:
Lead time modeling and acceleration of product design and development. IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom. 15(5): 882-896 (1999) - [j6]Yadati Narahari, Rachuri Sudarsan, Kevin W. Lyons, M. R. Duffey, Ram D. Sriram:
Design for tolerance of electro-mechanical assemblies: An integrated approach. IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom. 15(6): 1062-1079 (1999) - 1998
- [j5]Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan:
Asymptotic loss of priority scheduling policies in closed re-entrant lines: A computational study. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 110(3): 585-596 (1998) - 1997
- [j4]Y. Narahari, N. Hemachandra, M. S. Gaur:
Transient analysis of multiclass manufacturing systems with priority scheduling. Comput. Oper. Res. 24(5): 387-398 (1997) - 1996
- [j3]Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan:
Performance analysis of scheduling policies in re-entrant manufacturing systems. Comput. Oper. Res. 23(1): 37-51 (1996) - 1994
- [j2]Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
Transient analysis of manufacturing systems performance. IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom. 10(2): 230-244 (1994) - 1990
- [j1]Nukala Viswanadham, Yadati Narahari, T. L. Johnson:
Deadlock prevention and deadlock avoidance in flexible manufacturing systems using Petri net models. IEEE Trans. Robotics Autom. 6(6): 713-723 (1990)
Conference and Workshop Papers
- 2023
- [c124]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari:
Individual-Fair and Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. AAMAS 2023: 2872-2874 - [c123]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari:
Designing Fair, Cost-Optimal Auctions Based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs Through Farmer Collectives. CASE 2023: 1-8 - [c122]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Abhishek Chaudhary, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
A Decision Support Tool for District Level Planning of Agricultural Crops for Maximizing Profits of Farmers. CASE 2023: 1-6 - [c121]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
An Innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CASE 2023: 1-7 - 2022
- [c120]Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Yadati Narahari:
On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. AAMAS 2022: 1705-1707 - [c119]Rohit Patel, Inavamsi Enaganti, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari:
A Data-Driven, Farmer-Oriented Agricultural Crop Recommendation Engine (ACRE). BDA 2022: 227-248 - [c118]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Azal Fatima, Inavamsi Enaganti, Yadati Narahari:
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Efficient Procurement of Agricultural Inputs for Farmers through Farmer Collectives. COMPASS 2022: 696-700 - [c117]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Yadati Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. IJCAI 2022: 60-66 - [c116]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Yadati Narahari:
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. IJCAI 2022: 489-495 - [c115]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. WINE 2022: 256-272 - 2020
- [c114]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problem. AAAI 2020: 5379-5386 - [c113]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. AAMAS 2020: 1849-1851 - [c112]Shivika Narang, Yadati Narahari:
A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. AAMAS 2020: 1951-1953 - 2019
- [c111]Shivika Narang, Megha Byali, Pankaj Dayama, Vinayaka Pandit, Y. Narahari:
Design of Trusted B2B Market Platforms using Permissioned Blockchains and Game Theory. IEEE ICBC 2019: 385-393 - 2018
- [c110]Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Yadati Narahari:
Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. AAAI 2018: 917-924 - [c109]Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Amleshwar Kumar, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari:
Design of Coalition Resistant Credit Score Functions for Online Discussion Forums. AAMAS 2018: 95-103 - 2017
- [c108]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Parameterized Dichotomy of Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. AAMAS 2017: 42-50 - [c107]Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Thompson Sampling Based Mechanisms for Stochastic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems. AAMAS 2017: 87-95 - [c106]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. AAMAS 2017: 642-650 - [c105]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. AAMAS 2017: 1667-1669 - [c104]Sneha Mondal, Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Two-Phase Influence Maximization in Social Networks with Seed Nodes and Referral Incentives. ICWSM 2017: 620-623 - [c103]Aritra Chatterjee, Ganesh Ghalme, Shweta Jain, Rohit Vaish, Y. Narahari:
Analysis of Thompson Sampling for Stochastic Sleeping Bandits. UAI 2017 - 2016
- [c102]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal Bribery in Voting. AAAI 2016: 2466-2472 - [c101]Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Y. Narahari:
A Fluctuation Smoothing Approach for Unsupervised Automatic Short Answer Grading. NLP-TEA@COLING 2016: 82-91 - [c100]Shweta Jain, Ganesh Ghalme, Satyanath Bhat, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
A Deterministic MAB Mechanism for Crowdsourcing with Logarithmic Regret and Immediate Payments. AAMAS 2016: 86-94 - [c99]Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Yadati Narahari:
A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1385-1386 - [c98]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Crowdfunding Public Projects with Provision Point: A Prediction Market Approach. ECAI 2016: 778-786 - [c97]Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari:
Transfer Learning for Automatic Short Answer Grading. ECAI 2016: 1622-1623 - [c96]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Crowdsourced Referral Auctions. ECAI 2016: 1654-1655 - [c95]Shourya Roy, Sandipan Dandapat, Ajay Nagesh, Yadati Narahari:
Wisdom of Students: A Consistent Automatic Short Answer Grading Technique. ICON 2016: 178-187 - [c94]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification. ICTAI 2016: 996-1003 - [c93]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. IJCAI 2016: 229-235 - [c92]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Robust UCB scheme for active learning in regression from strategic crowds. IJCNN 2016: 2212-2219 - [c91]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. WINE 2016: 174-187 - 2015
- [c90]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
A Stackelberg Game Approach for Incentivizing Participation in Online Educational Forums with Heterogeneous Student Population. AAAI 2015: 1043-1049 - [c89]Praphul Chandra, Yadati Narahari, Debmalya Mandal, Prasenjit Dey:
Novel Mechanisms for Online Crowdsourcing with Unreliable, Strategic Agents. AAAI 2015: 1256-1262 - [c88]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Kernelization Complexity of Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation Problems in Voting. AAMAS 2015: 87-96 - [c87]Pankaj Dayama, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari:
Truthful Interval Cover Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing Applications. AAMAS 2015: 1091-1099 - [c86]Arpita Biswas, Shweta Jain, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
A Truthful Budget Feasible Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Time Critical Tasks. AAMAS 2015: 1101-1109 - [c85]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. AAMAS 2015: 1441-1450 - [c84]Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Yadati Narahari:
Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. AAMAS 2015: 1753-1754 - [c83]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Yadati Narahari:
A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. AAMAS 2015: 1787-1788 - [c82]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. AAMAS 2015: 1789-1790 - [c81]S. Prasanna Devi, Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, S. Vinu Kiran, S. Manivannan:
E-mandi implementation based on gale-shapely algorithm for perishable goods supply chain. CASE 2015: 1421-1426 - [c80]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election Using Sampling. IJCAI 2015: 1120-1126 - [c79]Shourya Roy, Y. Narahari, Om D. Deshmukh:
A Perspective on Computer Assisted Assessment Techniques for Short Free-Text Answers. CAA 2015: 96-109 - 2014
- [c78]Shweta Jain, Balakrishnan Narayanaswamy, Y. Narahari:
A Multiarmed Bandit Incentive Mechanism for Crowdsourcing Demand Response in Smart Grids. AAAI 2014: 721-727 - [c77]Satyanath Bhat, Swaprava Nath, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
A mechanism to optimally balance cost and quality of labeling tasks outsourced to strategic agents. AAMAS 2014: 917-924 - [c76]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Asymptotic collusion-proofness of voting rules: the case of large number of candidates. AAMAS 2014: 1419-1420 - [c75]Debmalya Mandal, Yadati Narahari:
A novel ex-post truthful mechanism for multi-slot sponsored search auctions. AAMAS 2014: 1555-1556 - [c74]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
A quality assuring multi-armed bandit crowdsourcing mechanism with incentive compatible learning. AAMAS 2014: 1609-1610 - [c73]Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari:
Mechanism design for sustainable virtual power plant formation. CASE 2014: 67-72 - [c72]Madhav V. Marathe, Y. Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam:
Message from social networking workshop chairs. COMSNETS 2014: 1 - 2013
- [c71]Ratul Ray, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Eliciting high quality feedback from crowdsourced tree networks using continuous scoring rules. AAMAS 2013: 279-286 - [c70]Chetan Yadati, Dilpreet Kaur, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Avik Sarkar, Y. Narahari:
Incentive compatible mechanisms for power cut allocation in smart grids. CASE 2013: 100-105 - [c69]Deepak Bagchi, Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya:
Incentive compatible green procurement using scoring rules. CASE 2013: 504-509 - [c68]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, C. A. Subramanian, Yadati Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam, Srinath Narasimha:
Topologies of stable strategic networks with localized payoffs. CASE 2013: 844-849 - [c67]Shweta Jain, Narayanaswamy Balakrishnan, Yadati Narahari, Saiful Azmi bin Hj Husain, Voo Nyuk Yoong:
Constrained tâtonnement for fast and incentive compatible distributed demand management in smart grids. e-Energy 2013: 125-136 - [c66]Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Scalable Preference Aggregation in Social Networks. HCOMP 2013: 42-50 - 2012
- [c65]Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou:
Threats and Trade-Offs in Resource Critical Crowdsourcing Tasks Over Networks. AAAI 2012: 2447-2448 - [c64]Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, Y. Narahari:
Optimal incentive timing strategies for product marketing on social networks. AAMAS 2012: 703-710 - [c63]L. Udaya Lakshmi, Y. Narahari, Deepak Bagchi, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya, Shantanu Biswas, Nukala Viswanadham:
A strategy-proof and budget balanced mechanism for carbon footprint reduction by global companies. CASE 2012: 64-69 - [c62]Premm Raj H, Y. Narahari:
Influence limitation in multi-campaign social networks: A Shapley value based approach. CASE 2012: 735-740 - [c61]Shantanu Biswas, Deepak Bagchi, Y. Narahari, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya, L. Udaya Lakshmi, Nukala Viswanadham:
Mechanism design for green, truthful procurement auctions. CASE 2012: 874-879 - [c60]Nukala Viswanadham, Sridhar Chidananda, Yadati Narahari, Pankaj Dayama:
Mandi electronic exchange: Orchestrating Indian agricultural markets for maximizing social welfare. CASE 2012: 992-997 - [c59]Ramasuri Narayanam, Yadati Narahari:
A game theory inspired, decentralized, local information based algorithm for community detection in social graphs. ICPR 2012: 1072-1075 - [c58]Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, James Y. Zou:
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing. WINE 2012: 212-226 - [c57]Swapnil Dhamal, Yadati Narahari:
Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies. WINE 2012: 504-511 - 2011
- [c56]Mayur Mohite, Y. Narahari:
Incentive compatible influence maximization in social networks and application to viral marketing. AAMAS 2011: 1081-1082 - [c55]Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Yadati Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources. UAI 2011: 539-546 - [c54]Yadati Narahari, Ramasuri Narayanam:
Game theoretic models for social network analysis. WWW (Companion Volume) 2011: 291-292 - 2010
- [c53]Radhika Arava, Deepak Bagchi, P. Suresh, Yadati Narahari, S. V. Subrahmanya:
Optimal allocation of carbon credits to emitting agents in a carbon economy. CASE 2010: 275-280 - [c52]Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari:
An iterative auction mechanism for combinatorial exchanges. CASE 2010: 849-854 - [c51]Nagaraj Kota, Y. Narahari:
Threshold behavior of incentives in social networks. CIKM 2010: 1461-1464 - [c50]Y. Narahari:
Game Theoretic Approaches to Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. PAKDD (1) 2010: 3 - [c49]Shantanu Biswas, Yadati Narahari:
Tâtonnement Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. CEC 2010: 25-31 - 2009
- [c48]Sriram Somanchi, Chaitanya Nittala, Yadati Narahari:
A Novel Bid Optimizer for Sponsored Search Auctions Using Cooperative Game Theory. IAT 2009: 435-438 - [c47]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Redistribution Mechanisms for the Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. MALLOW 2009 - [c46]Chandrashekar T. Subramanyam, Y. Narahari:
On the Incentive Compatible Core of a Procurement Network Game with Incomplete Information. MALLOW 2009 - [c45]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. CEC 2009: 74-81 - [c44]Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari:
Nash Bargaining Based Ad Networks for Sponsored Search Auctions. CEC 2009: 170-175 - [c43]Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari:
Approximately Efficient Iterative Mechanisms for Combinatorial Exchanges. CEC 2009: 182-187 - [c42]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Stability and Efficiency of Social Networks with Strategic, Resource Constrained Nodes. CEC 2009: 188-193 - [c41]Devansh Dikshit, Yadati Narahari:
Truthful and Quality Conscious Query Incentive Networks. WINE 2009: 386-397 - 2008
- [c40]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Determining the top-k nodes in social networks using the Shapley value. AAMAS (3) 2008: 1509-1512 - [c39]Prashanth Bandaru, Yadati Narahari:
Efficient algorithms for combinatorial auctions with volume discounts arising in web service composition. CASE 2008: 995-1000 - [c38]Ashwin Bellur, Yadati Narahari, Shantanu Biswas:
Cost sharing mechanisms for business clusters with strategic firms. CASE 2008: 1001-1006 - [c37]Ramakrishnan Kannan, Dinesh Garg, Karthik Subbian, Yadati Narahari:
A Nash bargaining approach to retention enhancing bid optimization in sponsored search auctions with discrete bids. CASE 2008: 1007-1012 - [c36]Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. WINE 2008: 438-445 - 2007
- [c35]Karthik Subbian, Ramakrishnan Kannan, Raghav Kumar Gautam, Y. Narahari:
Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Group Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. APSEC 2007: 270-277 - [c34]Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Yadati Narahari:
A Shapley Value Analysis to Coordinate the Formation of Procurement Networks. CASE 2007: 664-669 - [c33]Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, Sudeep Mallick, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya:
A Combinatorial Procurement Auction for QoS-Aware Web Services Composition. CASE 2007: 716-721 - [c32]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Broadcast in Ad hoc Wireless Networks with Selfish Nodes: A Bayesian Incentive Compatibility Approach. COMSWARE 2007 - [c31]Karthik Subbian, Y. Narahari:
Truth Eliciting Mechanisms for Trouble Ticket Allocation in Software Maintenance Services. SEKE 2007: 355- - [c30]Megha Mohabey, Y. Narahari, Sudeep Mallick, P. Suresh, S. V. Subrahmanya:
An Intelligent Procurement Marketplace forWeb Services Composition. Web Intelligence 2007: 551-554 - [c29]Raghav Kumar Gautam, N. Hemachandra, Y. Narahari, V. Hastagiri Prakash:
Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids. CEC/EEE 2007: 21-28 - [c28]Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Y. Narahari:
The Core and Shapley Value Analysis for Cooperative Formation of Procurement Networks. CEC/EEE 2007: 175-184 - [c27]Y. Narahari, Nikesh Kumar Srivastava:
A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Decentralized Supply Chain Formation. CEC/EEE 2007: 315-322 - [c26]Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, Siva Sankar Reddy:
Design of an Optimal Auction for Sponsored Search Auction. CEC/EEE 2007: 439-442 - 2006
- [c25]V. Hastagiri Prakash, Y. Narahari:
A Strategyproof Auction Mechanism for Grid Scheduling with Selfish Entities. WEBIST (1) 2006: 178-183 - 2005
- [c24]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
A Lagrangian heuristic for bid evaluation in e-procurement auctions. CASE 2005: 220-225 - [c23]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, Earnest Foster, Devadatta M. Kulkarni, Jeffrey D. Tew:
A Groves Mechanism Approach to Decentralized Design of Supply Chains. CEC 2005: 330-337 - [c22]Tallichetty S. Chandrashekar, Yadati Narahari:
Economic Mechanisms for Shortest Path Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information. WINE 2005: 70-79 - [c21]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari:
Design of Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Stackelberg Problems. WINE 2005: 718-727 - [c20]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari:
Price of Anarchy of Network Routing Games with Incomplete Information. WINE 2005: 1066-1075 - 2004
- [c19]Shantanu Biswas, Y. Narahari, Anish Das Sarma:
A Decomposition Based Approach for Design of Supply Aggregation and Demand Aggregation Exchanges. FORTE Workshops 2004: 58-71 - 2003
- [c18]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
e-Procurement Using Goal Programming. EC-Web 2003: 6-15 - [c17]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
Design of six sigma supply chains. ICRA 2003: 1737-1742 - [c16]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
A new approach to achieving sharp and timely deliveries in supply chain networks. IROS 2003: 2315-2320 - [c15]C. V. L. Raju, Yadati Narahari, Saurabh Shah:
Procurement auction using actor-critic type learning algorithm. SMC 2003: 4588-4594 - [c14]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
Trade Determination in Multi-Attribute Exchanges. CEC 2003: 173-180 - [c13]C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari, K. Ravikumar:
Reinforcement Learning Applications in Dynamic Pricing of Retail Markets. CEC 2003: 339-346 - 2002
- [c12]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
A New Approach to the Design of Electronic Exchanges. EC-Web 2002: 27-36 - [c11]Sourav Sen, Y. Narahari:
Improving Web Server Performance by Network Aware Data Buffering and Caching. HiPC 2002: 242-251 - [c10]S. Kameshwaran, Y. Narahari:
IMPROVE: An Innovative Market for e-Procurement. IC-AI 2002: 38-44 - [c9]C. V. L. Raju, Y. Narahari:
Queueing Network Modeling and Lead Time Compression of Electronic Procurement. ICRA 2002: 763-768 - [c8]Dinesh Garg, Yadati Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
Achieving Sharp Deliveries in Supply Chains through Variance Pool Allocation. ICRA 2002: 2345-2350 - 2000
- [c7]Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham, R. Bhattacharya:
Design of Synchronized Supply Chains: A Six Sigma Tolerancing Approach. ICRA 2000: 1151-1156 - 1998
- [c6]Rachuri Sudarsan, Y. Narahari, Kevin W. Lyons, Ram D. Sriram, M. R. Duffey:
Design for Tolerance of Electro-Mechanical Assemblies. ICRA 1998: 1490-1497 - 1995
- [c5]Y. Narahari, L. M. Khan:
Modeling Re-Entrant Mufacturing Systems with Inspections. ICRA 1995: 1738-1743 - 1994
- [c4]Y. Narahari, Sundar Ram Vedula:
Real-World Extensions to a Production Scheduling Algorithm Based on Lagrangian Relaxation. ICRA 1994: 3167-3172 - 1993
- [c3]C. R. M. Sundaram, Y. Narahari:
Analysis of Dynamic Load Balancing Strategies Using a Combination of Stochastic Petri Nets and Queueing Networks. Application and Theory of Petri Nets 1993: 397-414 - 1987
- [c2]N. Viswanadham, Y. Narahari:
Coloured Petri net models for automated manufacturing systems. ICRA 1987: 1985-1990 - 1985
- [c1]Y. Narahari, Nukala Viswanadham:
On the invariants of coloured Petri nets. Applications and Theory in Petri Nets 1985: 330-345
Editorship
- 2023
- [e3]Mingyu Feng, Tanja Käser, Partha P. Talukdar, Rakesh Agrawal, Y. Narahari, Mykola Pechenizkiy:
Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Educational Data Mining, EDM 2023, Bengaluru, India, July 11-14, 2023. International Educational Data Mining Society 2023 [contents] - 2015
- [e2]Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya:
Proceedings of the Second ACM IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, Bangalore, CoDS 2015, India, March 18-21, 2015. ACM 2015, ISBN 978-1-4503-3436-5 [contents] - [e1]Manish Gupta, Y. Narahari, V. S. Subrahmanian, Indrajit Bhattacharya:
Companion Volume to the Proceedings of the 2nd IKDD Conference on Data Sciences, CODS 2015 Companion Volume, Bangalore, India, March 20, 2015. ACM 2015, ISBN 978-1-4503-3616-1 [contents]
Informal and Other Publications
- 2024
- [i54]V. Udaya Sankar, Vishisht Srihari Rao, Y. Narahari:
Deep Learning Meets Mechanism Design: Key Results and Some Novel Applications. CoRR abs/2401.05683 (2024) - 2023
- [i53]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Bazil Ahmed, Prathik Diwakar, Ganesh Ghalme, Y. Narahari:
Designing Fair, Cost-optimal Auctions based on Deep Learning for Procuring Agricultural Inputs through Farmer Collectives. CoRR abs/2304.07341 (2023) - [i52]Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Jaydeep Pawar, Abhijnya Bhat, Deepanshu, Inavamsi Enaganti, Kartik Sagar, Y. Narahari:
An innovative Deep Learning Based Approach for Accurate Agricultural Crop Price Prediction. CoRR abs/2304.09761 (2023) - 2022
- [i51]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Achieving Envy-Freeness with Limited Subsidies under Dichotomous Valuations. CoRR abs/2201.07419 (2022) - [i50]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Mayank Ratan Bhardwaj, Y. Narahari:
Maxmin Participatory Budgeting. CoRR abs/2204.13923 (2022) - [i49]Siddharth Barman, Anand Krishna, Y. Narahari, Soumyarup Sadhukhan:
Nash Welfare Guarantees for Fair and Efficient Coverage. CoRR abs/2207.01970 (2022) - [i48]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Yadati Narahari:
Indivisible Participatory Budgeting under Weak Rankings. CoRR abs/2207.07981 (2022) - [i47]Gogulapati Sreedurga, Soumyarup Sadhukhan, Souvik Roy, Yadati Narahari:
Characterization of Group-Fair Social Choice Rules under Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR abs/2207.07984 (2022) - [i46]Amal Roy, Chandramani Singh, Y. Narahari:
Recent Advances in Modeling and Control of Epidemics using a Mean Field Approach. CoRR abs/2208.14765 (2022) - 2021
- [i45]Kumar Abhishek, Ganesh Ghalme, Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Sleeping Combinatorial Bandits. CoRR abs/2106.01624 (2021) - [i44]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Priyanka Bhatt, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
Improving Teacher-Student Interactions in Online Educational Forums using a Markov Chain based Stackelberg Game Model. CoRR abs/2112.01239 (2021) - 2020
- [i43]Shivika Narang, Y. Narahari:
A Study of Incentive Compatibility and Stability Issues in Fractional Matchings. CoRR abs/2001.05652 (2020) - [i42]Ganesh Ghalme, Swapnil Dhamal, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Ballooning Multi-Armed Bandits. CoRR abs/2001.10055 (2020) - [i41]Shivika Narang, Arpita Biswas, Y. Narahari:
On Achieving Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings. CoRR abs/2009.05823 (2020) - 2019
- [i40]Vishakha Patil, Ganesh Ghalme, Vineet Nair, Y. Narahari:
Achieving Fairness in the Stochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problem. CoRR abs/1907.10516 (2019) - 2017
- [i39]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Prabuchandran K. J., Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Dominant Strategy Truthful, Deterministic Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanism with Logarithmic Regret. CoRR abs/1703.00632 (2017) - [i38]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
On Optimal Mechanisms in the Two-Item Single-Buyer Unit-Demand Setting. CoRR abs/1705.01821 (2017) - [i37]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
Information Diffusion in Social Networks in Two Phases. CoRR abs/1706.07739 (2017) - [i36]Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Formation of Stable Strategic Networks with Desired Topologies. CoRR abs/1706.10215 (2017) - [i35]Swapnil Dhamal, Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, Y. Narahari:
Modeling Spread of Preferences in Social Networks for Sampling-based Preference Aggregation. CoRR abs/1708.05690 (2017) - [i34]Siddharth Barman, Arpita Biswas, Sanath Kumar Krishna Murthy, Y. Narahari:
Groupwise Maximin Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. CoRR abs/1711.07621 (2017) - 2016
- [i33]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Dinesh Garg, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
A Robust UCB Scheme for Active Learning in Regression from Strategic Crowds. CoRR abs/1601.06750 (2016) - [i32]Satyanath Bhat, Divya Padmanabhan, Shweta Jain, Y. Narahari:
A Truthful Mechanism with Biparameter Learning for Online Crowdsourcing. CoRR abs/1602.04032 (2016) - [i31]Divya Padmanabhan, Satyanath Bhat, Shirish K. Shevade, Y. Narahari:
Topic Model Based Multi-Label Classification from the Crowd. CoRR abs/1604.00783 (2016) - [i30]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Manipulation with Partial Information in Voting. CoRR abs/1604.04359 (2016) - [i29]Shourya Roy, Himanshu S. Bhatt, Y. Narahari:
An Iterative Transfer Learning Based Ensemble Technique for Automatic Short Answer Grading. CoRR abs/1609.04909 (2016) - [i28]Praphul Chandra, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Referral-Embedded Provision Point Mechanisms for Crowdfunding of Public Projects. CoRR abs/1610.01768 (2016) - [i27]D. Thirumulanathan, Rajesh Sundaresan, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Two Items to a Single Buyer Having Uniformly Distributed Valuations. CoRR abs/1610.06718 (2016) - 2015
- [i26]Swapnil Dhamal, Prabuchandran K. J., Y. Narahari:
A Multi-phase Approach for Improving Information Diffusion in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1502.06133 (2015) - [i25]Satyanath Bhat, Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
An Optimal Bidimensional Multi-Armed Bandit Auction for Multi-unit Procurement. CoRR abs/1502.06934 (2015) - [i24]Arupratan Ray, Debmalya Mandal, Y. Narahari:
Profit Maximizing Prior-free Multi-unit Procurement Auctions with Capacitated Sellers. CoRR abs/1504.01020 (2015) - [i23]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Frugal Bribery in Voting. CoRR abs/1504.08248 (2015) - [i22]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Manipulation is Harder with Incomplete Votes. CoRR abs/1504.08256 (2015) - [i21]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Estimating the Margin of Victory of an Election using Sampling. CoRR abs/1505.00566 (2015) - [i20]Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
Dynamic Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations. CoRR abs/1506.07631 (2015) - [i19]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
On Choosing Committees Based on Approval Votes in the Presence of Outliers. CoRR abs/1511.04190 (2015) - 2014
- [i18]Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
Redistribution Mechanisms for Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. CoRR abs/1401.3884 (2014) - [i17]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Detecting Possible Manipulators in Elections. CoRR abs/1404.2367 (2014) - [i16]Palash Dey, Neeldhara Misra, Y. Narahari:
Complexity of Kernelization in the Possible Winner Problem. CoRR abs/1405.3865 (2014) - [i15]Shweta Jain, Sujit Gujar, Satyanath Bhat, Onno Zoeter, Y. Narahari:
An Incentive Compatible Multi-Armed-Bandit Crowdsourcing Mechanism with Quality Assurance. CoRR abs/1406.7157 (2014) - [i14]Swapnil Dhamal, Akanksha Meghlan, Y. Narahari:
Cooperative Game Theoretic Solution Concepts for top-$k$ Problems. CoRR abs/1407.5442 (2014) - 2013
- [i13]Palash Dey, Y. Narahari:
Asymptotic Collusion-proofness of Voting Rules when the Number of Candidates is Large. CoRR abs/1305.5053 (2013) - 2012
- [i12]Rohith Dwarakanath Vallam, C. A. Subramanian, Ramasuri Narayanam, Yadati Narahari, Srinath Narasimha:
Topologies and Price of Stability of Complex Strategic Networks with Localized Payoffs : Analytical and Simulation Studies. CoRR abs/1201.0067 (2012) - [i11]Swapnil Dhamal, Y. Narahari:
Sufficient Conditions for Formation of a Network Topology by Self-interested Agents. CoRR abs/1201.1676 (2012) - [i10]Swaprava Nath, Onno Zoeter, Yadati Narahari, Christopher R. Dance:
Dynamic Mechanism Design for Markets with Strategic Resources. CoRR abs/1202.3751 (2012) - [i9]Pankaj Dayama, Aditya Karnik, Y. Narahari:
Optimal Mix of Incentive Strategies for Product Marketing on Social Networks. CoRR abs/1203.0135 (2012) - [i8]Swaprava Nath, Pankaj Dayama, Dinesh Garg, Y. Narahari, James Y. Zou:
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing. CoRR abs/1208.1676 (2012) - 2011
- [i7]Mayur Mohite, Y. Narahari:
Incentive Compatible Influence Maximization in Social Networks and Application to Viral Marketing. CoRR abs/1102.0918 (2011) - 2010
- [i6]Akash Das Sarma, Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms for Multi-Slot Sponsored Search Auctions. CoRR abs/1001.1414 (2010) - 2009
- [i5]Sujit Gujar, Y. Narahari:
An Optimal Multi-Unit Combinatorial Procurement Auction with Single Minded Bidders. CoRR abs/0902.0524 (2009) - [i4]Devansh Dikshit, Y. Narahari:
On Framework and Hybrid Auction Approach to the Spectrum Licensing Procedure. CoRR abs/0902.3104 (2009) - [i3]Sriram Somanchi, Chaitanya Nittala, Yadati Narahari:
A Novel Bid Optimizer for Sponsored Search Auctions based on Cooperative Game Theory. CoRR abs/0906.4764 (2009) - [i2]Ramasuri Narayanam, Y. Narahari:
Design of an Optimal Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol for Ad hoc Networks with Rational Nodes. CoRR abs/0907.1065 (2009) - 2008
- [i1]Sujit Gujar, Yadati Narahari:
On Optimal Linear Redistribution of VCG Payments in Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects. CoRR abs/0812.4792 (2008)
Coauthor Index
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