- Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami:
Group strategyproofness in queueing models. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 242-254 (2011) - Rebecca B. Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran:
Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 485-509 (2011) - Hervé Moulin, Francois Laigret:
Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 314-320 (2011) - Jawwad Noor:
Intertemporal choice and the magnitude effect. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 255-270 (2011) - Andrés Perea:
An algorithm for proper rationalizability. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 510-525 (2011) - Arkadi Predtetchinski:
One-dimensional bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 526-543 (2011) - Ryuji Sano:
Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 602-606 (2011) - Rene Saran:
Bilateral trading with naive traders. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 544-557 (2011) - Quazi Shahriar, John Wooders:
An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 558-573 (2011) - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. Games Econ. Behav. 72(2): 574-582 (2011) - Mathias Staudigl:
Potential games in volatile environments. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 271-287 (2011) - Alfredo Di Tillio:
A robustness result for rationalizable implementation. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 301-305 (2011) - Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz:
Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 288-300 (2011)