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ORCID7th SAGT 2014: Haifa, Israel
- Ron Lavi:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 7th International Symposium, SAGT 2014, Haifa, Israel, September 30 - October 2, 2014. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8768, Springer 2014, ISBN 978-3-662-44802-1
Matching Theory
- Aris Filos-Ratsikas
, Søren Kristoffer Stiil Frederiksen, Jie Zhang:
Social Welfare in One-Sided Matchings: Random Priority and Beyond. 1-12 - Marek Adamczyk, Piotr Sankowski, Qiang Zhang:
Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-Sided Matching. 13-24 - Linda Farczadi, Konstantinos Georgiou, Jochen Könemann:
Stable Marriage with General Preferences - Extended Abstract. 25-36
Game Dynamics
- György Dósa, Leah Epstein:
The Convergence Time for Selfish Bin Packing. 37-48 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Angelo Fanelli, Nick Gravin:
Short Sequences of Improvement Moves Lead to Approximate Equilibria in Constraint Satisfaction Games. 49-60 - Ágnes Cseh, Martin Skutella:
Paths to Stable Allocations. 61-73 - Aaron D. Jaggard, Neil Lutz, Michael Schapira, Rebecca N. Wright:
Self-stabilizing Uncoupled Dynamics. 74-85
Games of Coordination
- Elliot Anshelevich, John Postl:
Profit Sharing with Thresholds and Non-monotone Player Utilities. 86-97 - Shahar Dobzinski, Amir Ronen:
Shared Resource Management via Reward Schemes. 98-109 - Maximilian Drees, Sören Riechers, Alexander Skopalik:
Budget-Restricted Utility Games with Ordered Strategic Decisions. 110-121
Networks/Social Choice
- Dimitris Fotakis, Thodoris Lykouris, Evangelos Markakis, Svetlana Obraztsova:
Influence Maximization in Switching-Selection Threshold Models. 122-133 - Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers:
Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. 134-145 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski:
Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach. 146-157
Markets and Auctions
- Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier:
Clearing Markets via Bundles. 158-169 - Reshef Meir, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Walrasian Equilibrium with Few Buyers. 170-181 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm:
Multimarket Oligopolies with Restricted Market Access. 182-193 - Kshipra Bhawalkar, Patrick Hummel, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Value of Targeting. 194-205
Price of Anarchy
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations. 206-217 - Yoram Bachrach, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos, Milan Vojnovic:
Strong Price of Anarchy, Utility Games and Coalitional Dynamics. 218-230
Computational Aspects of Games
- Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form. 231-243 - Artur Czumaj, Michail Fasoulakis, Marcin Jurdzinski:
Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria in Symmetric Bimatrix Games. 244-254
Mechanism Design and Auctions
- Emmanouil Pountourakis, Guido Schäfer:
Mechanisms for Hiring a Matroid Base without Money. 255-266 - Mukund Sundararajan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Prediction and Welfare in Ad Auctions. 267-278 - Rafael Pass, Karn Seth:
On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design. 279-290
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