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ORCIDMichal Feldman
Person information
- affiliation: Tel Aviv University, Blavatnik School of Computer Science, Israel
- affiliation: Microsoft Research, Herzliya, Israel
- affiliation (former): Harvard University, School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Cambridge, MA, USA
- affiliation (former): Hebrew University of Jerusalem, School of Business Administration, Jerusalem, Israel
- affiliation (former, PhD 2005): University of California, Berkeley, School of Information Management and Systems, CA, USA
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2020 – today
- 2023
[j46]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai
:
Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding. Games Econ. Behav. 140: 316-340 (2023)- [j45]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76: 567-611 (2023) - [c108]Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. ICALP 2023: 58:1-58:20 - [c107]Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. EC 2023: 273-292 - [c106]Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz:
Ambiguous Contracts. EC 2023: 539 - [c105]Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Interdependent Public Projects. SODA 2023: 416-443 - [c104]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
"Who is Next in Line?" On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Bayesian Online Settings. SODA 2023: 3759-3776 - [c103]Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Multi-agent Contracts. STOC 2023: 1311-1324 - [i74]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Daniel Peretz:
Ambiguous Contracts. CoRR abs/2302.07621 (2023) - [i73]Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka:
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare. CoRR abs/2302.09633 (2023) - [i72]Ben Berger, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco:
Pandora's Problem with Combinatorial Cost. CoRR abs/2303.01078 (2023) - [i71]Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan, Tomasz Ponitka:
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations. CoRR abs/2304.03706 (2023) - [i70]Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR abs/2307.07495 (2023) - 2022
- [j44]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Prophet Matching with General Arrivals. Math. Oper. Res. 47(2): 878-898 (2022) - [j43]Xiyun Zhang, Gabriela Lobinska, Michal Feldman, Eddie Dekel, Martin A. Nowak, Yitzhak Pilpel, Yonatan Pauzner, Baruch Barzel, Ady Pauzner:
A spatial vaccination strategy to reduce the risk of vaccine-resistant variants. PLoS Comput. Biol. 18(8) (2022) - [j42]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. Theory Comput. 18: 1-33 (2022) - [c102]Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
Almost Full EFX Exists for Four Agents. AAAI 2022: 4826-4833 - [c101]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld:
Two-Price Equilibrium. AAAI 2022: 5008-5015 - [c100]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang, Almog Wald:
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. SAGT 2022: 60-77 - [c99]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC 2022: 820-845 - [c98]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
General Graphs are Easier than Bipartite Graphs: Tight Bounds for Secretary Matching. EC 2022: 1148-1177 - [e2]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Web and Internet Economics - 17th International Conference, WINE 2021, Potsdam, Germany, December 14-17, 2021, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13112, Springer 2022, ISBN 978-3-030-94675-3 [contents] - [i69]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
On the Significance of Knowing the Arrival Order in Prophet Inequality. CoRR abs/2202.09215 (2022) - [i68]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR abs/2202.09291 (2022) - [i67]Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Divyarthi Mohan, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Interdependent Public Projects. CoRR abs/2204.08044 (2022) - [i66]Almog Wald, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Lookahead Auctions with Pooling. CoRR abs/2209.12934 (2022) - [i65]Michal Feldman, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi, Simon Mauras, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Agents. CoRR abs/2211.02004 (2022) - [i64]Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Multi-Agent Contracts. CoRR abs/2211.05434 (2022) - 2021
- [j41]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. Oper. Res. 69(1): 188-206 (2021) - [c97]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI 2021: 5312-5320 - [c96]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. AAAI 2021: 5321-5329 - [c95]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. AAAI 2021: 5391-5398 - [c94]Paul Dütting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Combinatorial Contracts. FOCS 2021: 815-826 - [c93]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. IJCAI 2021: 175-181 - [c92]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. SAGT 2021: 112-123 - [c91]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? EC 2021: 390-408 - [c90]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economics-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. SOSA 2021: 107-110 - [i63]Ben Berger, Avi Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
(Almost Full) EFX Exists for Four Agents (and Beyond). CoRR abs/2102.10654 (2021) - [i62]Shahar Dobzinski, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Are Gross Substitutes a Substitute for Submodular Valuations? CoRR abs/2102.13343 (2021) - [i61]Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yishay Mansour:
Competitive Equilibria with Unequal Budgets: Supporting Arbitrary Pareto Optimal Allocations. CoRR abs/2103.08634 (2021) - [i60]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents. CoRR abs/2107.00357 (2021) - [i59]Paul Duetting, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim:
Combinatorial Contracts. CoRR abs/2109.14260 (2021) - [i58]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai, Aner Wolfenfeld:
Two-Price Equilibrium. CoRR abs/2112.08215 (2021) - 2020
- [j40]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123: 327-341 (2020) - [j39]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate Modularity Revisited. SIAM J. Comput. 49(1): 67-97 (2020) - [j38]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs. SIAM J. Comput. 49(3): 540-582 (2020) - [j37]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A general framework for endowment effects in combinatorial markets. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 38-44 (2020) - [j36]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-Unit Markets. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(4): 20:1-20:29 (2020) - [c89]Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Designing Committees for Mitigating Biases. AAAI 2020: 1942-1949 - [c88]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. EC 2020: 191 - [c87]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. EC 2020: 499-500 - [c86]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: Prophet Inequality for Vertex and Edge Arrival Models. EC 2020: 769-787 - [c85]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. WINE 2020: 206-219 - [i57]Ben Berger, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman:
On the Power and Limits of Dynamic Pricing in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/2002.06863 (2020) - [i56]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Online Stochastic Max-Weight Matching: prophet inequality for vertex and edge arrival models. CoRR abs/2002.09807 (2020) - [i55]Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir:
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. CoRR abs/2002.11461 (2020) - [i54]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. CoRR abs/2003.05913 (2020) - [i53]Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding. CoRR abs/2003.11857 (2020) - [i52]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ron Kupfer:
On a Competitive Secretary Problem with Deferred Selections. CoRR abs/2007.07216 (2020) - [i51]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR abs/2010.07280 (2020) - [i50]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Ori Zviran:
Price of Anarchy of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values. CoRR abs/2011.00498 (2020) - [i49]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Secretary Matching with General Arrivals. CoRR abs/2011.01559 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j35]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. Algorithmica 81(8): 3136-3161 (2019) - [j34]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. Theory Comput. Syst. 63(7): 1470-1498 (2019) - [j33]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(3): 14:1-14:27 (2019) - [c84]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. APPROX-RANDOM 2019: 7:1-7:23 - [c83]Yossi Azar, Allan Borodin, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
Efficient Allocation of Free Stuff. AAMAS 2019: 918-925 - [c82]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. EC 2019: 19-20 - [c81]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS 2019: 249-272 - [c80]Michal Feldman:
Auction Design under Interdependent Values (Invited Talk). ICALP 2019: 1:1-1:1 - [c79]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-min greedy matching. NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2019: 10:1 - [i48]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. CoRR abs/1903.08384 (2019) - [i47]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A General Framework for Endowment Effects in Combinatorial Markets. CoRR abs/1903.11360 (2019) - 2018
- [j32]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Michael Schwarz:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(3-4): 10:1-10:2 (2018) - [c78]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Truthful Prompt Scheduling for Minimizing Sum of Completion Times. ESA 2018: 27:1-27:14 - [c77]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama:
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. EC 2018: 319-320 - [c76]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner:
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. EC 2018: 369 - [c75]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein:
99% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. EC 2018: 443-460 - [c74]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Multi-unit Markets. WINE 2018: 140-153 - [i46]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Aviad Rubinstein:
99\% Revenue via Enhanced Competition. CoRR abs/1801.02908 (2018) - [i45]Alon Eden, Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman:
Max-Min Greedy Matching. CoRR abs/1803.05501 (2018) - [i44]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Tzahi Taub:
Prompt Scheduling for Selfish Agents. CoRR abs/1804.03244 (2018) - [i43]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kineret Segal:
An Economic-Based Analysis of RANKING for Online Bipartite Matching. CoRR abs/1804.06637 (2018) - [i42]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Ilan Nehama:
Prophets and Secretaries with Overbooking. CoRR abs/1805.05094 (2018) - [i41]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner:
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing. CoRR abs/1806.03865 (2018) - [i40]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1811.09871 (2018) - 2017
- [c73]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing Social Goods. ESA 2017: 35:1-35:14 - [c72]Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs. FOCS 2017: 540-551 - [c71]Yossi Azar, Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Alan Roytman:
Liquid Price of Anarchy. SAGT 2017: 3-15 - [c70]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi:
Online Random Sampling for Budgeted Settings. SAGT 2017: 29-40 - [c69]Michal Feldman, Yuval Snappir, Tami Tamir:
The Efficiency of Best-Response Dynamics. SAGT 2017: 186-198 - [c68]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing social goods. NetEcon@EC 2017: 10:1 - [c67]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. EC 2017: 243-244 - [c66]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC 2017: 323 - [c65]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC 2017: 343 - [c64]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman:
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. EC 2017: 405-422 - [c63]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate modularity revisited. STOC 2017: 1028-1041 - [i39]Yakov Babichenko, Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman, Boaz Patt-Shamir, Ron Peretz, Rann Smorodinsky:
Stable Secretaries. CoRR abs/1705.01589 (2017) - [i38]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Alan Roytman:
Makespan Minimization via Posted Prices. CoRR abs/1705.01965 (2017) - [i37]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Tim Roughgarden, Warut Suksompong:
Pricing Identical Items. CoRR abs/1705.06623 (2017) - [i36]Alon Eden, Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman:
Pricing Social Goods. CoRR abs/1706.10009 (2017) - 2016
- [j31]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput. 45(1): 29-48 (2016) - [j30]Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1): 8:1-8:26 (2016) - [c62]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Svetlana Obraztsova:
Variations on the Hotelling-Downs Model. AAAI 2016: 496-501 - [c61]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Oblivious Rounding and the Integrality Gap. APPROX-RANDOM 2016: 8:1-8:23 - [c60]Michal Feldman, Tomer Koren, Roi Livni, Yishay Mansour, Aviv Zohar:
Online Pricing with Strategic and Patient Buyers. NIPS 2016: 3864-3872 - [c59]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner:
Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Complements. EC 2016: 251-267 - [c58]Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Iddan Golomb:
On Voting and Facility Location. EC 2016: 269-286 - [c57]Vincent Cohen-Addad, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat:
The Invisible Hand of Dynamic Market Pricing. EC 2016: 383-400 - [c56]Shaddin Dughmi, Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi:
Lottery Pricing Equilibria. EC 2016: 401-418 - [c55]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. EC 2016: 637-654 - [c54]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The price of anarchy in large games. STOC 2016: 963-976 - [c53]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions. WINE 2016: 131-144 - [i35]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated- and Coarse- equilibria of Single-item auctions. CoRR abs/1601.07702 (2016) - [i34]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Jamie Morgenstern, Guy Reiner:
Simple Auctions For Agents With Complements. CoRR abs/1603.07939 (2016) - [i33]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour, Sigal Oren, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dynamics of Evolving Social Groups. CoRR abs/1605.09548 (2016) - [i32]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Approximate Modularity Revisited. CoRR abs/1612.02034 (2016) - [i31]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/1612.03161 (2016) - [i30]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR abs/1612.04746 (2016) - [i29]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR abs/1612.08821 (2016) - 2015
- [j29]Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects. Inf. Process. Lett. 115(2): 112-118 (2015) - [j28]Michal Feldman, Tom Ron:
Capacitated Network Design Games. Theory Comput. Syst. 57(3): 576-597 (2015) - [j27]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
Convergence to Strong Equilibrium in Network Design Games. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. 43(3): 71 (2015) - [c52]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. AAAI 2015: 872-878 - [c51]Michal Feldman, Ofir Geri:
Do Capacity Constraints Constrain Coalitions? AAAI 2015: 879-885 - [c50]Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler:
A Unified Framework for Strong Price of Anarchy in Clustering Games. ICALP (2) 2015: 601-613 - [c49]Shoshana Vasserman, Michal Feldman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Implementing the Wisdom of Waze. IJCAI 2015: 660-666 - [c48]Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Omer Lev, Moshe Tennenholtz:
How Robust Is the Wisdom of the Crowds? IJCAI 2015: 2055-2061 - [c47]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. SODA 2015: 123-135 - [c46]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE 2015: 300-313 - [e1]