default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDCarmine Ventre
Person information
- affiliation: King's College London, UK
Refine list
refinements active!
zoomed in on ?? of ?? records
view refined list in
export refined list as
showing all ?? records
2020 – today
- 2024
[j26]Haochen Li
, Yue Xiao, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Thermodynamic Analysis of Financial Markets: Measuring Order Book Dynamics with Temperature and Entropy. Entropy 26(1): 24 (2024)- [c79]Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Willy Wonka Mechanisms. AAMAS 2024: 78-86 - [c78]Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Piotr Krysta, Stefanos Leonardos, Georgios Piliouras, Carmine Ventre:
Who gets the Maximal Extractable Value? A Dynamic Sharing Blockchain Mechanism. AAMAS 2024: 2171-2173 - [c77]Jinyun Tong, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Reducing Systemic Risk in Financial Networks through Donations. AAMAS 2024: 2519-2521 - [c76]Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Societal Sorting as a Systemic Risk of Recommenders. RecSys 2024: 951-956 - [c75]Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, Lisa Wilhelmi:
Algorithms for Claims Trading. STACS 2024: 42:1-42:17 - [e2]Guido Schäfer, Carmine Ventre:
Algorithmic Game Theory - 17th International Symposium, SAGT 2024, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, September 3-6, 2024, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 15156, Springer 2024, ISBN 978-3-031-71032-2 [contents] - [i27]Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Willy Wonka Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2402.08314 (2024) - [i26]Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre, Lisa Wilhelmi:
Algorithms for Claims Trading. CoRR abs/2402.13627 (2024) - [i25]Pedro Braga, Georgios Chionas, Stefanos Leonardos, Piotr Krysta, Georgios Piliouras, Carmine Ventre:
On the Redistribution of Maximal Extractable Value: A Dynamic Mechanism. CoRR abs/2402.15849 (2024) - [i24]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
An Algorithmic Theory of Simplicity in Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/2403.08610 (2024) - [i23]Zhuohan Wang, Carmine Ventre:
A Financial Time Series Denoiser Based on Diffusion Model. CoRR abs/2409.02138 (2024) - 2023
- [j25]Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
New Constructions of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 48(1): 332-362 (2023) - [j24]Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Financial networks with singleton liability priorities. Theor. Comput. Sci. 963: 113965 (2023) - [c74]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Mechanism Design: (Ir)Rationality and Obvious Strategyproofness. DP@AI*IA 2023: 20-28 - [c73]Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade. AAMAS 2023: 2107-2115 - [c72]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Explicit Payments for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. AAMAS 2023: 2125-2133 - [c71]Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Error in the Euclidean Preference Model. AAMAS 2023: 2676-2678 - [c70]Haochen Li, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Detecting Financial Market Manipulation with Statistical Physics Tools. ICAIF 2023: 1 - [c69]Lingxiao Zhao, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Liquidity and Solvency Risks in Financial Networks. ICAIF 2023: 210-218 - [c68]Ziyi Wang, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov:
Robust Market Making: To Quote, or not To Quote. ICAIF 2023: 664-672 - [c67]Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents. IJCAI 2023: 2503-2510 - [c66]Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Error in the Euclidean Preference Model. IJCAI 2023: 2888-2896 - [c65]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. EC 2023: 657-677 - [i22]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
On the Connection between Greedy Algorithms and Imperfect Rationality. CoRR abs/2302.13641 (2023) - [i21]Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Clearing Financial Networks with Derivatives: From Intractability to Algorithms. CoRR abs/2312.05139 (2023) - [i20]Fei Wu, Thomas Thiery, Stefanos Leonardos, Carmine Ventre:
Strategic Bidding Wars in On-chain Auctions. CoRR abs/2312.14510 (2023) - 2022
- [j23]Elizabeth Black, Martim Brandão, Oana Cocarascu, Bart de Keijzer, Yali Du, Derek Long, Michael Luck, Peter McBurney, Albert Meroño-Peñuela, Simon Miles, Sanjay Modgil, Luc Moreau, Maria Polukarov, Odinaldo Rodrigues, Carmine Ventre:
Reasoning and interaction for social artificial intelligence. AI Commun. 35(4): 309-325 (2022) - [j22]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation. Theory Comput. Syst. 66(3): 696-720 (2022) - [c64]Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan, Fan Wu, Michail Basios:
The Spoofing Resistance of Frequent Call Markets. AAMAS 2022: 825-832 - [c63]Yuanzi Zhu, Carmine Ventre:
Irrational Behaviour and Globalisation. AAMAS 2022: 1780-1782 - [c62]Andrew Alden, Carmine Ventre, Blanka Horvath, Gordon Lee:
Model-Agnostic Pricing of Exotic Derivatives Using Signatures. ICAIF 2022: 96-104 - [c61]Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre:
Incentivising Market Making in Financial Markets. ICAIF 2022: 240-248 - [c60]Chunli Liu, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov:
Synthetic Data Augmentation for Deep Reinforcement Learning in Financial Trading. ICAIF 2022: 343-351 - [c59]Yanqing Ma, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov:
Denoised Labels for Financial Time Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning. ICAIF 2022: 471-479 - [c58]Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Derivatives. ICALP 2022: 76:1-76:18 - [c57]Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre:
Accounting for Strategic Response in Limit Order Book Dynamics. PRIMA 2022: 630-639 - [c56]Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Financial Networks with Singleton Liability Priorities. SAGT 2022: 205-222 - [e1]Daniele Magazzeni, Senthil Kumar, Rahul Savani, Renyuan Xu, Carmine Ventre, Blanka Horvath, Ruimeng Hu, Tucker Balch, Francesca Toni:
3rd ACM International Conference on AI in Finance, ICAIF 2022, New York, NY, USA, November 2-4, 2022. ACM 2022, ISBN 978-1-4503-9376-8 [contents] - [i19]Thomas Archbold, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Non-Obvious Manipulability for Single-Parameter Agents and Bilateral Trade. CoRR abs/2202.06660 (2022) - [i18]Luke Thorburn, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre:
Information Loss in Euclidean Preference Models. CoRR abs/2208.08160 (2022) - 2021
- [j21]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Approximation Guarantee of OSP Mechanisms: The Case of Machine Scheduling and Facility Location. Algorithmica 83(2): 695-725 (2021) - [c55]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring. AAAI 2021: 5423-5431 - [c54]Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan:
Call Markets with Adaptive Clearing Intervals. AAMAS 2021: 1587-1589 - [c53]Buhong Liu, Maria Polukarov, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan:
Agent-based markets: equilibrium strategies and robustness. ICAIF 2021: 24:1-24:8 - [c52]Zheng Gong, Carmine Ventre, John G. O'Hara:
The efficient hedging frontier with deep neural networks. ICAIF 2021: 27:1-27:8 - [c51]Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Two-Way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. WINE 2021: 3-21 - [i17]Stavros D. Ioannidis, Bart de Keijzer, Carmine Ventre:
Strong Approximations and Irrationality in Financial Networks with Financial Derivatives. CoRR abs/2109.06608 (2021) - [i16]Yanqing Ma, Carmine Ventre, Maria Polukarov:
Denoised Labels for Financial Time-Series Data via Self-Supervised Learning. CoRR abs/2112.10139 (2021) - 2020
- [j20]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Angelina Vidali:
Truthfulness on a budget: trading money for approximation through monitoring. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34(1): 5 (2020) - [c50]Zheng Gong, Carmine Ventre, John G. O'Hara:
Classifying high-frequency FX rate movements with technical indicators and inception model. ICAIF 2020: 50:1-50:8 - [c49]Bart de Keijzer, Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre:
Obviously Strategyproof Single-Minded Combinatorial Auctions. ICALP 2020: 71:1-71:17 - [c48]Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Novel Paradigm for the design of Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. ICTCS 2020: 184-189 - [i15]Fan Fang, Waichung Chung, Carmine Ventre, Michail Basios, Leslie Kanthan, Lingbo Li, Fan Wu:
Ascertaining price formation in cryptocurrency markets with DeepLearning. CoRR abs/2003.00803 (2020) - [i14]Fan Fang, Carmine Ventre, Michail Basios, Hoiliong Kong, Leslie Kanthan, Lingbo Li, David Martínez-Rego, Fan Wu:
Cryptocurrency Trading: A Comprehensive Survey. CoRR abs/2003.11352 (2020) - [i13]Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Two-way Greedy: Algorithms for Imperfect Rationality. CoRR abs/2007.11868 (2020) - [i12]Fan Fang, Carmine Ventre, Lingbo Li, Leslie Kanthan, Fan Wu, Michail Basios:
Better Model Selection with a new Definition of Feature Importance. CoRR abs/2009.07708 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j19]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Metastability of the Logit Dynamics for Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games. ACM Trans. Algorithms 15(2): 27:1-27:42 (2019) - [j18]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Social pressure in opinion dynamics. Theor. Comput. Sci. 795: 345-361 (2019) - [c47]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Angelina Vidali:
Truthfulness on a Budget: Trading Money for Approximation through Monitoring. AAMAS 2019: 1234-1242 - [c46]Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre:
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms without Money for Scheduling. AAMAS 2019: 1574-1581 - [c45]Christopher Culley, Ji Qi, Carmine Ventre:
How to Get the Most from Goods Donated to Charities. AAMAS 2019: 1910-1912 - [c44]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation. AAMAS 2019: 1952-1954 - [c43]Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms for Machine Scheduling. ESA 2019: 46:1-46:15 - [c42]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh, Jie Zhang, Bo An, Nick R. Jennings:
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance. PRICAI (2) 2019: 482-495 - [c41]Maria Kyropoulou, Carmine Ventre, Xiaomeng Zhang:
Mechanism Design for Constrained Heterogeneous Facility Location. SAGT 2019: 63-76 - [c40]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation - The Case of Machine Scheduling. SAGT 2019: 77-91 - [c39]Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Automated Optimal OSP Mechanisms for Set Systems - The Case of Small Domains. WINE 2019: 171-185 - [i11]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre, Long Tran-Thanh, Jie Zhang, Bo An, Nick R. Jennings:
Social Cost Guarantees in Smart Route Guidance. CoRR abs/1906.06617 (2019) - 2018
- [j17]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 62: 459-488 (2018) - [j16]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 745: 150-162 (2018) - [c38]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. AAMAS 2018: 1930-1932 - [c37]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. IJCAI 2018: 240-246 - [i10]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1804.10512 (2018) - [i9]Diodato Ferraioli, Adrian Meier, Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
On the approximation guarantee of obviously strategyproof mechanisms. CoRR abs/1805.04190 (2018) - 2017
- [j15]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Combinatorial Auctions Without Money. Algorithmica 77(3): 756-785 (2017) - [c36]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations. AAAI 2017: 516-522 - [c35]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Social Pressure in Opinion Games. IJCAI 2017: 3661-3667 - [i8]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Obvious Strategyproofness Needs Monitoring for Good Approximations. CoRR abs/1702.05640 (2017) - 2016
- [j14]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Heterogeneous facility location without money. Theor. Comput. Sci. 636: 27-46 (2016) - [j13]Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Decentralized dynamics for finite opinion games. Theor. Comput. Sci. 648: 96-115 (2016) - [c34]Diodato Ferraioli, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
What to Verify for Optimal Truthful Mechanisms without Money. AAMAS 2016: 68-76 - [c33]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. ECAI 2016: 1167-1175 - [i7]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Towards Better Models of Externalities in Sponsored Search Auctions. CoRR abs/1604.04095 (2016) - 2015
- [j12]Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre:
Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 53: 721-744 (2015) - [j11]Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractable. Theor. Comput. Sci. 571: 21-35 (2015) - [c32]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre, Gabor Aranyi:
A Mechanism Design Approach to Measure Awareness. AAAI 2015: 886-892 - [c31]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Truthful Mechanisms without Money for Non-Utilitarian Heterogeneous Facility Location. AAAI 2015: 1029-1035 - [c30]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
The Power of Verification for Greedy Mechanism Design. AAMAS 2015: 307-315 - [c29]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Cascade Model with Contextual Externalities and Bounded User Memory for Sponsored Search Auctions. AAMAS 2015: 1831-1832 - [c28]Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre:
Near-Optimal Approximation Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2015: 4275-4281 - [c27]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Metastability of Asymptotically Well-Behaved Potential Games - (Extended Abstract). MFCS (2) 2015: 311-323 - [c26]Annamária Kovács, Ulrich Meyer, Carmine Ventre:
Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation. WINE 2015: 398-412 - 2014
- [j10]Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. Games Econ. Behav. 86: 491-509 (2014) - [j9]Fabrizio Grandoni, Piotr Krysta, Stefano Leonardi, Carmine Ventre:
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multiobjective Optimization. SIAM J. Comput. 43(4): 1263-1290 (2014) - [j8]Carmine Ventre:
Truthful optimization using mechanisms with verification. Theor. Comput. Sci. 518: 64-79 (2014) - [c25]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Combinatorial auctions without money. AAMAS 2014: 1029-1036 - [c24]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Truthful mechanisms for the location of different facilities. AAMAS 2014: 1613-1614 - [c23]Paolo Serafino, Carmine Ventre:
Heterogeneous Facility Location without Money on the Line. ECAI 2014: 807-812 - 2013
- [j7]Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carmine Ventre:
On the approximation performance of fictitious play in finite games. Int. J. Game Theory 42(4): 1059-1083 (2013) - [j6]Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. Theor. Comput. Sci. 476: 24-37 (2013) - [c22]Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Using lotteries to approximate the optimal revenue. AAMAS 2013: 643-650 - [c21]Piotr Krysta, Orestis Telelis, Carmine Ventre:
Mechanisms for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a few distinct goods. AAMAS 2013: 691-698 - [i6]Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Ranking Games that have Competitiveness-based Strategies. CoRR abs/1301.5844 (2013) - [i5]Dimitris Fotakis, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Combinatorial Auctions without Money. CoRR abs/1310.0177 (2013) - [i4]Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games. CoRR abs/1311.1610 (2013) - 2012
- [j5]Patrick Briest, Luciano Gualà, Martin Hoefer, Carmine Ventre:
On stackelberg pricing with computationally bounded customers. Networks 60(1): 31-44 (2012) - [j4]Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ACM Trans. Comput. Theory 4(2): 6:1-6:17 (2012) - [c20]Diodato Ferraioli, Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Decentralized Dynamics for Finite Opinion Games. SAGT 2012: 144-155 - [i3]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
Metastability of Potential Games. CoRR abs/1211.2696 (2012) - 2011
- [j3]Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre:
Alternatives to truthfulness are hard to recognize. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 22(1): 200-216 (2011) - [j2]Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre:
A response to "Mechanism Design with Partial Verification and Revelation Principle". Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 22(1): 224 (2011) - [c19]Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carmine Ventre:
On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games. ESA 2011: 93-105 - [i2]Paul W. Goldberg, Rahul Savani, Troels Bjerre Sørensen, Carmine Ventre:
On the Approximation Performance of Fictitious Play in Finite Games. CoRR abs/1103.1040 (2011) - [i1]Paul W. Goldberg, Carmine Ventre:
Using Lotteries to Approximate the Optimal Revenue. CoRR abs/1110.1980 (2011) - 2010
- [c18]Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are Tractable. ESA (2) 2010: 39-50 - [c17]Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre:
Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. EC 2010: 335-344 - [c16]Fabrizio Grandoni, Piotr Krysta, Stefano Leonardi, Carmine Ventre:
Utilitarian Mechanism Design for Multi-Objective Optimization. SODA 2010: 573-584
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j1]Alessandro Ferrante, Gennaro Parlato, Francesco Sorrentino, Carmine Ventre:
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification. Theor. Comput. Sci. 410(8-10): 886-899 (2009) - [c15]Carmine Ventre, Ivan Visconti:
Co-sound Zero-Knowledge with Public Keys. AFRICACRYPT 2009: 287-304 - [c14]Diodato Ferraioli, Carmine Ventre:
On the Price of Anarchy of Restricted Job Scheduling Games. ICTCS 2009: 113-116 - [c13]Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification. EC 2009: 147-156 - [c12]Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà, Carmine Ventre:
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers. WINE 2009: 42-54 - 2008
- [c11]Paolo Penna, Carmine Ventre:
Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal Solutions. ESA 2008: 708-719 - [c10]Carmine Ventre, Ivan Visconti:
Completely Non-malleable Encryption Revisited. Public Key Cryptography 2008: 65-84 - [c9]Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre:
Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize. SAGT 2008: 194-205 - 2006
- [c8]