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1st SAGT 2008: Paderborn, Germany
- Burkhard Monien, Ulf-Peter Schroeder:
Algorithmic Game Theory, First International Symposium, SAGT 2008, Paderborn, Germany, April 30-May 2, 2008. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 4997, Springer 2008, ISBN 978-3-540-79308-3
Invited Talks
- Christos H. Papadimitriou:
The Search for Equilibrium Concepts. 1-3 - Reinhard Selten:
Experimental Results on the Process of Goal Formation and Aspiration Adaptation. 4 - Paul G. Spirakis:
Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games. 5-21
Session 1: Routing and Scheduling I
- Martin Hoefer, Alexander Souza:
The Influence of Link Restrictions on (Random) Selfish Routing. 22-32 - Dimitris Fotakis
:
Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy. 33-45 - Leah Epstein, Rob van Stee:
The Price of Anarchy on Uniformly Related Machines Revisited. 46-57 - Michal Feldman, Tami Tamir:
Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling Games. 58-69
Session 2: Markets
- Shuchi Chawla, Tim Roughgarden:
Bertrand Competition in Networks. 70-82 - Moshe Babaioff, Patrick Briest, Piotr Krysta:
On the Approximability of Combinatorial Exchange Problems. 83-94 - Pavlos S. Efraimidis, Lazaros Tsavlidis:
Window-Games between TCP Flows. 95-108 - Ronen Gradwohl
:
Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Network. 109-120
Session 3: Routing and Scheduling II
- Dimitris Fotakis
, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
Atomic Congestion Games: Fast, Myopic and Concurrent. 121-132 - Gunes Ercal, Rafit Izhak-Ratzin, Rupak Majumdar, Adam Meyerson:
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks. 133-144 - Rainer Feldmann, Marios Mavronicolas
, Andreas Pieris:
Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture. 145-157 - Matthias Englert, Thomas Franke, Lars Olbrich:
Sensitivity of Wardrop Equilibria. 158-169
Session 4: Mechanism Design
- Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer:
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. 170-181 - Jon Feldman, S. Muthukrishnan, Evdokia Nikolova, Martin Pál:
A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Scheduling. 182-193 - Vincenzo Auletta
, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, Carmine Ventre
:
Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognize. 194-205 - Markus Bläser, Elias Vicari:
Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design and Algebraic Communication Complexity. 206-217
Session 5: Potpourri of Games
- Nadine Baumann, Sebastian Stiller:
The Price of Anarchy of a Network Creation Game with Exponential Payoff. 218-229 - Ulrich Faigle, Britta Peis:
A Hierarchical Model for Cooperative Games. 230-241 - Arndt von Schemde, Bernhard von Stengel:
Strategic Characterization of the Index of an Equilibrium. 242-254 - Oren Ben-Zwi, Amir Ronen:
The Local and Global Price of Anarchy of Graphical Games. 255-266
Session 6: Solution Concepts
- Sébastien Hémon, Michel de Rougemont, Miklos Santha:
Approximate Nash Equilibria for Multi-player Games. 267-278 - Amos Fiat, Hila Pochter:
Subjective vs.Objective Reality - The Risk of Running Late. 279-290 - Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria. 291-302 - Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett
, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron Roth
:
The Price of Stochastic Anarchy. 303-314
Session 7: Cost Sharing
- Janina A. Brenner, Guido Schäfer:
Singleton Acyclic Mechanisms and Their Applications to Scheduling Problems. 315-326 - Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? 327-336 - Niv Buchbinder
, Liane Lewin-Eytan, Joseph Naor, Ariel Orda:
Non-cooperative Cost Sharing Games Via Subsidies. 337-349 - Yvonne Bleischwitz, Florian Schoppmann:
Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing for Metric Fault Tolerant Facility Location. 350-361
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