"Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets."

Itai Ashlagi et al. (2017)

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DOI: 10.1145/3033274.3084093

access: closed

type: Conference or Workshop Paper

metadata version: 2018-11-06

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Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria, Peng Shi:
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets. EC 2017: 263

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