"Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A ..."

Yeon-Koo Che (2000)

> Home

Details and statistics

DOI: 10.1006/GAME.1999.0782

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-22

- view
  - electronic edition via DOI
  - unpaywalled version
  authority control:
- export record
  dblp key:
  - journals/geb/Che00
- ask others
- share record
  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/geb/Che00
Yeon-Koo Che:
Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999). Games Econ. Behav. 33(2): 195-205 (2000)

manage site settings

To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.