default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCID9th ACM-EC 2008: Chicago, IL, USA
- Lance Fortnow, John Riedl, Tuomas Sandholm:
Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008. ACM 2008, ISBN 978-1-60558-169-9
Sponsored search
- Kevin Bartz, Cory Barr, Adil Aijaz:
Natural language generation for sponsored-search advertisements. 1-9 - Azarakhsh Malekian, Chi-Chao Chang, Ravi Kumar, Grant Wang:
Optimizing query rewrites for keyword-based advertising. 10-19 - Kartik Hosanagar, Vadim Cherepanov:
Optimal bidding in stochastic budget constrained slot auctions. 20
Characterizing incentive compatibility
- Aaron Archer, Robert Kleinberg:
Truthful germs are contagious: a local to global characterization of truthfulness. 21-30 - Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira:
Mechanism design over discrete domains. 31-37 - Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan:
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. 38-47 - Dov Monderer:
Monotonicity and implementability: extended abstract. 48
Pricing
- Liad Blumrosen, Thomas Holenstein:
Posted prices vs. negotiations: an asymptotic analysis. 49 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour:
Item pricing for revenue maximization. 50-59 - Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Sergei Vassilvitskii:
Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability. 60-69
Communication complexity in mechanisms
- Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondrák:
Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions. 70-77 - Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. 78-87 - Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Moni Naor, Michael Schapira:
Informational overhead of incentive compatibility. 88-97 - Maher Said
:
Information revelation and random entry in sequential ascending auctions. 98
Eliciting the truth and worrying about lying
- Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable. 99-108 - Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer:
Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability. 109-118 - Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings:
Incentives for expressing opinions in online polls. 119-128 - Nicolas S. Lambert, David M. Pennock, Yoav Shoham:
Eliciting properties of probability distributions. 129-138 - Lance Fortnow, Rakesh Vohra:
The complexity of forecast testing: abstract. 139
Networks
- Po-An Chen, David Kempe:
Altruism, selfishness, and spite in traffic routing. 140-149 - J. Stephen Judd, Michael J. Kearns:
Behavioral experiments in networked trade. 150-159 - Jens Grossklags, Nicolas Christin, John Chuang:
Security and insurance management in networks with heterogeneous agents. 160-169
Prediction markets
- Nicolas S. Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman, Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, Yoav Shoham, David M. Pennock:
Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting. 170-179 - Mohammad Ghodsi, Hamid Mahini, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information. 180-189 - Yiling Chen, Lance Fortnow, Nicolas S. Lambert, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman:
Complexity of combinatorial market makers. 190-199 - Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami:
Non-myopic strategies in prediction markets. 200-209
Economic redistribution
- Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer:
Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand. 210-219 - Ruggiero Cavallo:
Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design. 220-229 - Jiyong Zhang, Nicolas Jones, Pearl Pu:
A visual interface for critiquing-based recommender systems. 230-239 - Fang Wu, Bernardo A. Huberman:
Popularity, novelty and attention. 240-245 - Jiang Yang, Lada A. Adamic, Mark S. Ackerman:
Crowdsourcing and knowledge sharing: strategic user behavior on taskcn. 246-255
Convergence to, and robustness of, solutions
- Heiner Ackermann, Paul W. Goldberg, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Röglin, Berthold Vöcking:
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets. 256-263 - Baruch Awerbuch, Yossi Azar, Amir Epstein, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Alexander Skopalik:
Fast convergence to nearly optimal solutions in potential games. 264-273 - Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold:
Fault tolerance in large games. 274-283
Social networks and peer production
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Siddharth Suri, Éva Tardos, Tom Wexler:
Strategic network formation with structural holes. 284-293 - Dominic Meier, Yvonne Anne Oswald, Stefan Schmid, Roger Wattenhofer:
On the windfall of friendship: inoculation strategies on social networks. 294-301 - Dennis M. Wilkinson:
Strong regularities in online peer production. 302-309 - Haifeng Liu, Ee-Peng Lim, Hady Wirawan Lauw, Minh-Tam Le, Aixin Sun, Jaideep Srivastava, Young Ae Kim:
Predicting trusts among users of online communities: an epinions case study. 310-319
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2025-11-08 00:52 CET by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
