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ORCIDDavid C. Parkes
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- affiliation: Harvard University, School of Engineering and Applied Science
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2020 – today
- 2025
[i96]David Huang, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Edwin Lock, David C. Parkes:
Accelerated Preference Elicitation with LLM-Based Proxies. CoRR abs/2501.14625 (2025)- [i95]Ermis Soumalias, Yanchen Jiang, Kehang Zhu, Michael J. Curry, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment. CoRR abs/2502.10308 (2025) - [i94]Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton, Jason Hoelscher-Obermaier, Akbir Khan, Euan McLean, Chandler Smith, Wolfram Barfuss, Jakob N. Foerster, Tomas Gavenciak, The Anh Han
, Edward Hughes, Vojtech Kovarík, Jan Kulveit, Joel Z. Leibo, Caspar Oesterheld, Christian Schröder de Witt, Nisarg Shah, Michael P. Wellman, Paolo Bova, Theodor Cimpeanu, Carson Ezell, Quentin Feuillade-Montixi, Matija Franklin, Esben Kran, Igor Krawczuk, Max Lamparth, Niklas Lauffer, Alexander Meinke, Sumeet Motwani, Anka Reuel, Vincent Conitzer, Michael Dennis, Iason Gabriel, Adam Gleave, Gillian K. Hadfield, Nika Haghtalab, Atoosa Kasirzadeh, Sébastien Krier, Kate Larson, Joel Lehman, David C. Parkes, Georgios Piliouras, Iyad Rahwan:
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI. CoRR abs/2502.14143 (2025) - [i93]Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
BundleFlow: Deep Menus for Combinatorial Auctions by Diffusion-Based Optimization. CoRR abs/2502.15283 (2025) - 2024
- [j55]Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath:
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics. J. ACM 71(1): 5:1-5:53 (2024) - [j54]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Nontruthful Position Auctions Are More Robust to Misspecification. Math. Oper. Res. 49(2): 901-927 (2024) - [c202]Luca D'Amico-Wong, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract). AAAI 2024: 23468-23470 - [c201]Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti:
Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. ICLR 2024 - [c200]Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld:
Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. ICLR 2024 - [c199]Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu:
Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective. ICML 2024 - [c198]Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen:
Position: Social Environment Design Should be Further Developed for AI-based Policy-Making. ICML 2024 - [c197]Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Platform Equilibrium: Analyzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. EC 2024: 542 - [c196]Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. EC 2024: 545-546 - [c195]Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich:
Generative Social Choice. EC 2024: 985 - [c194]Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. EC 2024: 1100 - [i92]Safwan Hossain, Tonghan Wang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu:
Multi-Sender Persuasion - A Computational Perspective. CoRR abs/2402.04971 (2024) - [i91]Jamelle Watson-Daniels, Flávio du Pin Calmon, Alexander D'Amour, Carol Xuan Long, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun:
Predictive Churn with the Set of Good Models. CoRR abs/2402.07745 (2024) - [i90]Michael J. Curry, Zhou Fan, David C. Parkes:
Optimal Automated Market Makers: Differentiable Economics and Strong Duality. CoRR abs/2402.09129 (2024) - [i89]Luca D'Amico-Wong, Hugh Zhang, Marc Lanctot, David C. Parkes:
Easy as ABCs: Unifying Boltzmann Q-Learning and Counterfactual Regret Minimization. CoRR abs/2402.11835 (2024) - [i88]Edwin Zhang, Sadie Zhao, Tonghan Wang, Safwan Hossain, Henry Gasztowtt, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe, Yiling Chen:
Social Environment Design. CoRR abs/2402.14090 (2024) - [i87]Luca D'Amico-Wong, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Disrupting Bipartite Trading Networks: Matching for Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/2406.07385 (2024) - [i86]Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning. CoRR abs/2406.07428 (2024) - [i85]Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang, Manzil Zaheer, Aranyak Mehta, David C. Parkes:
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2407.08022 (2024) - [i84]Dima Ivanov, Paul Dütting, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Tonghan Wang, David C. Parkes:
Principal-Agent Reinforcement Learning. CoRR abs/2407.18074 (2024) - [i83]Tonghan Wang, Heng Dong, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes, Milind Tambe:
On Diffusion Models for Multi-Agent Partial Observability: Shared Attractors, Error Bounds, and Composite Flow. CoRR abs/2410.13953 (2024) - 2023
- [c193]Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun:
Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. AAAI 2023: 10306-10314 - [c192]Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Daniel J. Moroz, Michael Neuder, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes:
Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap V3. AFT 2023: 25:1-25:22 - [c191]Zhun Deng, He Sun, Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes:
Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. AISTATS 2023: 10594-10618 - [c190]He Sun, Zhun Deng, Hui Chen, David C. Parkes:
Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data. ICAIF 2023: 36-45 - [c189]Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes:
Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. ICML 2023: 11213-11236 - [c188]Tonghan Wang, Paul Duetting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, David C. Parkes:
Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks. NeurIPS 2023 - [c187]Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
Data Market Design through Deep Learning. NeurIPS 2023 - [c186]Yaniv Yacoby, John Girash, David C. Parkes:
Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. SIGCSE (1) 2023: 694-700 - [c185]Matheus Venturyne Xavier Ferreira, David C. Parkes:
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. STOC 2023: 723-736 - [c184]Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes:
Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study. WWW 2023: 3592-3602 - [i82]Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras, Romuald Elie, Guy Lever, Andrea Tacchetti:
Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers. CoRR abs/2302.06607 (2023) - [i81]Manuel Wuthrich, Mark York, David C. Parkes:
Eliciting Information from participants with Competing Incentives and Dependent Beliefs. CoRR abs/2302.14122 (2023) - [i80]Omer Nahum, Gali Noti, David C. Parkes, Nir Rosenfeld:
Decongestion by Representation: Learning to Improve Economic Welfare in Marketplaces. CoRR abs/2306.10606 (2023) - [i79]Tonghan Wang, Paul Dütting, Dmitry Ivanov, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, David C. Parkes:
Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Piecewise Affine Neural Networks. CoRR abs/2307.02318 (2023) - [i78]Sara Fish, Paul Gölz, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Gili Rusak, Itai Shapira, Manuel Wüthrich:
Generative Social Choice. CoRR abs/2309.01291 (2023) - [i77]Hugh Zhang, David C. Parkes:
Chain-of-Thought Reasoning is a Policy Improvement Operator. CoRR abs/2309.08589 (2023) - [i76]Alon Eden, Gary Qiurui Ma, David C. Parkes:
Platform Equilibrium: Analayzing Social Welfare in Online Market Places. CoRR abs/2309.08781 (2023) - [i75]Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes:
Data Market Design through Deep Learning. CoRR abs/2310.20096 (2023) - 2022
- [j53]Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes:
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. Oper. Res. 70(2): 1025-1041 (2022) - [j52]Rediet Abebe, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Jon M. Kleinberg, Zhibin Liang, David C. Parkes, Mauro Sozio, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis:
Opinion Dynamics Optimization by Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov. Data 16(2): 33:1-33:34 (2022) - [c183]Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren:
Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract). AAAI 2022: 12943-12944 - [c182]Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Ben Altschuler, He Sun, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes:
Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design✱. ICAIF 2022: 9-17 - [c181]Matthias Gerstgrasser, Rakshit Trivedi, David C. Parkes:
CrowdPlay: Crowdsourcing Human Demonstrations for Offline Learning. ICLR 2022 - [c180]Gianluca Brero, Eric Mibuari, Nicolas Lepore, David C. Parkes:
Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms. NeurIPS 2022 - [c179]Mira Finkelstein, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Lucy Liu, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Sarah Keren:
Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms. NeurIPS 2022 - [p1]Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, David C. Parkes, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Max Kleiman-Weiner:
Too Many cooks: Bayesian inference for coordinating Multi-agent Collaboration. Human-Like Machine Intelligence 2022: 152-170 - [i74]Gianluca Brero, Nicolas Lepore, Eric Mibuari, David C. Parkes:
Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms. CoRR abs/2202.07106 (2022) - [i73]Xintong Wang, Gary Qiurui Ma, Alon Eden, Clara Li, Alexander Trott, Stephan Zheng, David C. Parkes:
Using Reinforcement Learning to Study Platform Economies under Market Shocks. CoRR abs/2203.13395 (2022) - [i72]Zhou Fan, Francisco J. Marmolejo Cossío, Ben Altschuler, He Sun, Xintong Wang, David C. Parkes:
Differential Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3 and Implications for Contract Design. CoRR abs/2204.00464 (2022) - [i71]Jamelle Watson-Daniels, David C. Parkes, Berk Ustun:
Predictive Multiplicity in Probabilistic Classification. CoRR abs/2206.01131 (2022) - [i70]Yaniv Yacoby, John Girash, David C. Parkes:
Empowering First-Year Computer Science Ph.D. Students to Create a Culture that Values Community and Mental Health. CoRR abs/2208.12650 (2022) - [i69]Mira Finkelstein, Lucy Liu, Nitsan Levy Schlot, Yoav Kolumbus, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenshein, Sarah Keren:
Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms. CoRR abs/2209.12006 (2022) - [i68]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, David C. Parkes:
Credible Decentralized Exchange Design via Verifiable Sequencing Rules. CoRR abs/2209.15569 (2022) - [i67]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Darshan Chakrabarti, Matthias Gerstgrasser, Vincent Li, David C. Parkes:
Learning Stackelberg Equilibria and Applications to Economic Design Games. CoRR abs/2210.03852 (2022) - [i66]Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes:
Oracles & Followers: Stackelberg Equilibria in Deep Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning. CoRR abs/2210.11942 (2022) - [i65]Zhun Deng, He Sun, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Linjun Zhang, David C. Parkes:
Reinforcement Learning with Stepwise Fairness Constraints. CoRR abs/2211.03994 (2022) - [i64]Peter Stone, Rodney Brooks, Erik Brynjolfsson, Ryan Calo, Oren Etzioni, Greg Hager, Julia Hirschberg, Shivaram Kalyanakrishnan, Ece Kamar, Sarit Kraus, Kevin Leyton-Brown, David C. Parkes, William H. Press, AnnaLee Saxenian, Julie Shah, Milind Tambe, Astro Teller:
Artificial Intelligence and Life in 2030: The One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence. CoRR abs/2211.06318 (2022) - 2021
- [j51]Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath:
Optimal auctions through deep learning. Commun. ACM 64(8): 109-116 (2021) - [j50]David C. Parkes:
Playing with symmetry with neural networks. Nat. Mach. Intell. 3(8): 658 (2021) - [j49]Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner:
Too Many Cooks: Bayesian Inference for Coordinating Multi-Agent Collaboration. Top. Cogn. Sci. 13(2): 414-432 (2021) - [c178]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo:
Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms. AAAI 2021: 5219-5227 - [c177]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern:
Dynamic posted-price mechanisms for the blockchain transaction-fee market. AFT 2021: 86-99 - [c176]Paul Tylkin, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes:
Learning Robust Helpful Behaviors in Two-Player Cooperative Atari Environments. AAMAS 2021: 1686-1688 - [c175]Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes:
Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. ICML 2021: 4227-4238 - [c174]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern:
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction Fee Market (Invited Talk). Tokenomics 2021: 6:1-6:1 - [c173]Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka:
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. WINE 2021: 76-94 - [c172]Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes:
Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. WINE 2021: 428-445 - [i63]Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes:
Low-cost attacks on Ethereum 2.0 by sub-1/3 stakeholders. CoRR abs/2102.02247 (2021) - [i62]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes, Mitchell Stern:
Dynamic Posted-Price Mechanisms for the Blockchain Transaction-Fee Market. CoRR abs/2103.14144 (2021) - [i61]Michael Neuder, Rithvik Rao, Daniel J. Moroz, David C. Parkes:
Strategic Liquidity Provision in Uniswap v3. CoRR abs/2106.12033 (2021) - [i60]Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Shira Li, Jonathan Ma, Scott Duke Kominers, David C. Parkes:
Deep Learning for Two-Sided Matching. CoRR abs/2107.03427 (2021) - [i59]Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher:
The AI Economist: Optimal Economic Policy Design via Two-level Deep Reinforcement Learning. CoRR abs/2108.02755 (2021) - [i58]Mark York, Munther A. Dahleh, David C. Parkes:
Eliciting Social Knowledge for Creditworthiness Assessment. CoRR abs/2108.09289 (2021) - 2020
- [j48]Nripsuta Ani Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu:
How do fairness definitions fare? Testing public attitudes towards three algorithmic definitions of fairness in loan allocations. Artif. Intell. 283: 103238 (2020) - [j47]Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes:
The capacity constrained facility location problem. Games Econ. Behav. 124: 478-490 (2020) - [j46]Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes:
Spatio-temporal pricing for ridesharing platforms. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 53-57 (2020) - [j45]Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah:
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 8(1): 2:1-2:34 (2020) - [j44]Malvika Rao, David F. Bacon, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer:
Incentivizing Deep Fixes in Software Economies. IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 46(1): 51-70 (2020) - [c171]Debmalya Mandal, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes:
The Effectiveness of Peer Prediction in Long-Term Forecasting. AAAI 2020: 2160-2167 - [c170]Sarah Keren, Haifeng Xu, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes, Barbara J. Grosz:
Information Shaping for Enhanced Goal Recognition of Partially-Informed Agents. AAAI 2020: 9908-9915 - [c169]Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes:
Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. AFT 2020: 46-58 - [c168]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, Elena Wu-Yan:
Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present-Bias. AAMAS 2020: 807-815 - [c167]Hau Chan, David C. Parkes, Karim R. Lakhani:
The Price of Anarchy of Self-Selection in Tullock Contests. AAMAS 2020: 1795-1797 - [c166]Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner:
Too Many Cooks: Coordinating Multi-agent Collaboration Through Inverse Planning. AAMAS 2020: 2032-2034 - [c165]Sarah A. Wu, Rose E. Wang, James A. Evans, Josh Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner:
Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. CogSci 2020 - [c164]Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu:
The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. ICML 2020: 3092-3101 - [c163]Sarah Keren, Sara Bernardini, Kofi Kwapong, David C. Parkes:
Reasoning About Plan Robustness Versus Plan Cost for Partially Informed Agents. KR 2020: 550-559 - [c162]Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes:
From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization. NeurIPS 2020 - [c161]Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes:
A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. WWW 2020: 1018-1028 - [i57]Nir Rosenfeld, Aron Szanto, David C. Parkes:
A Kernel of Truth: Determining Rumor Veracity on Twitter by Diffusion Pattern Alone. CoRR abs/2002.00850 (2020) - [i56]Daniel J. Moroz, Daniel J. Aronoff, Neha Narula, David C. Parkes:
Double-Spend Counterattacks: Threat of Retaliation in Proof-of-Work Systems. CoRR abs/2002.10736 (2020) - [i55]Rose E. Wang, Sarah A. Wu, James A. Evans, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, David C. Parkes, Max Kleiman-Weiner:
Too many cooks: Coordinating multi-agent collaboration through inverse planning. CoRR abs/2003.11778 (2020) - [i54]Stephan Zheng, Alexander Trott, Sunil Srinivasa, Nikhil Naik, Melvin Gruesbeck, David C. Parkes, Richard Socher:
The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies. CoRR abs/2004.13332 (2020) - [i53]Nir Rosenfeld, Sophie Hilgard, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, David C. Parkes:
From Predictions to Decisions: Using Lookahead Regularization. CoRR abs/2006.11638 (2020) - [i52]Vincent Conitzer, Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Eric Sodomka:
Welfare-Preserving ε-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss. CoRR abs/2007.09579 (2020) - [i51]Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes:
Defending Against Malicious Reorgs in Tezos Proof-of-Stake. CoRR abs/2009.05413 (2020) - [i50]He Sun, Zhun Deng, Hui Chen, David C. Parkes:
Decision-Aware Conditional GANs for Time Series Data. CoRR abs/2009.12682 (2020) - [i49]Gianluca Brero, Alon Eden, Matthias Gerstgrasser, David C. Parkes, Duncan Rheingans-Yoo:
Reinforcement Learning of Simple Indirect Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2010.01180 (2020) - [i48]Rediet Abebe, T.-H. Hubert Chan, Jon M. Kleinberg, Zhibin Liang, David C. Parkes, Mauro Sozio, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis:
Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion via Non-Convex Local Search. CoRR abs/2011.02583 (2020) - [i47]Elisa Bertino, Finale Doshi-Velez, Maria L. Gini, Daniel Lopresti, David C. Parkes:
Artificial Intelligence & Cooperation. CoRR abs/2012.06034 (2020) - [i46]Ian T. Foster, David C. Parkes, Stephan Zheng:
The Rise of AI-Driven Simulators: Building a New Crystal Ball. CoRR abs/2012.06049 (2020) - [i45]Sujata Banerjee, Yiling Chen, Kobbi Nissim, David C. Parkes, Katie A. Siek, Lauren Wilcox:
Modernizing Data Control: Making Personal Digital Data Mutually Beneficial for Citizens and Industry. CoRR abs/2012.08571 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j43]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 44(1): 196-211 (2019) - [j42]Iyad Rahwan, Manuel Cebrián, Nick Obradovich, Josh C. Bongard, Jean-François Bonnefon, Cynthia Breazeal, Jacob W. Crandall, Nicholas A. Christakis, Iain D. Couzin, Matthew O. Jackson, Nicholas R. Jennings, Ece Kamar, Isabel M. Kloumann, Hugo Larochelle, David Lazer, Richard McElreath, Alan Mislove, David C. Parkes, Alex 'Sandy' Pentland, Margaret E. Roberts, Azim Shariff, Joshua B. Tenenbaum, Michael P. Wellman:
Machine behaviour. Nat. 568(7753): 477-486 (2019) - [c160]Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic:
Bayesian Fairness. AAAI 2019: 509-516 - [c159]Nripsuta Ani Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu:
How Do Fairness Definitions Fare?: Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. AIES 2019: 99-106 - [c158]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, James Y. Zou:
Contingent Payment Mechanisms for Resource Utilization. AAMAS 2019: 422-430 - [c157]Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes:
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. EC 2019: 583 - [c156]Paul Duetting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath:
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. ICML 2019: 1706-1715 - [c155]Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla:
Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. ICML 2019: 5261-5270 - [c154]Berk Ustun, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes:
Fairness without Harm: Decoupled Classifiers with Preference Guarantees. ICML 2019: 6373-6382 - [c153]Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes:
Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. IJCAI 2019: 557-564 - [c152]Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Josh Tenenbaum:
Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games. NeurIPS 2019: 1249-1259 - [c151]Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes:
The Capacity Constrained Facility Location Problem. WINE 2019: 336 - [i44]Gregory D. Hager, Ann W. Drobnis, Fei Fang, Rayid Ghani, Amy Greenwald, Terah Lyons, David C. Parkes, Jason Schultz, Suchi Saria, Stephen F. Smith, Milind Tambe:
Artificial Intelligence for Social Good. CoRR abs/1901.05406 (2019) - [i43]Goran Radanovic, Rati Devidze, David C. Parkes, Adish Singla:
Learning to Collaborate in Markov Decision Processes. CoRR abs/1901.08029 (2019) - [i42]Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes:
Weighted Tensor Completion for Time-Series Causal Inference. CoRR abs/1902.04646 (2019) - [i41]Sophie Hilgard, Nir Rosenfeld, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Jack Cao, David C. Parkes:
Learning Representations by Humans, for Humans. CoRR abs/1905.12686 (2019) - [i40]Duncan Rheingans-Yoo, Scott Duke Kominers, Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes:
Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences. CoRR abs/1905.13191 (2019) - [i39]Zhe Feng, David C. Parkes, Haifeng Xu:
The Intrinsic Robustness of Stochastic Bandits to Strategic Manipulation. CoRR abs/1906.01528 (2019) - [i38]Jack Serrino, Max Kleiman-Weiner, David C. Parkes, Joshua B. Tenenbaum:
Finding Friend and Foe in Multi-Agent Games. CoRR abs/1906.02330 (2019) - [i37]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, Elena Wu-Yan:
Penalty Bidding Mechanisms for Allocating Resources and Overcoming Present Bias. CoRR abs/1906.09713 (2019) - [i36]David C. Parkes, Rakesh V. Vohra, et al.:
Algorithmic and Economic Perspectives on Fairness. CoRR abs/1909.05282 (2019) - [i35]Michael Neuder, Daniel J. Moroz, Rithvik Rao, David C. Parkes:
Selfish Behavior in the Tezos Proof-of-Stake Protocol. CoRR abs/1912.02954 (2019) - 2018
- [j41]David C. Parkes:
Technical perspective: Moving spectrum. Commun. ACM 61(1): 96 (2018) - [c150]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Playing the Wrong Game: Bounding Externalities in Diverse Populations of Agents. AAMAS 2018: 86-94 - [c149]Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes:
Deep Learning for Revenue-Optimal Auctions with Budgets. AAMAS 2018: 354-362 - [c148]Noah Golowich, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes:
Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2018: 261-267 - [c147]Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis:
Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. KDD 2018: 1089-1098 - [c146]Jean Pouget-Abadie, Vahab S. Mirrokni, David C. Parkes, Edoardo M. Airoldi:
Optimizing Cluster-based Randomized Experiments under Monotonicity. KDD 2018: 2090-2099 - [c145]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. EC 2018: 49 - [i34]Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes:
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. CoRR abs/1801.04015 (2018) - [i33]Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes, Charalampos E. Tsourakakis:
Opinion Dynamics with Varying Susceptibility to Persuasion. CoRR abs/1801.07863 (2018) - [i32]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities. CoRR abs/1804.02268 (2018) - [i31]Haris Aziz, Hau Chan, Barton E. Lee, David C. Parkes:
Mechanism Design without Money for Common Goods. CoRR abs/1806.00960 (2018) - [i30]Nripsuta Saxena, Karen Huang, Evan DeFilippis, Goran Radanovic, David C. Parkes, Yang Liu:
How Do Fairness Definitions Fare? Examining Public Attitudes Towards Algorithmic Definitions of Fairness. CoRR abs/1811.03654 (2018) - 2017
- [j40]Ehud Kalai, Marco Battaglini, Gary Charness, Vincent P. Crawford, Françoise Forges, David C. Parkes, Jennifer Byrd:
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue. Games Econ. Behav. 103: 1-18 (2017) - [c144]David C. Parkes:
On AI, Markets and Machine Learning. AAMAS 2017: 2 - [c143]David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia:
Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots - Extended Version. AAMAS Workshops (Visionary Papers) 2017: 45-66 - [c142]Hongyao Ma, David C. Parkes, Valentin Robu:
Generalizing Demand Response Through Reward Bidding. AAMAS 2017: 60-68 - [c141]Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes:
Fair Division via Social Comparison. AAMAS 2017: 281-289 - [c140]David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia:
Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. AAMAS 2017: 1679-1681 - [c139]David C. Parkes, Paul Tylkin, Lirong Xia:
Thwarting Vote Buying Through Decoy Ballots. IJCAI 2017: 3784-3790 - [c138]Christos Dimitrakakis, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic, Paul Tylkin:
Multi-View Decision Processes: The Helper-AI Problem. NIPS 2017: 5443-5452 - [c137]Arpit Agarwal, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes, Nisarg Shah:
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Users. EC 2017: 81-98 - [i29]Christos Dimitrakakis, Yang Liu, David C. Parkes, Goran Radanovic:
Subjective fairness: Fairness is in the eye of the beholder. CoRR abs/1706.00119 (2017) - [i28]Paul Dütting, Zhe Feng, Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes:
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning. CoRR abs/1706.03459 (2017) - [i27]Yang Liu, Goran Radanovic, Christos Dimitrakakis, Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes:
Calibrated Fairness in Bandits. CoRR abs/1707.01875 (2017) - 2016
- [c136]Brandon K. Liu, David C. Parkes, Sven Seuken:
Personalized Hitting Time for Informative Trust Mechanisms Despite Sybils. AAMAS 2016: 1124-1132 - [c135]Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes:
Practical Peer Prediction for Peer Assessment. HCOMP 2016: 199-208 - [c134]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Social Choice for Agents with General Utilities. IJCAI 2016: 345-351 - [c133]Hongyao Ma, Valentin Robu, Na Li, David C. Parkes:
Incentivizing Reliability in Demand-Side Response. IJCAI 2016: 352-358 - [c132]Debmalya Mandal, David C. Parkes:
Correlated Voting. IJCAI 2016: 366-372 - [c131]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
When are Marginal Congestion Tolls Optimal? ATT@IJCAI 2016 - [c130]Harikrishna Narasimhan, Shivani Agarwal, David C. Parkes:
Automated Mechanism Design without Money via Machine Learning. IJCAI 2016: 433-439 - [c129]Victor Shnayder, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes:
Measuring Performance of Peer Prediction Mechanisms Using Replicator Dynamics. IJCAI 2016: 2611-2617 - [c128]Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes:
Long-term Causal Effects via Behavioral Game Theory. NIPS 2016: 2604-2612 - [c127]Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes:
Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. EC 2016: 179-196 - [c126]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. EC 2016: 813 - [c125]Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes:
A General Statistical Framework for Designing Strategy-proof Assignment Mechanisms. UAI 2016 - [i26]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Truthful Outcomes from Non-Truthful Position Auctions. CoRR abs/1602.07593 (2016) - [i25]Victor Shnayder, Arpit Agarwal, Rafael M. Frongillo, David C. Parkes:
Informed Truthfulness in Multi-Task Peer Prediction. CoRR abs/1603.03151 (2016) - [i24]Hongyao Ma, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, James Y. Zou:
Contingent Payment Mechanisms to Maximize Resource Utilization. CoRR abs/1607.06511 (2016) - [i23]Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes:
Fair Division via Social Comparison. CoRR abs/1611.06589 (2016) - [i22]Debmalya Mandal, Matthew Leifer, David C. Parkes, Galen Pickard, Victor Shnayder:
Peer Prediction with Heterogeneous Tasks. CoRR abs/1612.00928 (2016) - 2015
- [j39]Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes:
Design and analysis of multi-hospital kidney exchange mechanisms using random graphs. Games Econ. Behav. 91: 360-382 (2015) - [j38]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Behavioral Biases. SIGMETRICS Perform. Evaluation Rev. 43(3): 67-70 (2015) - [j37]David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Beyond Dominant Resource Fairness: Extensions, Limitations, and Indivisibilities. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 3(1): 3:1-3:22 (2015) - [j36]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 3(1): 5:1-5:41 (2015) - [c124]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. AAAI 2015: 986-992 - [c123]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
On Sex, Evolution, and the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm. AAMAS 2015: 929-937 - [c122]James Y. Zou, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Strategic Voting Behavior in Doodle Polls. CSCW 2015: 464-472 - [c121]Harikrishna Narasimhan, David C. Parkes, Yaron Singer:
Learnability of Influence in Networks. NIPS 2015: 3186-3194 - [c120]Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes, Elery Pfeffer, James Y. Zou:
Incentive-Compatible Experimental Design. EC 2015: 285-302 - [i21]Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes:
Statistical inference of long-term causal effects in multiagent systems under the Neyman-Rubin model. CoRR abs/1501.02315 (2015) - [i20]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
On Sex, Evolution, and the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm. CoRR abs/1502.05056 (2015) - 2014
- [j35]Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Designing incentives for online question-and-answer forums. Games Econ. Behav. 86: 458-474 (2014) - [j34]Ian A. Kash, Rohan Murty, David C. Parkes:
Enabling Spectrum Sharing in Secondary Market Auctions. IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 13(3): 556-568 (2014) - [j33]Costas Courcoubetis, Roch Guérin, Patrick Loiseau, David C. Parkes, Jean C. Walrand, Adam Wierman:
Special Issue on Pricing and Incentives in Networks and Systems: Guest Editors' Introduction. ACM Trans. Internet Techn. 14(2-3): 8:1-8:3 (2014) - [c119]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Sybil-proof accounting mechanisms with transitive trust. AAMAS 2014: 205-212 - [c118]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David Maxwell Chickering, Denis Xavier Charles, David C. Parkes:
Approximating the shapley value via multi-issue decompositions. AAMAS 2014: 1209-1216 - [c117]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Computing Parametric Ranking Models via Rank-Breaking. ICML 2014: 360-368 - [c116]Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon:
Truthful prioritization for dynamic bandwidth sharing. MobiHoc 2014: 235-244 - [c115]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice. NIPS 2014: 3185-3193 - [c114]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions. EC 2014: 57-74 - [e8]Jeffrey P. Bigham, David C. Parkes:
Proceedings of the Seconf AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing, HCOMP 2014, November 2-4, 2014, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA. AAAI 2014, ISBN 978-1-57735-682-0 [contents] - [i19]Victor Shnayder, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia, Jeremy Hoon:
Truthful Prioritization Schemes for Spectrum Sharing. CoRR abs/1408.1492 (2014) - [i18]Panos Toulis, David C. Parkes:
Long-term causal effects of economic mechanisms on agent incentives. CoRR abs/1408.3783 (2014) - [i17]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
A Statistical Decision-Theoretic Framework for Social Choice. CoRR abs/1410.7856 (2014) - [i16]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Playing the Wrong Game: Smoothness Bounds for Congestion Games with Risk Averse Agents. CoRR abs/1411.1751 (2014) - [i15]Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes:
Congestion Games with Distance-Based Strict Uncertainty. CoRR abs/1411.4943 (2014) - 2013
- [j32]Yoram Bachrach, David C. Parkes, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein:
Computing cooperative solution concepts in coalitional skill games. Artif. Intell. 204: 1-21 (2013) - [j31]Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Truth, justice, and cake cutting. Games Econ. Behav. 77(1): 284-297 (2013) - [j30]Valentin Robu, Enrico H. Gerding, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nick R. Jennings:
An Online Mechanism for Multi-Unit Demand and its Application to Plug-in Hybrid Electric Vehicle Charging. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 48: 175-230 (2013) - [j29]David C. Parkes:
SIGecom news. SIGecom Exch. 12(2): 2-3 (2013) - [j28]Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes:
Non-Cooperative Location Privacy. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 10(2): 84-98 (2013) - [j27]Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
A game-theoretic analysis of the ESP game. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(1): 3:1-3:35 (2013) - [c113]David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Dynamic Social Choice with Evolving Preferences. AAAI 2013: 767-773 - [c112]Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, David C. Parkes:
Automated Workflow Synthesis. AAAI 2013: 1020-1026 - [c111]Jens Witkowski, Yoram Bachrach, Peter B. Key, David C. Parkes:
Dwelling on the Negative: Incentivizing Effort in Peer Prediction. HCOMP 2013: 190-197 - [c110]Valentin Robu, David C. Parkes, Takayuki Ito, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Efficient Interdependent Value Combinatorial Auctions with Single Minded Bidders. IJCAI 2013: 339-345 - [c109]Hossein Azari Soufiani, Hansheng Diao, Zhenyu Lai, David C. Parkes:
Generalized Random Utility Models with Multiple Types. NIPS 2013: 73-81 - [c108]James Y. Zou, Daniel J. Hsu, David C. Parkes, Ryan Prescott Adams:
Contrastive Learning Using Spectral Methods. NIPS 2013: 2238-2246 - [c107]Hossein Azari Soufiani, William Z. Chen, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Generalized Method-of-Moments for Rank Aggregation. NIPS 2013: 2706-2714 - [c106]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. UAI 2013 - [i14]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions. CoRR abs/1307.5216 (2013) - [i13]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Preference Elicitation For General Random Utility Models. CoRR abs/1309.6864 (2013) - [i12]Andrew Mao, Hossein Azari Soufiani, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Capturing Cognitive Aspects of Human Judgment. CoRR abs/1311.0251 (2013) - 2012
- [j26]David C. Parkes:
SIGecom news. SIGecom Exch. 11(2): 2-3 (2012) - [c105]David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
A Complexity-of-Strategic-Behavior Comparison between Schulze's Rule and Ranked Pairs. AAAI 2012: 1429-1435 - [c104]Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes:
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations. AAAI 2012: 1492-1498 - [c103]David F. Bacon, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen, Malvika Rao, Ian A. Kash, Manu Sridharan:
Predicting your own effort. AAMAS 2012: 695-702 - [c102]Haoqi Zhang, Eric Horvitz, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Task routing for prediction tasks. AAMAS 2012: 889-896 - [c101]Haoqi Zhang, Edith Law, Rob Miller, Krzysztof Gajos, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz:
Human computation tasks with global constraints. CHI 2012: 217-226 - [c100]Andrew Mao, Yiling Chen, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang:
TurkServer: Enabling Synchronous and Longitudinal Online Experiments. HCOMP@AAAI 2012 - [c99]Victor Shnayder, Jeremy Hoon, David C. Parkes, Vikas Kawadia:
Truthful prioritization schemes for spectrum sharing. INFOCOM Workshops 2012: 196-201 - [c98]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Random Utility Theory for Social Choice. NIPS 2012: 126-134 - [c97]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment rules through discriminant-based classifiers. EC 2012: 477-494 - [c96]John K. Lai, David C. Parkes:
Monotone branch-and-bound search for restricted combinatorial auctions. EC 2012: 705-722 - [c95]David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
Beyond dominant resource fairness: extensions, limitations, and indivisibilities. EC 2012: 808-825 - [c94]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market user interface design. EC 2012: 898-915 - [c93]Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes:
Peer prediction without a common prior. EC 2012: 964-981 - [i11]Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. CoRR abs/1205.2630 (2012) - [i10]Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer:
Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. CoRR abs/1206.3253 (2012) - [i9]Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh:
Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. CoRR abs/1206.6820 (2012) - [i8]Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes:
Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. CoRR abs/1207.1360 (2012) - [i7]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Pichayut Jirapinyo, John K. Lai, Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers. CoRR abs/1208.1184 (2012) - [i6]Hossein Azari Soufiani, David C. Parkes, Lirong Xia:
Random Utility Theory for Social Choice. CoRR abs/1211.2476 (2012) - 2011
- [j25]David C. Parkes:
Complex financial products: caveat emptor: technical perspective. Commun. ACM 54(5): 100 (2011) - [j24]Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes:
Journals for certification, conferences for rapid dissemination. Commun. ACM 54(8): 36-38 (2011) - [c92]Yuga J. Cohler, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Optimal Envy-Free Cake Cutting. AAAI 2011: 626-631 - [c91]Florin Constantin, Malvika Rao, Chien-Chung Huang, David C. Parkes:
On Expressing Value Externalities in Position Auctions. AAAI 2011: 644-649 - [c90]Jens Witkowski, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Incentive-Compatible Escrow Mechanisms. AAAI 2011: 751-757 - [c89]Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes, Eric Horvitz, Kamal Jain, Mary Czerwinski, Desney S. Tan:
Market User Interface Design - (Extended Abstract). AMMA 2011: 2-4 - [c88]Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, Enrico H. Gerding, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings:
An Online Mechanism for Multi-speed Electric Vehicle Charging. AMMA 2011: 100-112 - [c87]Yiling Chen, Jerry Kung, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia, Haoqi Zhang:
Incentive design for adaptive agents. AAMAS 2011: 627-634 - [c86]Enrico H. Gerding, Valentin Robu, Sebastian Stein, David C. Parkes, Alex Rogers, Nicholas R. Jennings:
Online mechanism design for electric vehicle charging. AAMAS 2011: 811-818 - [c85]Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
Combinatorial Agency of Threshold Functions. SAGT 2011: 154-165 - [c84]Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes:
A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. EC 2011: 323-332 - [c83]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. EC 2011: 341-350 - [i5]Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Simplicity-Expressiveness Tradeoffs in Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1102.3632 (2011) - [i4]Joseph Y. Halpern, David C. Parkes:
Viewpoint: Journals for Certification, Conferences for Rapid Dissemination. CoRR abs/1106.2649 (2011) - [i3]Jonathan Bredin, Quang Duong, David C. Parkes:
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents. CoRR abs/1111.0046 (2011) - 2010
- [j23]Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer:
Specifying and monitoring economic environments using rights and obligations. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 20(2): 158-197 (2010) - [j22]David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Florin Constantin, Satinder Singh:
Dynamic Incentive Mechanisms. AI Mag. 31(4): 79-94 (2010) - [j21]Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang:
Strong activity rules for iterative combinatorial auctions. Comput. Oper. Res. 37(7): 1271-1284 (2010) - [c82]Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Truth, Justice, and Cake Cutting. AAAI 2010: 756-761 - [c81]Sven Seuken, Jie Tang, David C. Parkes:
Accounting Mechanisms for Distributed Work Systems. AAAI 2010: 860-866 - [c80]William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes:
Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI 2010: 887-894 - [c79]James Y. Zou, Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes:
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money. AAAI 2010: 947-952 - [c78]Sven Seuken, Kamal Jain, David C. Parkes:
Hidden Market Design. AAAI 2010: 1498-1503 - [c77]Jie Tang, Sven Seuken, David C. Parkes:
Hybrid transitive trust mechanisms. AAMAS 2010: 233-240 - [c76]Sujit Gujar, David C. Parkes:
Dynamic Matching with a Fall-back Option. ECAI 2010: 263-268 - [c75]Eric Huang, Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Krzysztof Z. Gajos, Yiling Chen:
Toward automatic task design: a progress report. HCOMP@KDD 2010: 77-85 - [c74]David F. Bacon, Eric Bokelberg, Yiling Chen, Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao, Manu Sridharan:
Software economies. FoSER 2010: 7-12 - [c73]Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Kurt C. Wallnau:
Designing for incentives: better information sharing for better software engineering. FoSER 2010: 195-200 - [c72]Nevena Vratonjic, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, Maxim Raya, David C. Parkes:
Security Games in Online Advertising: Can Ads Help Secure the Web? WEIS 2010 - [c71]Ian A. Kash, David C. Parkes:
Impersonation Strategies in Auctions. WINE 2010: 492-495 - [e7]David C. Parkes, Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Proceedings 11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2010), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, June 7-11, 2010. ACM 2010, ISBN 978-1-60558-822-3 [contents]
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j20]Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes:
An options-based solution to the sequential auction problem. Artif. Intell. 173(7-8): 876-899 (2009) - [j19]Joan Feigenbaum, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock:
Computational challenges in e-commerce. Commun. ACM 52(1): 70-74 (2009) - [j18]Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes:
Multi-item Vickrey-Dutch auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 66(1): 326-347 (2009) - [j17]David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 1 (2009) - [c70]Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
Fair Package Assignment. AMMA 2009: 92 - [c69]Julien Freudiger, Mohammad Hossein Manshaei, Jean-Pierre Hubaux, David C. Parkes:
On non-cooperative location privacy: a game-theoretic analysis. CCS 2009: 324-337 - [c68]Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes:
Cryptographic Combinatorial Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography 2009: 285-304 - [c67]David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Christopher Thorpe:
Cryptographic Combinatorial Clock-Proxy Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2009: 305-324 - [c66]Benjamin Lubin, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Rajarshi Das, David C. Parkes:
Expressive Power-Based Resource Allocation for Data Centers. IJCAI 2009: 1451-1456 - [c65]Haoqi Zhang, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
A General Approach to Environment Design with One Agent. IJCAI 2009: 2002-2014 - [c64]Jacomo Corbo, Shaili Jain, Michael Mitzenmacher, David C. Parkes:
An Economically-Principled Generative Model of AS Graph Connectivity. INFOCOM 2009: 2941-2945 - [c63]Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
The role of game theory in human computation systems. KDD Workshop on Human Computation 2009: 58-61 - [c62]David F. Bacon, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes, Malvika Rao:
A market-based approach to software evolution. OOPSLA Companion 2009: 973-980 - [c61]Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
Self-correcting sampling-based dynamic multi-unit auctions. EC 2009: 89-98 - [c60]Shaili Jain, Yiling Chen, David C. Parkes:
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums. EC 2009: 129-138 - [c59]Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes, Yiling Chen:
Policy teaching through reward function learning. EC 2009: 295-304 - [c58]David C. Parkes:
When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures. SOFSEM 2009: 62-66 - [c57]Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan:
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. TCC 2009: 36-53 - [c56]Benjamin Lubin, David C. Parkes:
Quantifying the Strategyproofness of Mechanisms via Metrics on Payoff Distributions. UAI 2009: 349-358 - [i2]Saul Youssef, John Brunelle, John Huth, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer, Jim Shank:
Minimal Economic Distributed Computing. CoRR abs/0902.4730 (2009) - 2008
- [j16]David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe:
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. Electron. Commer. Res. Appl. 7(3): 294-312 (2008) - [j15]Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes:
M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 32: 705-755 (2008) - [j14]Benjamin Lubin, Adam I. Juda, Ruggiero Cavallo, Sébastien Lahaie, Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
ICE: An Expressive Iterative Combinatorial Exchange. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 33: 33-77 (2008) - [j13]Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exch. 7(2) (2008) - [c55]Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh:
Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37 - [c54]Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes:
Efficient Metadeliberation Auctions. AAAI 2008: 50-56 - [c53]Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, David M. Pennock:
An Expressive Auction Design for Online Display Advertising. AAAI 2008: 108-113 - [c52]Sven Seuken, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes:
Partially Synchronized DEC-MDPs in Dynamic Mechanism Design. AAAI 2008: 162-169 - [c51]Haoqi Zhang, David C. Parkes:
Value-Based Policy Teaching with Active Indirect Elicitation. AAAI 2008: 208-214 - [c50]Erik G. Schultink, Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes:
Economic Hierarchical Q-Learning. AAAI 2008: 689-695 - [c49]William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier:
Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 - [c48]Mark Klein, Gabriel A. Moreno, David C. Parkes, Daniel Plakosh, Sven Seuken, Kurt C. Wallnau:
Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. NetEcon 2008: 73-78 - [c47]Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome. EC 2008: 78-87 - [c46]Sevan G. Ficici, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer:
Learning and Solving Many-Player Games through a Cluster-Based Representation. UAI 2008: 187-195 - [c45]Shaili Jain, David C. Parkes:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Games with a Purpose. WINE 2008: 342-350 - [e6]Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 1. IFAAMAS 2008, ISBN 978-0-9817381-0-9 [contents] - [e5]Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 2. IFAAMAS 2008, ISBN 978-0-9817381-1-6 [contents] - [e4]Lin Padgham, David C. Parkes, Jörg P. Müller, Simon Parsons:
7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 3. IFAAMAS 2008, ISBN 978-0-9817381-2-3 [contents] - [i1]Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, Salil P. Vadhan:
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch. 2008: 97 (2008) - 2007
- [j12]Anna Nagurney, David C. Parkes, Patrizia Daniele:
The Internet, evolutionary variational inequalities, and the time-dependent Braess paradox. Comput. Manag. Sci. 4(4): 355-375 (2007) - [j11]Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes, Quang Duong:
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 30: 133-179 (2007) - [j10]Debasis Mishra, David C. Parkes:
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations. J. Econ. Theory 132(1): 335-366 (2007) - [j9]David C. Parkes, Lin Padgham:
AAMAS 2008. Künstliche Intell. 21(3): 76 (2007) - [c44]David C. Parkes, Quang Duong:
An Ironing-Based Approach to Adaptive Online Mechanism Design in Single-Valued Domains. AAAI 2007: 94-101 - [c43]Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
On Revenue-Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. AMEC/TADA 2007: 1-15 - [c42]Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes:
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values. AAMAS 2007: 110 - [c41]Christopher Thorpe, David C. Parkes:
Cryptographic Securities Exchanges. Financial Cryptography 2007: 163-178 - [c40]Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes:
The Importance of Network Topology in Local Contribution Games. WINE 2007: 388-395 - [e3]Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, David C. Parkes, Paul Resnick:
Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2007), San Diego, California, USA, June 11-15, 2007. ACM 2007, ISBN 978-1-59593-653-0 [contents] - 2006
- [j8]Jacomo Corbo, Antoni Calvó-Armengol, David C. Parkes:
A study of Nash equilibrium in contribution games for peer-to-peer networks. ACM SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 40(3): 61-66 (2006) - [c39]Laura Kang, David C. Parkes:
Passive verification of the strategyproofness of mechanisms in open environments. ICEC 2006: 19-30 - [c38]David C. Parkes, Michael O. Rabin, Stuart M. Shieber, Christopher Thorpe:
Practical secrecy-preserving, verifiably correct and trustworthy auctions. ICEC 2006: 70-81 - [c37]Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes:
Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. AAMAS 2006: 1151-1158 - [c36]Adrian Petcu, Boi Faltings, David C. Parkes:
MDPOP: faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. AAMAS 2006: 1397-1404 - [c35]Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes:
The sequential auction problem on eBay: an empirical analysis and a solution. EC 2006: 180-189 - [c34]Ruggiero Cavallo, David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh:
Optimal Coordinated Planning Amongst Self-Interested Agents with Private State. UAI 2006 - 2005
- [j7]David C. Parkes:
Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 44(3): 269-302 (2005) - [j6]David C. Parkes:
Special Issue of Decision Support Systems on the Fourth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. Decis. Support Syst. 39(1): 1-2 (2005) - [j5]Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri:
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions. Decis. Support Syst. 39(1): 105-121 (2005) - [j4]David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam:
Models for Iterative Multiattribute Procurement Auctions. Manag. Sci. 51(3): 435-451 (2005) - [c33]David C. Parkes:
Computational Mechanism Design: An AI Agenda. BNAIC 2005: 3-10 - [c32]Jeffrey Shneidman, Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Alvin AuYoung, Alex C. Snoeren, Amin Vahdat, Brent N. Chun:
Why Markets Could (But Don't Currently) Solve Resource Allocation Problems in Systems. HotOS 2005 - [c31]Sébastien Lahaie, Florin Constantin, David C. Parkes:
More on the Power of Demand Queries in Combinatorial Auctions: Learning Atomic Languages and Handling Incentives. IJCAI 2005: 959-964 - [c30]Geoffrey Mainland, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh:
Decentralized, Adaptive Resource Allocation for Sensor Networks. NSDI 2005 - [c29]Jacomo Corbo, David C. Parkes:
The price of selfish behavior in bilateral network formation. PODC 2005: 99-107 - [c28]Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David C. Parkes:
Online auctions with re-usable goods. EC 2005: 165-174 - [c27]David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam I. Juda, Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan:
ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange. EC 2005: 249-258 - [c26]Jonathan Bredin, David C. Parkes:
Models for Truthful Online Double Auctions. UAI 2005: 50-59 - 2004
- [c25]David C. Parkes, Grant Schoenebeck:
GROWRANGE: Anytime VCG-Based Mechanisms. AAAI 2004: 34-41 - [c24]Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes:
An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. AMEC 2004: 44-58 - [c23]Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer:
Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations. AMEC 2004: 188-201 - [c22]David C. Parkes, Jeffrey Shneidman:
Distributed Implementations of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism. AAMAS 2004: 261-268 - [c21]David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh, Dimah Yanovsky:
Approximately Efficient Online Mechanism Design. NIPS 2004: 1049-1056 - [c20]Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. PODC 2004: 88-97 - [c19]Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, David C. Parkes:
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. EC 2004: 71-80 - [c18]Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes:
Applying learning algorithms to preference elicitation. EC 2004: 180-188 - [c17]Geoffrey Mainland, Laura Kang, Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes, Matt Welsh:
Using virtual markets to program global behavior in sensor networks. ACM SIGOPS European Workshop 2004: 1 - [e2]Peyman Faratin, David C. Parkes, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar, William E. Walsh:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2003 Workshop, AMEC 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003, Revised Selected Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 3048, Springer 2004, ISBN 3-540-22674-5 [contents] - 2003
- [j3]Rajdeep K. Dash, Nicholas R. Jennings, David C. Parkes:
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms. IEEE Intell. Syst. 18(6): 40-47 (2003) - [c16]William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Rajarshi Das:
Choosing Samples to Compute Heuristic-Strategy Nash Equilibrium. AMEC 2003: 109-123 - [c15]Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
Rationality and Self-Interest in Peer to Peer Networks. IPTPS 2003: 139-148 - [c14]David C. Parkes, Satinder Singh:
An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design. NIPS 2003: 791-798 - [c13]Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri:
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. EC 2003: 166-175 - [c12]Aditya V. Sunderam, David C. Parkes:
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions. EC 2003: 214-215 - [c11]Chaki Ng, David C. Parkes, Margo I. Seltzer:
Virtual worlds: fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. EC 2003: 238-239 - [c10]Eric J. Friedman, David C. Parkes:
Pricing WiFi at Starbucks: issues in online mechanism design. EC 2003: 240-241 - [c9]Jeffrey Shneidman, David C. Parkes:
Using redundancy to improve robustness of distributed mechanism implementations. EC 2003: 276-277 - 2002
- [j2]David C. Parkes:
Conference report: the third ACM conference on electronic commerce. SIGecom Exch. 3(1): 57-61 (2002) - [c8]David C. Parkes:
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 103-122 - [e1]Julian A. Padget, Onn Shehory, David C. Parkes, Norman M. Sadeh, William E. Walsh:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce IV, Designing Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2002 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce, Bologna, Italy, July 16, 2002, Revised Papers. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2531, Springer 2002, ISBN 3-540-00327-4 [contents] - 2001
- [j1]David C. Parkes, Bernardo A. Huberman:
Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection. Games Econ. Behav. 35(1-2): 124-165 (2001) - [c7]David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar:
An auction-based method for decentralized train scheduling. Agents 2001: 43-50 - [c6]David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso:
Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges. IJCAI 2001: 1161-1168 - 2000
- [c5]David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar:
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 74-81 - [c4]David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar:
Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Proxy Agents and Price-Adjustment. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 82-89
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [c3]David C. Parkes:
Optimal Auction Design for Agents with Hard Valuation Problems. Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce (IJCAI Workshop) 1999: 206-219 - [c2]David C. Parkes:
iBundle: an efficient ascending price bundle auction. EC 1999: 148-157 - 1998
- [c1]David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar, Dean P. Foster:
Accounting for Cognitive Costs in On-Line Auction Design. AMET 1998: 25-40
Coauthor Index
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