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ORCID23rd ACM-EC 2022: Boulder, CO, USA
- David M. Pennock, Ilya Segal, Sven Seuken:
EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Boulder, CO, USA, July 11 - 15, 2022. ACM 2022, ISBN 978-1-4503-9150-4
Best Paper and Best Paper with Student Lead Author
- Etan A. Green, E. Barry Plunkett:
The Science of the Deal: Optimal Bargaining on eBay Using Deep Reinforcement Learning. 1-27 - Modibo K. Camara:
Computationally Tractable Choice. 28
Exemplary Track Papers
- Jon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, Manish Raghavan:
The Challenge of Understanding What Users Want: Inconsistent Preferences and Engagement Optimization. 29 - Martino Banchio
, Andrzej Skrzypacz:
Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design. 30-31 - Leon Musolff:
Algorithmic Pricing Facilitates Tacit Collusion: Evidence from E-Commerce. 32-33
Session 1A: Decision Theory
- Xiaosheng Mu, Luciano Pomatto, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz:
Monotone Additive Statistics. 34 - Hamed Hamze Bajgiran, Federico Echenique:
Closure Operators: Complexity and Applications to Classification and Decision-making. 35-55 - Xiaoyu Cheng:
Robust Data-Driven Decisions Under Model Uncertainty. 56-57 - Annie Liang, Jay Lu, Xiaosheng Mu:
Algorithmic Design: Fairness Versus Accuracy. 58-59
Session 1B: Online Matching and Ridesharing
- Francisco Castro, Hongyao Ma, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Chiwei Yan:
Randomized FIFO Mechanisms. 60 - Süleyman Kerimov, Itai Ashlagi, Itai Gurvich:
On the Optimality of Greedy Policies in Dynamic Matching. 61 - Mohammad Akbarpour, Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Shengwu Li, Amin Saberi:
The Value of Excess Supply in Spatial Matching Markets. 62 - Yash Kanoria:
Dynamic Spatial Matching. 63-64
Session 1C: Blockchains
- Aviv Yaish, Saar Tochner, Aviv Zohar:
Blockchain Stretching & Squeezing: Manipulating Time for Your Best Interest. 65-88 - Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu:
Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-Stake. 89-114 - Guillermo Angeris, Alex Evans, Tarun Chitra, Stephen P. Boyd:
Optimal Routing for Constant Function Market Makers. 115-128 - Nikolaj Ignatieff Schwartzbach:
Payment Schemes from Limited Information with Applications in Distributed Computing. 129-149
Session 1D: Robust Auction Design
- Nir Bachrach, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Distributional Robustness: From Pricing to Auctions. 150 - Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes:
On the Robustness of Second-Price Auctions in Prior-Independent Mechanism Design. 151-152 - Ethan Che:
Robustly Optimal Auction Design under Mean Constraints. 153-181 - Wanchang Zhang:
Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism. 182-183
Session 2A: Equilibrium in Games
- Akash Gaonkar, Divya Raghunathan, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Derby Game: An Ordering-based Colonel Blotto Game. 184-207 - Vianney Perchet, Philippe Rigollet, Thibaut Le Gouic:
An Algorithmic Solution to the Blotto Game using Multi-marginal Couplings. 208-209 - Jakub Cerný, Bo An, Allan N. Zhang:
Quantal Correlated Equilibrium in Normal Form Games. 210-239 - Evan Friedman, Felix Mauersberger:
Quantal Response Equilibrium with Symmetry: Representation and Applications. 240-241
Session 2B: Prophet Inequalities
- Nick Arnosti, Will Ma:
Tight Guarantees for Static Threshold Policies in the Prophet Secretary Problem. 242 - Kristen Kessel, Ali Shameli, Amin Saberi, David Wajc:
The Stationary Prophet Inequality Problem. 243-244 - Makis Arsenis, Robert Kleinberg:
Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities. 245 - Saeed Alaei, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, Rad Niazadeh:
Descending Price Auctions with Bounded Number of Price Levels and Batched Prophet Inequality. 246
Session 2C: Social Networks
- Evan Sadler:
Seeding a Simple Contagion. 247-248 - Rediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali:
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Segregation. 249-284 - Daniel Goetz, Wei Lu:
Peer Effects from Friends and Strangers: Evidence from Random Matchmaking in an Online Game. 285-286 - Apostolos Filippas, John J. Horton, Elliot Lipnowski:
The Production and Consumption of Social Media. 287-288
Session 2D: School Choice and Object Reallocation
- Natalie Cox, Ricardo Fonseca, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson:
Do Peer Preferences Matter in School Choice Market Design?: Theory and Evidence. 289 - Maxwell Allman, Itai Ashlagi, Irene Lo, Juliette Love, Katherine Mentzer, Lulabel Ruiz-Setz, Henry O'Connell:
Designing School Choice for Diversity in the San Francisco Unified School District. 290-291 - Dong Woo Hahm, Minseon Park:
A Dynamic Framework of School Choice: Effects of Middle Schools on High School Choice. 292-293 - Özgün Ekici:
Pair-efficient Reallocation of Indivisible Objects. 294
Session 3A: Empirics of Online Platforms
- Shumpei Goke, Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ralph A. Mastromonaco, Samuel S. Seljan:
Bidders' Responses to Auction Format Change in Internet Display Advertising Auctions. 295 - Miguel Alcobendas, Robert Zeithammer:
Adjustment of Bidding Strategies After a Switch to First-Price Rules. 296 - George Gui, Harikesh Nair, Fengshi Niu:
Auction Throttling and Causal Inference of Online Advertising Effects. 297 - Megan Hunter:
Chasing Stars: Firms' Strategic Responses to Online Consumer Ratings. 298-299
Session 3B: Pricing
- Paul Milgrom, Mitchell Watt:
Linear Pricing Mechanisms for Markets without Convexity. 300 - J. Massey Cashore, Peter I. Frazier, Éva Tardos:
Dynamic Pricing Provides Robust Equilibria in Stochastic Ride-Sharing Networks. 301-302 - Johannes Brustle, José Correa, Paul Dütting, Victor Verdugo:
The Competition Complexity of Dynamic Pricing. 303-320 - Tristan Pollner, Mohammad Roghani, Amin Saberi, David Wajc:
Improved Online Contention Resolution for Matchings and Applications to the Gig Economy. 321-322
Session 3C: Social Learning
- Gideon Amir, Itai Arieli, Galit Ashkenazi-Golan, Ron Peretz:
Granular DeGroot Dynamics - a Model for Robust Naive Learning in Social Networks. 323-324 - Wanying Huang, Philipp Strack, Omer Tamuz:
Learning in Repeated Interactions on Networks. 325 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko:
A Population's Feasible Posterior Beliefs. 326-327 - Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov:
Bias-Variance Games. 328-329
Session 3D: Mechanism Design I
- Afshin Nikzad:
Constrained Majorization: Applications in Mechanism Design. 330-331 - Deniz Kattwinkel, Axel Niemeyer, Justus Preusser, Alexander Winter:
Mechanisms without Transfers for Fully Biased Agents. 332-333 - Niccolò Lomys, Takuro Yamashita:
A Mediator Approach to Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment. 334 - Estelle Marine Varloot, Rida Laraki:
Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms. 335-369
Session 4A: Online Platforms and Fairness
- Ron Bekkerman, Maxime C. Cohen, Edward Kung, John Maiden, Davide Proserpio:
The Effect of Short-Term Rentals on Residential Investment. 370 - Mario Leccese:
Asymmetric Taxation, Pass-through and Market Competition: Evidence from Ride-sharing and Taxis. 371-372 - Rémi Castera, Patrick Loiseau, Bary S. R. Pradelski:
Statistical Discrimination in Stable Matchings. 373-374 - Vitalii Emelianov, Nicolas Gast, Patrick Loiseau:
Fairness in Selection Problems with Strategic Candidates. 375-403
Session 4B: Fair Division and Prediction Markets
- Biaoshuai Tao:
On Existence of Truthful Fair Cake Cutting Mechanisms. 404-434 - Moshe Babaioff, Uriel Feige:
Fair Shares: Feasibility, Domination and Incentives. 435 - Yushi Bai, Uriel Feige, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Fair Allocations for Smoothed Utilities. 436-465 - Dian Yu, Jianjun Gao, Weiping Wu, Zizhuo Wang:
Price Interpretability of Prediction Markets: A Convergence Analysis. 466-467
Session 4C: Bayesian Persuasion
- Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Persuasion as Transportation. 468 - Xiao Lin, Ce Liu:
Credible Persuasion. 469 - Chang Liu:
Motivating Effort with Information about Future Rewards. 470 - Jibang Wu, Zixuan Zhang, Zhe Feng, Zhaoran Wang, Zhuoran Yang, Michael I. Jordan, Haifeng Xu:
Sequential Information Design: Markov Persuasion Process and Its Efficient Reinforcement Learning. 471-472
Session 4D: Auctions with Budget-Constrained Bidders
- Eleni Batziou, Martin Bichler, Maximilian Fichtl:
Core-Stability in Assignment Markets with Financially Constrained Buyers. 473-474 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Song Zuo:
Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping. 475 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Christian Kroer, Rachitesh Kumar:
Contextual Standard Auctions with Budgets: Revenue Equivalence and Efficiency Guarantees. 476 - Shao-Heng Ko, Kamesh Munagala:
Optimal Price Discrimination for Randomized Mechanisms. 477-496
Session 5A: Mechanism Design with Learning
- Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan:
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. 497-528 - Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan:
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. 529-557 - Modibo K. Camara:
Mechanism Design with a Common Dataset. 558 - Laura Blattner, Scott Nelson, Jann Spiess:
Unpacking the Black Box: Regulating Algorithmic Decisions. 559
Session 5B: Voting
- Nikhil Garg, Wes Gurnee, David Rothschild, David B. Shmoys:
Combatting Gerrymandering with Social Choice: The Design of Multi-member Districts. 560-561 - Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia:
In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins. 562 - Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, Nisarg Shah:
Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting. 563-600 - Antonin Macé, Rafael Treibich:
A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions. 601
Session 5C: Estimation Methods
- Yeshwanth Cherapanamjeri, Constantinos Daskalakis, Andrew Ilyas, Manolis Zampetakis:
Estimation of Standard Auction Models. 602-603 - Edvard Bakhitov, Amandeep Singh:
Causal Gradient Boosting: Boosted Instrumental Variable Regression. 604-605 - Christopher Harshaw, Fredrik Sävje, David Eisenstat, Vahab Mirrokni, Jean Pouget-Abadie:
Design and Analysis of Bipartite Experiments Under a Linear Exposure-response Model. 606 - Lorenzo Magnolfi, Jonathon McClure, Alan Sorensen:
Embeddings and Distance-based Demand for Differentiated Products. 607
Session 5D: Mechanism Design II
- Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao:
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? 608-663 - Yingkai Li:
Selling Data to an Agent with Endogenous Information. 664-665 - Curtis Bechtel, Shaddin Dughmi, Neel Patel:
Delegated Pandora's Box. 666-693 - Zi Yang Kang, Ellen V. Muir:
Contracting and Vertical Control by a Dominant Platform. 694-695
Session 6A: Contract Design
- Maneesha Papireddygari, Bo Waggoner:
Contracts with Information Acquisition, via Scoring Rules. 703-704 - Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti:
Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomization. 705-735 - Svenja M. Griesbach, Martin Hoefer, Max Klimm, Tim Koglin:
Public Signals in Network Congestion Games. 736 - Nicole Immorlica, Andre M. Sztutman, Robert M. Townsend:
Optimal Credit Scores Under Adverse Selection. 737-738
Session 6B: Strategic Data Sharing and Attacks
- Yotam Gafni, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Long-term Data Sharing under Exclusivity Attacks. 739-759 - Kun Jin, Xueru Zhang, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili, Parinaz Naghizadeh, Mingyan Liu:
Incentive Mechanisms for Strategic Classification and Regression Problems. 760-790 - Federico Echenique, Kevin He:
Screening p-Hackers: Dissemination Noise as Bait. 791 - Yukun Cheng, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li, Xiang Yan:
Tight Incentive Analysis on Sybil Attacks to Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks. 792-793
Session 6C: Recommendations
- Peng Shi:
Optimal Match Recommendations in Two-sided Marketplaces with Endogenous Prices. 794 - Sarah Dean, Jamie Morgenstern:
Preference Dynamics Under Personalized Recommendations. 795-816 - Arash Asadpour, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Sequential Submodular Maximization and Applications to Ranking an Assortment of Products. 817 - Yiding Feng, Wei Tang, Haifeng Xu:
Online Bayesian Recommendation with No Regret. 818-819
Session 6D: Auctions and Bargaining
- Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. 820-845 - Shanglyu Deng:
Speculation in Procurement Auctions. 846 - Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski, Marek Pycia:
Double Auctions and Transaction Costs. 847 - S. Nageeb Ali, Navin Kartik, Andreas Kleiner:
Sequential Veto Bargaining with Incomplete Information. 848
Session 7A: Information Design
- Reza Alijani, Siddhartha Banerjee, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang:
The Limits of an Information Intermediary in Auction Design. 849-868 - Chenghan Zhou, Thanh Hong Nguyen, Haifeng Xu:
Algorithmic Information Design in Multi-Player Games: Possibilities and Limits in Singleton Congestion. 869 - Alex Smolin, Takuro Yamashita:
Information Design in Concave Games. 870 - Itai Arieli, Ronen Gradwohl, Rann Smorodinsky:
Herd Design. 871-872
Session 7B: Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design
- Soheil Ghili:
A Characterization for Optimal Bundling of Products with Non-Additive Values. 873 - Frank Yang:
Costly Multidimensional Screening. 874 - S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou:
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Locally-Implementable. 875-896 - Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design. 897-914
Session 7C: Learning to Play
- Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria. 915-916 - Nika Haghtalab, Thodoris Lykouris, Sloan Nietert, Alexander Wei:
Learning in Stackelberg Games with Non-myopic Agents. 917-918 - Muhammed O. Sayin, Kaiqing Zhang, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Fictitious Play in Markov Games with Single Controller. 919-936 - Han Wu, Stefan Wager:
Thompson Sampling with Unrestricted Delays. 937-955
Session 7D: Stable Matching
- Orhan Aygün, Bertan Turhan:
How to De-reserve Reserves: Admissions to Technical Colleges in India. 956-957 - Péter Biró, Avinatan Hassidim, Assaf Romm, Ran I. Shorrer, Sándor Sovago:
The Large Core of College Admission Markets: Theory and Evidence. 958-959 - Nick Arnosti:
A Continuum Model of Stable Matching with Finite Capacities. 960 - Yunseo Choi:
On Two-sided Matching in Infinite Markets. 961
Session 8A: Online Matching
- Steven Delong, Alireza Farhadi, Rad Niazadeh, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources. 962-963 - Yiding Feng, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi:
Near-Optimal Bayesian Online Assortment of Reusable Resources. 964-965 - Rajan Udwani:
Periodic Reranking for Online Matching of Reusable Resources. 966 - Mark Braverman, Mahsa Derakhshan, Antonio Molina Lovett:
Max-Weight Online Stochastic Matching: Improved Approximations Against the Online Benchmark. 967-985 - Vahideh H. Manshadi, Scott Rodilitz, Daniela Sabán, Akshaya Suresh:
Online Algorithms for Matching Platforms with Multi-Channel Traffic. 986-987
Session 8B: Information Elicitation and Crowdsourcing
- Yingkai Li, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu:
Optimization of Scoring Rules. 988-989 - Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden:
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals. 990-1012 - Pavel Atanasov, Jens Witkowski, Barbara A. Mellers, Philip Tetlock:
Crowd Prediction Systems: Markets, Polls, and Elite Forecasters. 1013-1014 - Bobak Pakzad-Hurson:
Crowdsourcing and Optimal Market Design. 1015 - Zhi Liu, Nikhil Garg:
Equity in Resident Crowdsourcing: Measuring Under-reporting without Ground Truth Data. 1016-1017
Session 8C: Market Design Applications
- Patrick Hummel, Michael Schwarz:
Efficient Capacity Provisioning for Firms with Multiple Locations: The Case of the Public Cloud. 1018-1039