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ORCIDS. Matthew Weinberg
Matthew Weinberg
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- affiliation: Princeton University, NJ, USA
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2020 – today
- 2020
[j12]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. J. ACM 67(4): 24:1-24:40 (2020)- [c50]Rediet Abebe, Jon M. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Subsidy Allocations in the Presence of Income Shocks. AAAI 2020: 7032-7039 - [c49]Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. ICALP 2020: 8:1-8:14 - [c48]Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo:
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. ITCS 2020: 3:1-3:25 - [c47]Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. ITCS 2020: 60:1-60:10 - [c46]Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms When Demand Queries Are NP-Hard. ITCS 2020: 61:1-61:32 - [c45]Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg:
New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function Minimization. ITCS 2020: 64:1-64:16 - [c44]Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. EC 2020: 193-256 - [c43]Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On the (in-)approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. EC 2020: 477-497 - [c42]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Credible, Truthful, and Two-Round (Optimal) Auctions via Cryptographic Commitments. EC 2020: 683-712 - [c41]Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Separating the communication complexity of truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions. STOC 2020: 1073-1085 - [i51]Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg:
When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase. CoRR abs/2002.06326 (2020) - [i50]Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, Raghuvansh Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Mechanism Design for Single-Minded Agents. CoRR abs/2002.06329 (2020) - [i49]Eric Neyman, Georgy Noarov, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Binary Scoring Rules that Incentivize Precision. CoRR abs/2002.10669 (2020) - [i48]Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, Joan Bruna, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design. CoRR abs/2003.01497 (2020) - [i47]Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Credible, Truthful, and Bounded-Round Mechanisms via Cryptographic Commitments. CoRR abs/2004.01598 (2020) - [i46]Jad Rahme, Samy Jelassi, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Auction learning as a two-player game. CoRR abs/2006.05684 (2020) - [i45]Michael Chang, Sidhant Kaushik, S. Matthew Weinberg, Thomas L. Griffiths, Sergey Levine:
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions. CoRR abs/2007.02382 (2020) - [i44]Natalie Collina, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On the (in)-approximability of Bayesian Revenue Maximization for a Combinatorial Buyer. CoRR abs/2007.05164 (2020) - [i43]Sepehr Assadi, Hrishikesh Khandeparkar, Raghuvansh R. Saxena, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Separating the Communication Complexity of Truthful and Non-Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2011.07414 (2020) - [i42]S. Matthew Weinberg, Zixin Zhou:
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms are not Local. CoRR abs/2011.09688 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j11]Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Matroid prophet inequalities and applications to multi-dimensional mechanism design. Games Econ. Behav. 113: 97-115 (2019) - [j10]Pablo Daniel Azar
, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information. Games Econ. Behav. 118: 511-532 (2019) - [j9]Hu Fu, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 17 (2019) - [c40]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms. COLT 2019: 383-416 - [c39]Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. EC 2019: 417-418 - [c38]Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. EC 2019: 459-473 - [c37]Pravesh Kothari, Sahil Singla, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Approximation Schemes for a Unit-Demand Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. FOCS 2019: 220-232 - [c36]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Matthew Weinberg:
Settling the Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Two Subadditive Buyers. FOCS 2019: 249-272 - [c35]Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. ITCS 2019: 5:1-5:1 - [c34]Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal (and benchmark-optimal) competition complexity for additive buyers over independent items. STOC 2019: 686-696 - [c33]Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. WINE 2019: 142-155 - [c32]Matheus Xavier Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg, Danny Yuxing Huang, Nick Feamster, Tithi Chattopadhyay:
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. WWW 2019: 196-206 - [i41]Tithi Chattopadhyay, Nick Feamster, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Danny Yuxing Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Selling a Single Item with Negative Externalities. CoRR abs/1902.10008 (2019) - [i40]Pravesh Kothari, Divyarthi Mohan, Ariel Schvartzman, Sahil Singla, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Approximation Schemes for a Buyer with Independent Items via Symmetries. CoRR abs/1905.05231 (2019) - [i39]Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eitan Zlatin, Albert Zuo:
Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules: On Large Manipulating Sets and Cover-Consistence. CoRR abs/1906.03324 (2019) - [i38]Maryam Bahrani, Nicole Immorlica, Divyarthi Mohan, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Asynchronous Majority Dynamics in Preferential Attachment Trees. CoRR abs/1907.05823 (2019) - [i37]Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality. CoRR abs/1909.10584 (2019) - [i36]Linda Cai, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Implementation in Advised Strategies: Welfare Guarantees from Posted-Price Mechanisms when Demand Queries are NP-hard. CoRR abs/1910.04342 (2019) - [i35]Andrei Graur, Tristan Pollner, Vidhya Ramaswamy, S. Matthew Weinberg:
New Query Lower Bounds for Submodular Function MInimization. CoRR abs/1911.06889 (2019) - [i34]Aviad Rubinstein, Jack Z. Wang, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Single-Choice Prophet Inequalities from Samples. CoRR abs/1911.07945 (2019) - 2018
- [j8]Ambarish Chandra, Matthew Weinberg:
How Does Advertising Depend on Competition? Evidence from U.S. Brewing. Manag. Sci. 64(11): 5132-5148 (2018) - [j7]Hu Fu, Matthew Weinberg:
Editors' introduction. SIGecom Exch. 17(1): 1 (2018) - [j6]Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(3-4): 19:1-19:25 (2018) - [j5]Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(3-4): 20:1-20:19 (2018) - [c31]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization. FOCS 2018: 416-426 - [c30]Aviad Rubinstein, Tselil Schramm, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Computing Exact Minimum Cuts Without Knowing the Graph. ITCS 2018: 39:1-39:16 - [c29]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, Matthew Weinberg:
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. EC 2018: 523-538 - [c28]Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. SODA 2018: 2026-2035 - [c27]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2018: 2256-2273 - [c26]Harry A. Kalodner, Steven Goldfeder, Xiaoqi Chen, S. Matthew Weinberg, Edward W. Felten:
Arbitrum: Scalable, private smart contracts. USENIX Security Symposium 2018: 1353-1370 - [i33]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/1808.02458 (2018) - [i32]Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. CoRR abs/1809.06528 (2018) - [i31]Nick Arnosti, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Bitcoin: A Natural Oligopoly. CoRR abs/1811.08572 (2018) - [i30]Tomer Ezra, Michal Feldman, Eric Neyman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Complement-Free Couples Must Communicate: A Hardness Result for Two-Player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1811.09871 (2018) - [i29]Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. CoRR abs/1811.12459 (2018) - [i28]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1812.01577 (2018) - [i27]Hedyeh Beyhaghi, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal (and Benchmark-Optimal) Competition Complexity for Additive Buyers over Independent Items. CoRR abs/1812.01794 (2018) - 2017
- [c25]Zhe Huang, S. Matthew Weinberg, Liang Zheng, Carlee Joe-Wong, Mung Chiang:
Discovering valuations and enforcing truthfulness in a deadline-aware scheduler. INFOCOM 2017: 1-9 - [c24]Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. ITCS 2017: 35:1-35:20 - [c23]Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget Constrained Buyer: The General Case. EC 2017: 39-40 - [c22]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements: Abstract. EC 2017: 323 - [c21]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. EC 2017: 343 - [i26]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Simultaneous Two-player Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1704.03547 (2017) - [i25]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Multi-armed Bandit Problems with Strategic Arms. CoRR abs/1706.09060 (2017) - [i24]Raghuvansh R. Saxena, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The menu complexity of "one-and-a-half-dimensional" mechanism design. CoRR abs/1711.02165 (2017) - [i23]Aviad Rubinstein, Tselil Schramm, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Computing exact minimum cuts without knowing the graph. CoRR abs/1711.03165 (2017) - [i22]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, Jon Schneider, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Selling to a No-Regret Buyer. CoRR abs/1711.09176 (2017) - 2016
- [j4]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 15(1): 71-77 (2016) - [c20]Miles Carlsten, Harry A. Kalodner, S. Matthew Weinberg, Arvind Narayanan:
On the Instability of Bitcoin Without the Block Reward. CCS 2016: 154-167 - [c19]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2016: 1444-1457 - [c18]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Parallel algorithms for select and partition with noisy comparisons. STOC 2016: 851-862 - [c17]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. STOC 2016: 926-939 - [r1]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms 2016: 1801-1808 - [i21]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Parallel Algorithms for Select and Partition with Noisy Comparisons. CoRR abs/1603.04941 (2016) - [i20]Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. CoRR abs/1605.02054 (2016) - [i19]Jon Schneider, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules. CoRR abs/1605.09733 (2016) - [i18]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements. CoRR abs/1612.04746 (2016) - [i17]Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Ophir Friedler, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, S. Matthew Weinberg:
The Competition Complexity of Auctions: A Bulow-Klemperer Result for Multi-Dimensional Bidders. CoRR abs/1612.08821 (2016) - [i16]S. Matthew Weinberg, James Zou:
Signal to noise in matching markets. CoRR abs/1612.09006 (2016) - 2015
- [j3]Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Pricing lotteries. J. Econ. Theory 156: 144-174 (2015) - [c16]William Wu, Constantinos Daskalakis, Nicolaas Kaashoek, Christos Tzamos, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs. L@S 2015: 281-286 - [c15]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jamie Morgenstern, Vasilis Syrgkanis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Simple Auctions with Simple Strategies. EC 2015: 305-322 - [c14]Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. EC 2015: 377-394 - [c13]Constantinos Daskalakis, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Revenue Maximization and Ex-Post Budget Constraints. EC 2015: 433-447 - [c12]Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms. SODA 2015: 1934-1952 - [i15]Aviad Rubinstein, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Simple Mechanisms for a Combinatorial Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity. CoRR abs/1501.07637 (2015) - [i14]Mark Braverman, Jieming Mao, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1511.02831 (2015) - 2014
- [b1]S. Matthew Weinberg:
Algorithms for strategic agents. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2014 - [j2]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. SIGecom Exch. 13(2): 31-35 (2014) - [c11]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208 - [c10]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. FOCS 2014: 21-30 - [c9]Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information. SODA 2014: 1358-1377 - [i13]Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Bayesian Truthful Mechanisms for Job Scheduling from Bi-criterion Approximation Algorithms. CoRR abs/1405.5940 (2014) - [i12]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. CoRR abs/1405.6146 (2014) - [i11]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1408.5192 (2014) - 2013
- [c8]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design. FOCS 2013: 618-627 - [c7]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. SODA 2013: 578-595 - [c6]Pablo Daniel Azar, Constantinos Daskalakis, Silvio Micali, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal and Efficient Parametric Auctions. SODA 2013: 596-604 - [i10]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. CoRR abs/1305.4000 (2013) - [i9]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design. CoRR abs/1305.4002 (2013) - [i8]Pablo Daniel Azar, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Prophet Inequalities with Limited Information. CoRR abs/1307.3736 (2013) - 2012
- [c5]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. FOCS 2012: 130-139 - [c4]Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design. EC 2012: 370-387 - [c3]Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Matroid prophet inequalities. STOC 2012: 123-136 - [c2]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms. STOC 2012: 459-478 - [i7]Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Matroid Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/1201.4764 (2012) - [i6]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. CoRR abs/1207.5518 (2012) - 2011
- [j1]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 10(2): 29-33 (2011) - [i5]Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1112.4006 (2011) - [i4]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1112.4572 (2011) - [i3]Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. 18: 170 (2011) - [i2]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. 18: 172 (2011) - 2010
- [c1]Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Pricing Randomized Allocations. SODA 2010: 585-597
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [i1]Patrick Briest, Shuchi Chawla, Robert D. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Pricing Randomized Allocations. CoRR abs/0904.2400 (2009)
Coauthor Index
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