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ORCID20th ACM-EC 2019: Phoenix, AZ, USA
- Anna R. Karlin, Nicole Immorlica, Ramesh Johari:
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2019, Phoenix, AZ, USA, June 24-28, 2019. ACM 2019, ISBN 978-1-4503-6792-9
ACM SIGecom Best Paper Award
- Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan
:
Obvious Dominance and Random Priority. 1
ACM SIGecom Best Full Paper Award
- José Correa, Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, Kevin Schewior:
Prophet Inequalities for I.I.D. Random Variables from an Unknown Distribution. 3-17
ACM SIGecom Best Paper with a Student Lead Author Award
- Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Kira Goldner, Anna R. Karlin:
Combinatorial Auctions with Interdependent Valuations: SOS to the Rescue. 19-20
Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets
- Ioannis Caragiannis, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Rohit Vaish:
Stable Fractional Matchings. 21-39 - Jiehua Chen, Piotr Skowron, Manuel Sorge:
Matchings under Preferences: Strength of Stability and Trade-Offs. 41-59 - Thành Nguyen, Hai Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym:
Stability in Matching Markets with Complex Constraints. 61 - Jan Christoph Schlegel:
Trading Networks with General Preferences. 63
Session 1b: Machine Learning and Applications
- Arjun Seshadri, Johan Ugander:
Fundamental Limits of Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete Choice. 65-66 - Devesh Raval, Ted Rosenbaum, Nathan E. Wilson:
How Do Machine Learning Algorithms Perform in Predicting Hospital Choices?: Evidence from Changing Environments. 67-68 - Dmitry Ivanov, Alexander S. Nesterov:
Identifying Bid Leakage in Procurement Auctions: Machine Learning Approach. 69-70 - Hao Yan, Sanmay Das, Allen Lavoie, Sirui Li, Betsy Sinclair:
The Congressional Classification Challenge: Domain Specificity and Partisan Intensity. 71-89
Session 1c: Prophet Inequalities
- Nima Anari, Rad Niazadeh, Amin Saberi, Ali Shameli:
Nearly Optimal Pricing Algorithms for Production Constrained and Laminar Bayesian Selection. 91-92 - Nikolai Gravin, Hongao Wang:
Prophet Inequality for Bipartite Matching: Merits of Being Simple and Non Adaptive. 93-109 - Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim:
Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors. 111-129 - Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Robert Kleinberg:
Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection. 131-132
Session 2a: Signaling and Strategic Learning
- Ozan Candogan:
Persuasion in Networks: Public Signals and k-Cores. 133-134 - Lee Cohen, Yishay Mansour:
Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Exploration. 135-151 - Gal Bahar, Rann Smorodinsky, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Social Learning and the Innkeeper's Challenge. 153-170 - Guy Aridor, Kevin Liu, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
The Perils of Exploration under Competition: A Computational Modeling Approach. 171-172 - Omer Ben-Porat, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Regression Equilibrium. 173-191
Session 2b: Online Platforms
- Zoë B. Cullen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson:
Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency in a Simple Labor Market: Extended Abstract. 193 - Apostolos Filippas, Srikanth Jagabathula, Arun Sundararajan:
Managing Market Mechanism Transitions: A Randomized Trial of Decentralized Pricing Versus Platform Control. 195-196 - Gregory Lewis, Georgios Zervas:
The Supply and Demand Effects of Review Platforms. 197 - Akos Lada, Alexander Peysakhovich, Diego Aparicio, Michael Bailey:
Observational Data for Heterogeneous Treatment Effects with Application to Recommender Systems. 199-213 - Charles Hodgson, Gregory Lewis:
You Can Lead a Horse to Water: Spatial Learning and Path Dependence in Consumer Search. 215
Session 2c: Mechanism Design I
- Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions. 217-236 - Shuchi Chawla, Yifeng Teng, Christos Tzamos:
Buy-Many Mechanisms are Not Much Better than Item Pricing. 237-238 - Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, R. Preston McAfee:
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities. 239-240 - Nima Haghpapanah, Ron Siegel:
Consumer-Optimal Market Segmentation. 241-242 - Jiali Huang, Ankur Mani, Zizhuo Wang:
The Value of Price Discrimination in Large Random Networks. 243-244
Session 3a: Voting and Social Choice
- Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang:
Improved Metric Distortion for Deterministic Social Choice Rules. 245-262 - Yu Cheng, Zhihao Jiang, Kamesh Munagala, Kangning Wang:
Group Fairness in Committee Selection. 263-279 - Gerdus Benadè, Paul Gölz, Ariel D. Procaccia:
No Stratification Without Representation. 281-314 - Laurent Bartholdi, Wade Hann-Caruthers, Maya Josyula, Omer Tamuz, Leeat Yariv:
Equitable Voting Rules. 315 - François Durand, Antonin Macé, Matías Núñez:
Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games. 317-320
Session 3b: Applied Matching Markets
- Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Noam Nisan, Lior Kovalio, Assaf Romm:
Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements. 321 - Surender Baswana, Partha Pratim Chakrabarti, Sharat Chandran, Yashodhan Kanoria, Utkarsh Patange:
Centralized Admissions for Engineering Colleges in India. 323-324 - José Correa, Rafael Epstein, Juan Escobar, Ignacio Rios, Bastián Bahamondes, Carlos Bonet, Natalie Epstein, Nicolas Aramayo, Martin Castillo, Andrés Cristi, Boris Epstein:
School Choice in Chile. 325-343 - Moshe Babaioff, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Assaf Romm:
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure. 345 - Ran I. Shorrer:
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes. 347-348 - Zhuoshu Li, Kelsey Lieberman, William Macke, Sofia Carrillo, Chien-Ju Ho, Jason Wellen, Sanmay Das:
Incorporating Compatible Pairs in Kidney Exchange: A Dynamic Weighted Matching Model. 349-367
Session 3c: Pricing and Contracts
- Paul Dütting, Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Simple versus Optimal Contracts. 369-387 - Ian Ball, Deniz Kattwinkel:
Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design. 389-390 - Amine Allouah, Omar Besbes:
Sample-Based Optimal Pricing. 391 - Omar Besbes, Adam N. Elmachtoub, Yunjie Sun:
Static Pricing: Universal Guarantees for Reusable Resources. 393-394 - Yiwei Chen, Stefanus Jasin:
Power of Dynamic Pricing in Revenue Management with Strategic (Forward-looking) Customers. 395 - John R. Birge, Yifan Feng, N. Bora Keskin, Adam Schultz:
Dynamic Learning and Market Making in Spread Betting Markets with Informed Bettors. 397-398
Session 3d: Joint session with 51st ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC)
- Jason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart:
Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms. 399-416 - Alexandros Psomas, Ariel Schvartzman, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Smoothed Analysis of Multi-Item Auctions with Correlated Values. 417-418 - Hu Fu, Christopher Liaw, Sikander Randhawa:
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue. 419-420
Session 4a: Networks
- Dean Eckles, Hossein Esfandiari, Elchanan Mossel, M. Amin Rahimian:
Seeding with Costly Network Information. 421-422 - Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao:
Influence Maximization on Undirected Graphs: Towards Closing the (1-1/e) Gap. 423-453 - Tianshu Sun, Sean J. Taylor:
Displaying Things in Common to Encourage Friendship Formation: A Large Randomized Field Experiment. 455 - Francesca Parise, Asuman E. Ozdaglar:
Graphon Games. 457-458
Session 4b: Cryptocurrency and Financial Markets
- Jonah Brown-Cohen, Arvind Narayanan, Alexandros Psomas, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols. 459-473 - Guy Goren, Alexander Spiegelman:
Mind the Mining. 475-487 - Amos Fiat, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Energy Equilibria in Proof-of-Work Mining. 489-502 - Yaarit Even, Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Xavier Vives:
Information and Learning in Heterogeneous Markets. 503
Session 4c: Fair Division
- Robert Bredereck, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Dusan Knop, Rolf Niedermeier:
High-Multiplicity Fair Allocation: Lenstra Empowered by N-fold Integer Programming. 505-523 - Simina Brânzei, Noam Nisan:
Communication Complexity of Cake Cutting. 525 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Nick Gravin, Xin Huang:
Envy-Freeness Up to Any Item with High Nash Welfare: The Virtue of Donating Items. 527-545 - Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. 547-548
Session 5a: Social Learning
- Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Segev Shlomov:
Robust Non-Bayesian Social Learning. 549-550 - Daniel Vial, Vijay G. Subramanian:
Local Non-Bayesian Social Learning with Stubborn Agents. 551-552 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Manuel Mueller-Frank:
Naive Learning Through Probability Matching. 553 - Gad Allon, Kimon Drakopoulos, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Information Inundation on Platforms and Implications. 555-556 - Itai Arieli, Moran Koren, Rann Smorodinsky:
The Implications of Pricing on Social Learning. 557-558
Session 5b: Routing and Ridesharing
- José Correa, Andrés Cristi, Tim Oosterwijk:
On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time. 559-577 - Roberto Cominetti, Marco Scarsini, Marc Schröder, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Price of Anarchy in Stochastic Atomic Congestion Games with Affine Costs. 579-580 - Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz:
Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars. 581-582 - Hongyao Ma, Fei Fang, David C. Parkes:
Spatio-Temporal Pricing for Ridesharing Platforms. 583 - Omar Besbes, Francisco Castro, Ilan Lobel:
Spatial Capacity Planning. 585
Session 5c: Applied Pricing
- Vincent Conitzer, Christian Kroer, Debmalya Panigrahi, Okke Schrijvers, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses, Chris Wilkens:
Pacing Equilibrium in First-Price Auction Markets. 587 - Mahsa Derakhshan, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme:
LP-based Approximation for Personalized Reserve Prices. 589 - Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter:
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces. 591-592 - Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken:
Cloud Pricing: The Spot Market Strikes Back. 593 - Navid Azizan Ruhi, Yu Su, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Adam Wierman:
Optimal Pricing in Markets with Non-Convex Costs. 595
Session 6a: Game Theory
- Soheil Behnezhad, Avrim Blum, Mahsa Derakhshan, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Saeed Seddighin:
Optimal Strategies of Blotto Games: Beyond Convexity. 597-616 - Mason Wright, Yongzhao Wang, Michael P. Wellman:
Iterated Deep Reinforcement Learning in Games: History-Aware Training for Improved Stability. 617-636 - Vidya Muthukumar, Anant Sahai:
Robust Commitments and Partial Reputation. 637-638 - Jiarui Gan, Haifeng Xu, Qingyu Guo, Long Tran-Thanh, Zinovi Rabinovich, Michael J. Wooldridge:
Imitative Follower Deception in Stackelberg Games. 639-657
Session 6b: Data Markets
- Yiling Chen, Shuran Zheng:
Prior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical Estimation. 659-677 - Sameer Mehta, Milind Dawande, Ganesh Janakiraman, Vijay S. Mookerjee:
How to Sell a Dataset?: Pricing Policies for Data Monetization. 679 - Parinaz Naghizadeh, Arunesh Sinha:
Adversarial Contract Design for Private Data Commercialization. 681-699 - Anish Agarwal, Munther A. Dahleh, Tuhin Sarkar:
A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solution. 701-726
Session 6c: Dynamic Algorithms
- Will Ma, David Simchi-Levi:
Tight Weight-dependent Competitive Ratios for Online Edge-weighted Bipartite Matching and Beyond. 727-728 - Itai Ashlagi, Maximilien Burq, Chinmoy Dutta, Patrick Jaillet, Amin Saberi, Chris Sholley:
Edge Weighted Online Windowed Matching. 729-742 - Shipra Agrawal, Randy Jia:
Learning in Structured MDPs with Convex Cost Functions: Improved Regret Bounds for Inventory Management. 743-744
Session 7a: Combinatorial Markets and Social Choice
- Christian Kroer, Alexander Peysakhovich, Eric Sodomka, Nicolás E. Stier Moses:
Computing Large Market Equilibria using Abstractions. 745-746 - Martin Bichler, Stefan Waldherr:
Computing Core-Stable Outcomes in Combinatorial Exchanges with Financially Constrained Bidders. 747 - Sébastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin:
Adaptive-Price Combinatorial Auctions. 749-750 - Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals. 751-752 - Haris Aziz, Anna Bogomolnaia, Hervé Moulin:
Fair Mixing: the Case of Dichotomous Preferences. 753-781 - Ron Lavi, Elisheva S. Shamash:
Principal-Agent VCG Contracts. 783
Session 7b: Fairness and Social Good
- Taylor Lundy, Alexander Wei, Hu Fu, Scott Duke Kominers, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization. 785-803 - Swati Gupta, Vijay Kamble:
Individual Fairness in Hindsight. 805-806 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan:
Simplicity Creates Inequity: Implications for Fairness, Stereotypes, and Interpretability. 807-808 - Sumegha Garg, Michael P. Kim, Omer Reingold:
Tracking and Improving Information in the Service of Fairness. 809-824 - Jon M. Kleinberg, Manish Raghavan:
How Do Classifiers Induce Agents to Invest Effort Strategically? 825-844 - Hadi Elzayn, Zachary Schutzman:
Price of Privacy in the Keynesian Beauty Contest. 845-863
Session 7c: Mechanism Design II
- Peter Troyan, Thayer Morrill:
Obvious Manipulations. 865 - Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility. 867 - Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors. 869-883 - Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility. 885-886 - Nick Gravin, Yaonan Jin, Pinyan Lu, Chenhao Zhang:
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations. 887-900 - Georgios Amanatidis, Pieter Kleer, Guido Schäfer:
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives: Offline and Online. 901-919
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